Research into the organization of the firm typically contrasts family businesses with impersonal corporate structures, and kinship ties among corporate elites are often associated with inefficiency and corruption. This analysis of over 14,000 equity investors and executive officers finds that familial networks were embedded in early corporations, not just among directors but also among small shareholders in the firm. Related investing was especially prominent among women and other relatively disadvantaged groups. Personal ties in newer, riskier enterprises encouraged capital mobilization in emerging ventures and persistence in shareholding, and related investing was significantly associated with lower risk of corporate bank failures. The results support a more positive view of family networks in business organizations and in overall economic development.

The French economy has been criticized for a lack of integration of women in business and for the prevalence of inefficient family firms. A sample drawn from patent and exhibition records is used to examine the role of women in enterprise and invention in France. Middle-class women were extensively engaged in entrepreneurship and innovation, and the empirical analysis indicates that their commercial efforts were significantly enhanced by association with family firms. Such formerly invisible achievements suggest a more productive role for family-based enterprises, as a means of incorporating relatively disadvantaged groups into the market economy as managers and entrepreneurs.

Prizes for innovations are currently experiencing a renaissance, following their marked decline during the nineteenth century. Debates about such incentive mechanisms tend to employ canonical historical anecdotes to motivate and support the analysis and policy proposals. Daguerre's “patent buyout,” the Longitude Prize, inducement prizes for butter substitutes and billiard balls, the activities of the Royal Society of Arts and other “encouragement” institutions—all comprise potentially misleading case studies. The article surveys and summarizes extensive empirical research using samples drawn from Britain, France, and the United States, including “great inventors” and their ordinary counterparts, and prizes at industrial exhibitions. The results suggest that administered systems of rewards to innovators suffered from a number of disadvantages in design and practice, which might be inherent to their nonmarket orientation.

An extensive global market in patents and innovations developed after the middle of the nineteenth century. I employ data from the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, New South Wales, Spain, and Japan during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to assess the evolution of transfers in patent-property rights across these countries. The empirical analysis examines the factors that affected patterns in patent assignments and foreign patenting for these countries. It sheds further light on cross-sectional variation in foreign patenting and transfers to corporations, based on a panel data set of patent grants and assignments at issue in the United States during the Second Industrial Revolution. The results indicate that, just as inventive activity responded to incentives, the patterns of market exchange in patent rights varied in accordance with legal, economic, and institutional parameters. The analysis is consistent with the position that developing countries today might benefit from tailoring their patent institutions to individual circumstances rather than adhering to harmonized standards.

I examine the evolution of conflict and cooperation during economic growth by analyzing civil disputes in New South Wales between 1860 and 1900. Disputes per capita fell over time and the proportion of cases settled before trial increased, but patterns varied across locations and types of disputes. Economic conflicts were likelier to be settled than personal disputes, and the fraction of cases settled was significantly lower in frontier areas and in districts without access to transportation. The results suggest that increased market exchange facilitates the development of informal rules and encourages transactors to find cooperative solutions through private bargaining.

Nineteenth-century laws granted wives previously withheld rights to their own property and earnings as well as liability for debts and contracts. I use 4,198 women's patents to assess whether these laws encouraged greater female commercial activity. Patentees were motivated by potential profits and were responsive to market incentives. Women's patenting jumped significantly in states with legal reforms and was lowest in states without such laws. Much of the subsequent increase occurred in metropolitan centers where property rights were of greater concern. Thus, by reducing transactions costs and increasing expected benefits, legal reforms arguably stimulated women's investments in patenting and commercial activities.

Economic development depends on the establishment of appropriate institutions, such as a patent system that defends property rights in inventions. Skeptics argue that patents in early America were unenforceable because judges arbitrarily ruled against patentees. I examine 795 patent cases to assess the role of the courts and find that judges protected patent rights because they believed that inventors were motivated by expected returns. Although changes occurred in the 1850s, the courts consistently upheld the view that the patent system fostered economic growth. If inventive activity indeed responded to material incentives, this finding implies that the legal system stimulated technical change by reinforcing the effectiveness of the patent system.

The laws of the United States are extremely favorable to the division of property.

—Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America

The growth in inventive activity during early American industrialization is explored by examining the careers of 160 inventors credited with important technological discoveries. Analysis of biographical information and complete patent histories through 1865 indicates that these “great inventors” were entrepreneurial and responded systematically to market demand. Their inventions were procyclical and originated disproportionately from localities linked with extensive markets. Although unexceptional in terms of schooling or technical skills, they vigorously pursued the returns to their inventions, redirected their inventive activity to meet emerging needs, and were distinguished by high geographical mobility toward districts conducive to invention and its commercialization.

The skills and knowledge necessary for patentable invention during early American industrialization were widely dispersed among the general population. This endowment permitted a rather elastic supply of patentable ideas over the relevant range as the expansion of markets induced more individuals to invent and innovate.Although a broadening of the ranks of patentees was primarily responsible for the initial acceleration of patenting, the importance of patentees with greater long-term investments in inventive activity increased during later stages of development.