When the question of a “new age” is put to a philosopher there are two quite different ways in which he can define the issue and accordingly respond. On the one hand, he might construe his task as that of a clarifier of some general claim about cultural revolutions. From this perspective he would set about the task of analyzing the concept of a cultural revolution in terms of some loose analogue of necessary and sufficient conditions. These criteria having been laid down, he could then make suggestions as to whether or not those conditions obtain which would justify the claim that we are in the midst of such a cultural revolution. On the other hand, he might construe his charge more specifically as that of assessing the present state of his own field to see if something like a shift in perspective is manifest in this narrower domain. In this paper I am going to take the latter tack. I will, first, briefly survey the contemporary scene in philosophy to illustrate the “changing temper” I am to talk about; secondly, locate these phenomena in a broader historical context; and, thirdly, try to get at the reasons underlying the changes on which I am focusing. The major part of the paper will be devoted to the third point.

Objectives: The objectives were to ascertain the value of a range of methods—including clinical features, resting and exercise electrocardiography, and rapid access chest pain clinics (RACPCs)—used in the diagnosis and early management of acute coronary syndrome (ACS), suspected acute myocardial infarction (MI), and exertional angina.

The surface of the AlPdMn quasicrystal perpendicular to a fivefold axis has been probed by LEED, XPS, Auger spectroscopy and surface EXAFS.

It is my conviction that much of the criticism of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice misses its mark precisely because of a failure to appreciate the distinctive methodological structure of this work. I have three types of criticisms specifically in mind. First, the critic whose ultimate weapon is the counterexample. Secondly, the critic who focuses on one aspect of Rawls’ project without taking into account the whole theory. And thirdly, the critic who attempts to assess the theory absolutely rather than as one member of a set of welldefined alternatives. In this paper I hope to exhibit why these kinds of criticisms miss the mark, and I propose to do this indirectly by focusing on Rawls’ conception of philosophical method. Once this is exhibited, the relevance and irrelevance of certain kinds of criticisms becomes obvious. In my attempt to explicate Rawls’ conception of method, I will begin with his early methodological papers as providing the context within which the methodological structure of A Theory of justice should be viewed.