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To people operating in India's economy, actually existing markets are remarkably different from how planners and academics conceive them. From the outside, they appear as demarcated arenas of exchange bound by state-imposed rules. As historical and social realities, however, markets are dynamic, adaptative, and ambiguous spaces. This book delves into this intricate context, exploring Indian markets through the competition and collaboration of those who frame and participate in markets. Anchored in vivid case studies – from colonial property and advertising milieus to today's bazaar and criminal economies – this volume underlines the friction and interdependence between commerce, society, and state. Contributors from history, anthropology, political economy, and development studies synthesize existing scholarly approaches, add new perspectives on Indian capitalism's evolution, and reveal the transactional specificities that underlie the real-world functioning of markets.
Among our greatest leaders are those driven by impulses they cannot completely control - by lust. Lust is not, however, an abstraction, it has definition. Definition that, given the impact of leaders who lust, is essential to extract. This book identifies six types of lust with which leaders are linked: 1. Power: the ceaseless craving to control. 2. Money: the limitless desire to accrue great wealth. 3. Sex: the constant hunt for sexual gratification. 4. Success: the unstoppable need to achieve. 5. Legitimacy: the tireless claim to identity and equity. 6. Legacy: the endless quest to leave a permanent imprint. Each of the core chapters focuses on different lusts and features a cast of characters who bring lust to life. In the real world leaders who lust can and often do have an enduring impact. This book therefore is counterintuitive - it focuses not on moderation, but on immoderation.
This book examines the birth of the scientific understanding of motion. It investigates which logical tools and methodological principles had to be in place to give a consistent account of motion, and which mathematical notions were introduced to gain control over conceptual problems of motion. It shows how the idea of motion raised two fundamental problems in the 5th and 4th century BCE: bringing together being and non-being, and bringing together time and space. The first problem leads to the exclusion of motion from the realm of rational investigation in Parmenides, the second to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Methodological and logical developments reacting to these puzzles are shown to be present implicitly in the atomists, and explicitly in Plato who also employs mathematical structures to make motion intelligible. With Aristotle we finally see the first outline of the fundamental framework with which we conceptualise motion today.
This chapter specifies the methods used in the book to studying the alliances between local and intervening counterinsurgency allies. Nine wars are examined in the book. Five wars are studied using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, including the USA in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam, as well as India in Sri Lanka and the USSR in Afghanistan. For these five wars, thousands of primary source US, Indian, and Soviet government documents describing the day-to-day workings of these alliances were examined and used to identify 460 specific policy requests, which were then incorporated in an original dataset tracking local compliance and other relevant variables. The coding rules for each variable are detailed in this chapter. The remaining four wars, namely Vietnam in Cambodia, Egypt in Yemen, Cuba in Angola, and Syria in Lebanon, rely on secondary historical accounts or primary source observations from outside actors such as US intelligence agencies.
Detailing the US intervention in Vietnam this chapter provides a list of policy requests from the USA to Vietnamese partners and the rate of Vietnamese compliance from 1964 to 1973. Providing a summary of the US-Vietnam counterinsurgency partnership, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the Vietnamese-US alliance, including detailing how the shock of the 1968 Tet Offensive led to a sharp increase in local compliance, suggesting that significant enemy activity can motivate clients to cooperate with the demands of intervening patrons. Overall, similar to other interventions, local compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of US and Vietnamese interests, interacting with US dependency on Saigon to implement particular reforms. There are 105 US policy requests identified and detailed, including pacification, reconciliation and development programs.
Detailing the US intervention in Afghanistan this chapter provides a list of policy requests from the USA to Afghan partners and the rate of Afghan compliance from 2001 to 2011. Providing a summary of the US-Afghan counterinsurgency partnership from the start of the US intervention to 2011, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the Afghan-US alliance, namely the tension between US and Afghan officials, and an unusual pattern of free riding in Afghanistan not observed in other interventions examined in the book. Afghan compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of US and Afghan interests, interacting with US dependency on Kabul to implement particular reforms. There are 148 US policy requests identified and detailed including working against corruption, expanding governance capacity, addressing counternarcotics, and aiding in development programs.
Large-scale military interventions are usually seen as foreign policy options limited to large powers. Yet, Vietnam, Egypt, Syria, and Cuba engaged in costly COIN interventions. Emerging from their own colonial histories, these smaller interveners offer a different perspective to interventions, drawing from their experiences of occupation, revolution, and insurgency. These wars reveal how alliance dynamics shift when the asymmetries in capabilities between allies are less significant than in the interventions examined previously. Smaller interveners rely less on technology and are more likely to maintain modest agendas for development. Vietnam in Cambodia and Egypt in Yemen embedded themselves into the local regimes they were aiding, thus ignoring the norm of promoting the legal sovereignty of local regimes. Syria in Lebanon aided multiple groups to assert its interests, as opposed to commandeering the government in Beirut, in part due to Israel’s efforts to constrain Damascus. Similarly, Cuban forces did not occupy the Angolan state, partly due to the USSR's influence, and partly as Castro’s anti-imperialist stance made the Cubans wary to appear as an occupying force.
Detailing the US intervention in Iraq, this chapter provides a list of policy requests from the USA to Iraqi partners and the rate of Iraqi compliance with US requests from 2004 to 2010. Providing a summary of the US-Iraqi counterinsurgency partnership (2003–11), this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the Iraqi-US alliance, namely the imperfect and awkward transition to Iraqi sovereignty and Washington negotiating with not one, but two local governments in Iraq, namely the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad, and the Kurdish Regional Government in Erbil. Iraqi compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of US and Iraqi interests, interacting with US dependency on Iraq to implement particular reforms. There are 106 US policy requests identified and detailed including working against sectarianism and corruption.
Summarizing, I detail the leverage sources for “weak” local COIN proxies. As postcolonial military intervention conceptualizes local partner regime success as a fundamental component of a successful foreign military intervention, local allies have much political influence over wealthy intervening patrons. Local allies that offer political inputs necessary for the COIN effort can capitalize on their indispensable role to extract concessions and assert influence over intervening wealthy patrons. Comparing the nine wars, I find consistency in local ally compliance, with one-third of requests from intervening forces resulting in compliance, one-third partial compliance, and one-third noncompliance. Interestingly, rates of local compliance had little impact on war outcome as intervening forces did not always offer great advice to local partners, and stronger local partners, such as Sri Lanka, that were more capable of combatting insurgents, could simultaneously resist the policy prescriptions of intervening patrons. These findings show the complexity of COIN by proxy, and should temper expectations about how much local reform can (and perhaps should) be coerced by intervening patrons.
I propose a model analyzing patterns in local compliance in response to requests from intervening COIN allies. I argue four primary variables affect the likelihood of compliance with policies proposed by intervening forces: (1) the capacity of the local partner to implement the requested policy, (2) whether the respective interests of the local and intervening forces converge or diverge over the policy, (3) the dependency of the intervening ally on the local regime to implement the requested policy, and (4) acute external threats from insurgent forces. The theory contends that these are key to understanding the seemingly curious behavior of local COIN partners, who at times seem to undermine the strength of a joint COIN effort by remaining obstinate against key reforms promoted by intervening patrons. Instead of presuming local allies comply with such requests when it is in their interest to do, and refuse when their interests diverge, I argue there is a specific pattern of interaction between interests, and the reliance of foreign intervening forces on local actors to implement policy, that affects the likelihood of compliance by local partners with policy demands.
Detailing the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka this chapter provides a list of policy requests from New Delhi to Colombo and the rate of Sri Lankan compliance from 1986 to 1989. Providing a summary of the Indian-Sri Lankan counterinsurgency partnership, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the alliance, including the unique dynamics of New Delhi initially supporting the Tamil insurgents to later sending troops into Tamil regions of Sri Lanka to fight Tamil separatists alongside representatives from the Sri Lankan regime in Colombo. An overestimation of its ability to coercively influence both the Tamil insurgents as a proxy faction and the government in Colombo as a proxy ally backfired, costing New Delhi both politically and militarily. Overall, similar to other interventions, local compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of Indian and Sri Lanka interests, interacting with Indian dependency on Colombo to implement particular policies. There are 79 Indian policy requests to Colombo identified and detailed, including electoral, law enforcement, and governance policies as well as policies to address Tamil grievances.
Introduces the big questions asked in this book, namely: When do intervening forces have coercive leverage over local partners in large-scale counterinsurgency interventions? When can local partners coerce their powerful patrons? What makes these partnerships so notoriously problematic? This chapter specifies why local allies matter in counterinsurgency and what political dynamics have changed from the colonial to postcolonial era of intervention, including the effect of local partners exercising (nominal) legal sovereignty that provides important political opportunities for local partners. The chapter also summarizes the argument that certain structural incentives embedded within intervention motivate local counterinsurgency proxies to comply with certain requests from intervening patrons, while defying others, detailing that the record on local compliance is varied.