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Data preservation, reuse, and synthesis are important goals in contemporary archaeological research that have been addressed by the recent collaboration of the Eastern Archaic Faunal Working Group (EAFWG). We used the Digital Archaeological Record (tDAR) to preserve 60 significant legacy faunal databases from 23 Archaic period archaeological sites located in several contiguous subregions of the interior North American Eastern Woodlands. In order to resolve the problem of synthesizing non-standardized databases, we used the ontology and integration tools available in tDAR to explore comparability and combine datasets so that our research questions about aquatic resource use during the Archaic could be addressed at multiple scales. The challenges of making digital databases accessible for reuse, including the addition of metadata, and of linking disparate data in queryable datasets are significant but worth the effort. Our experience provides one example of how collaborative research may productively resolve problems in making legacy data accessible and usable for synthetic archaeological research.
Housing has been unjustifiably neglected in comparative welfare state research. The banking crisis of 2007–08, however, revealed how important housing, especially home ownership and the institutional structures of the mortgage market, has become to welfare state change. Securitisation of mortgages created a new circuit of global capital, while national mortgage markets became the conduit through which home owners were connected to this wave of globally sourced capital. In the UK, equity stored in owner-occupied property became much more fungible because of the very open/liberal mortgage market. As a result home owners began to ‘bank’ on their homes using it not only for consumption but increasingly as a financial safety net, a cushion against adversity and a means for securing access to privately supplied services and supporting their family's welfare needs across the life-course. This welfare state change – a move towards asset-based welfare – was historically and today remains underpinned by the emergence of the UK as a home-owning society.
Most debate on home ownership and risk has focused on the management of mortgage debt. But there are other risks for home buyers in settings where housing dominates people's wealth portfolios: where the investment dimensions of property are at a premium; and where housing wealth is, de facto, an asset base for welfare. This article draws from qualitative research with 150 UK mortgage holders to assess the character, extent and possible mitigation of this wider risk regime. The analysis first explores the value home buyers attach to the financial returns on housing. Next we document the extent to which home equity is earmarked and used as a financial buffer. Finally, reflecting on the merits and limitations of this tactic, we conclude by asking whether – in the interests of housing and social policy, as well as with a view to managing the economy – there is any need, scope or appetite for more actively sharing the financial risks and investment gains of housing systems anchored on owner-occupation.
A two-dimensional model for the flapping of an elastic flag under axial flow is described. The vortical wake is accounted for by the shedding of discrete point vortices with unsteady intensity, enforcing the regularity condition at the flag's trailing edge. The stability of the flat state of rest as well as the characteristics of the flapping modes in the periodic regime are compared successfully to existing linear stability and experimental results. An analysis of the flapping regime shows the co-existence of direct kinematic waves, travelling along the flag in the same direction as the imposed flow, and reverse dynamic waves, travelling along the flag upstream from the trailing edge.
Commercial appropriation of personality has generally been approached from two basic perspectives in the major common law and civil law jurisdictions analysed in the preceding chapters: (i) the unfair competition or intellectual property perspective aligning the problem most closely with the common forms of intellectual property rights such as patents, copyright and trade marks and (ii) the privacy and personality perspective, focusing on the damage to human dignity. The differences in substantive legal protection examined in the preceding chapters remain quite significant and a number of legal concepts have been employed to address the same basic problem. Despite these differences, a surprising number of common trends may be identified from the discussions of the individual systems. This chapter draws together some of the common features and patterns of development that emerge from the individual systems. While the developments have at times been systematic, they have more often been rather more haphazard, although they may be distilled into three basic models. These basic models inevitably attempt to reconcile the economic and non-economic aspects of personality, which often conflict in the development of intellectual property rights in aspects of personality. This is a problem that pervades the analysis in the preceding chapters and is summarised in a subsequent section. Finally, we examine the effects of European human rights law both in raising the threshold of protection for privacy interests and in marking the boundaries, which are often difficult to identify, between privacy and freedom of expression.
The term ‘privacy’ used in the common law literature corresponds in France to the topic of ‘protection of the personality’ or ‘rights of personality’. This concept is relatively new in French legal history, since it appeared only in the second half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the French civil code, or Code Napoléon of 1804, does not contain any provision concerning the protection of the personality. Rather, the most important theme of the Code civil is ‘property’, even if it has a philosophical connotation stemming directly from the natural rights doctrine.
As early as the middle of the nineteenth century, the reproduction of a person's likeness began to attract the attention of jurists and was soon considered to be the subject of an exclusive right, the exact nature of which remains, however, unclear. The judicial decision in the Rachel case, concerning a famous actress who was portrayed on her deathbed, is seen as the birth of the right to one's image in France. In this judgment, dated 16 June 1858, the civil court stated that
no one may, without the express consent of the family, reproduce and make available to the public the features of a person on his deathbed, however famous this person has been and however public his acts during his life have been; the right to oppose this reproduction is absolute; it flows from the respect the family's pain commands and it should not be disregarded; otherwise the most intimate and respectable feelings would be offended.
Four predominant approaches to problems of invasions of privacy may be identified. First, the adjustment of existing causes of action to cover invasions of privacy. The traditional common law approach has involved stretching statutory provisions and well-established torts such as defamation, trespass and the action for breach of confidence to embrace interests in privacy. Second, the piecemeal addition of new causes of action, either by reference to the circumstances in which liability is imposed (e.g., harassment or appropriation of personality) or by explicitly labelling them as invasions of privacy. A number of common law jurisdictions have adopted this piecemeal approach. Property and reputation remain the primary protected interest, and protection for other interests is parasitic. Third, a general remedy declaring that, in principle, every invasion of privacy is actionable, subject to necessary qualifications limiting recovery: this might be non-exhaustive, leaving the terms and scope open-ended or exhaustive, defining the terms and circumstances for recovery comprehensively. Fourth, the declaration that every person has a right to privacy in a general and open-ended way, without specifying the circumstances in which privacy can be invaded. English law has traditionally been reluctant to develop beyond the first two approaches. In the United States, the casuistic approach was abandoned in favour of a general remedy for invasion of privacy, cast rather unusually in rights based terminology. This is an approach which other common law systems have, thus far, refused to adopt.
Within the common law systems, the phrase ‘unfair competition’ is often used in three distinct ways: in the broadest sense, as a generic term to cover a wide range of legal and equitable causes of action dealing with unfair trading; as a synonym for the tort of passing off; and, finally, as a label for a general cause of action based on the misappropriation of valuable intangibles. The latter form of unfair competition emerged in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century, although it has been sparingly applied and has subsequently been confined, largely by the constitutional doctrine that federal statutory intellectual property rights such as copyright and patents are supreme and, in any conflict, pre-empt the application of state laws. Such a cause of action has been rejected by the English and Australian courts which refuse to protect ‘all the intangible elements of value … which may flow from the exercise by an individual of his powers or resources whether in the organization of a business or undertaking or the use of ingenuity, knowledge, skill or labour’. Intellectual property rights are dealt ‘as special heads of protected interests and not under a wide generalization’. The crucial factor will be whether an intangible falls within one of the discrete recognised categories, rather than the fact that the intangible creation has some form of value.
Cases concerning the commercial appropriation of personality have been decided by German courts since the early twentieth century. Generally, German judges have shown great sympathy for persons affected by unauthorised advertising or merchandising and have been prepared to grant effective protection, in contrast to the rather ambivalent attitude of the English courts. As early as 1910 the famous aviator, Count Zeppelin, could prevent the unauthorised registration of his name and portrait as a trade mark for tobacco. Subsequently an extensive body of case law has firmly established that persons are entitled to an injunction, to damages or to compensation for unjust enrichment, if their name, portrait or reputation is exploited without their consent.
Most of these judgments are based on the various personality rights recognised by German law. § 12 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code of 1900 – BGB) prohibits the unauthorised use of another person's name, § 22 of the Kunsturheberrechtsgesetz (Act on Copyright in Works of Visual Arts of 1907 – KUG) provides that a person's portrait may only be exhibited or disseminated with the depicted person's consent. Along with the moral rights granted by copyright legislation, these rights to one's name and to one's image are known as ‘specific personality rights’ (besondere Persönlichkeitsrechte). Before the 1950s, legal protection of the personality was limited to these specific rights.