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The 2dF QSO Redshift Survey (2QZ) is now complete and available to the astronomical community (see www.2dfquasar.org). In this paper we review some of the principle science results to come from the survey, in particular concentrating on tests for cosmological parameters. Measurements of large-scale structure using the correlation function and power spectrum, together with determinations of the geometric distortion of clustering in redshift-space have been used. These produce a consistent picture which is well matched to the now standard cosmological model with Ωm ≃ 0.3 and ΩΛ ≃ 0.7. In particular, geometric distortions provide evidence for non-zero ΩΛ independent of type Ia supernovae, the CMB, or the assumed type of dark matter (e.g. CDM). However, gravitational lensing results in the form of potential arcminute separation lensed pairs and a stronger than expected anti-correlation between QSOs and foreground galaxies in groups and clusters may prove to be inconsistent with the current standard model. These issues certainly require further investigation.
The language of thought hypothesis is this: central among the causes of our behavior are inner states with linguistic structure that play roughly the role we pre-scientifically ascribe to our beliefs and desires. A philosophical thesis has been proposed on the basis of that scientific hypothesis- namely, that the way to explicate commonsense notions of the content of beliefs and desires, of their intentionality, is in terms of the meaning of such internal sentences. I am going to compare this explicative strategy with a certain functionalist theory of propositional attitudes, on which propositional attitude ascriptions of the form ‘x believes (desires) that —’ are explicatively more fundamental than anything linguistic and semantic. This is a modern dress version of an old dispute; but the issue is not between the naturalistic proponent of linguistic meaning and the antinaturalistic proponent of irreducible intentionality.
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