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We implemented universal SARS-CoV-2 testing of patients undergoing surgical procedures as a means to conserve personal protective equipment (PPE). The rate of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection was <0.5%, and suggests that early local public health interventions were successful. While our protocol was resource-intensive, it prevented exposures to healthcare team members.
A well-functioning democracy requires a degree of mutual respect and a willingness to talk across political divides. Yet numerous studies have shown that many electorates are polarized along partisan lines, with animosity towards the partisan out-group. This article further develops the idea of affective polarization, not by partisanship, but instead by identification with opinion-based groups. Examining social identities formed during Britain's 2016 referendum on European Union membership, the study uses surveys and experiments to measure the intensity of partisan and Brexit-related affective polarization. The results show that Brexit identities are prevalent, felt to be personally important and cut across traditional party lines. These identities generate affective polarization as intense as that of partisanship in terms of stereotyping, prejudice and various evaluative biases, convincingly demonstrating that affective polarization can emerge from identities beyond partisanship.
Approximately, 1.7 million individuals in the United States have been infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus responsible for the novel coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19). This has disproportionately impacted adults, but many children have been infected and hospitalised as well. To date, there is not much information published addressing the cardiac workup and monitoring of children with COVID-19. Here, we share the approach to the cardiac workup and monitoring utilised at a large congenital heart centre in New York City, the epicentre of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.
For a test to be useful, it must be informative; that is, it must (at least some of the time) give different results depending on what is going on. In Chapter 1, we said we would simplify (at least initially) what is going on into just two homogeneous alternatives, D+ and D−. In this chapter, we consider the simplest type of tests, dichotomous tests, which have only two possible results (T+ and T−).
A test should give the same or similar results when administered repeatedly to the same individual within a time too short for real biological variation to take place. Results should be consistent whether the test is repeated by the same observer or instrument or by different observers or instruments. This desirable characteristic of a test is called “reliability” or “reproducibility.”
We have learned how to quantify the accuracy of dichotomous (Chapter 2) and multilevel (Chapter 3) tests. In this chapter, we turn to critical appraisal of studies of diagnostic test accuracy, with an emphasis on problems with study design that affect the interpretation or credibility of the results. After a general discussion of an approach to studies of diagnostic tests, we will review some common biases to which studies of test accuracy are uniquely or especially susceptible and conclude with an introduction to systematic reviews of test accuracy studies.
While screening tests share some features with diagnostic tests, they deserve a chapter of their own because of important differences. Whereas we generally do diagnostic tests on sick people to determine the cause of their symptoms, we generally do screening tests on healthy people with a low prior probability of disease. The problems of false positives and harms of treatment loom larger. In Chapter 4, on evaluating studies of diagnostic test accuracy, we assumed that accurate diagnosis would lead to better outcomes. The benefits and harms of screening tests are so closely tied to the associated treatments that it is hard to evaluate diagnosis and treatment separately. Instead, we compare outcomes such as mortality between those who receive the screening test and those who don’t. We postponed our discussion of screening until after our discussion of randomized trials because randomized trials are a key element in the evaluation of screening tests. Finally, because decisions about screening are often made at the population level, political and other nonmedical factors are more influential. Thus, in this chapter, we focus explicitly on the question of whether doing a screening test improves health, not just on how it alters disease probabilities, and we pay particular attention to biases and nonmedical factors that can lead to excessive screening.1
In previous chapters, we discussed issues affecting evaluation and use of diagnostic tests: how to assess test reliability and accuracy, how to combine the results of tests with prior information to estimate disease probability, and how a test’s value depends on the decision it will guide and the relative cost of errors. In this chapter, we move from diagnosing prevalent disease to predicting incident outcomes. We will discuss the difference between diagnostic tests and risk predictions and then focus on evaluating predictions, specifically covering calibration, discrimination, net benefit calculations, and decision curves.
As we noted in the Preface and Chapter 1, because the purpose of doing diagnostic tests is often to determine how to treat the patient, we may need to quantify the effects of treatment to decide whether to do a test. For example, if the treatment for a disease provides a dramatic benefit, we should have a lower threshold for testing for that disease than if the treatment is of marginal or unknown efficacy. In Chapters 2, 3, and 6, we showed how the expected benefit of testing depends on the treatment threshold probability (PTT = C/[C + B]) in addition to the prior probability and test characteristics. In this chapter, we discuss how to quantify the benefits and harms of treatments (which determine C and B) using the results of randomized trials. In Chapter 9, we will extend the discussion to observational studies of treatment efficacy; in Chapter 10, we will look at screening tests themselves as treatments and how to quantify their efficacy.
In the previous two chapters, we discussed using the results of randomized trials and observational studies to estimate treatment effects. We were primarily interested in measures of effect size and in problems with design (in randomized trials) and confounding (in observational studies) that could bias effect estimates. We did not focus on whether the apparent treatment effects could be a result of chance or attempt to quantify the precision of our effect estimates. The statistics used to help us with these issues − P-values and confidence intervals – are the subject of this chapter.
We wrestled for a long time with the question of whether to include the term “evidence-based” in the title of the first edition of this book. Although both of us are firm believers in the principles and goals of evidence-based medicine (EBM), as articulated by its first proponents we also knew that the term “evidence-based” would be viewed negatively by some potential readers [2–4]. We decided to keep “evidence-based” in the title and use this chapter to directly address some of the criticisms of EBM, many of which we believe have merit. We also recognize that, as elegant and satisfying as evidence-based diagnosis is, there are some very real cognitive barriers to applying it in a clinical setting. These barriers are the second topic of this chapter. Finally, we end the book with some thoughts on the future of evidence-based diagnosis and why it will be increasingly important.