We link equity and treasury bond markets via an informational channel. When macroeconomic state shifts are more probable, informed traders are more likely to have valid signals about fundamentals, so that uninformed traders are less willing to trade against informed ones. This implies low volume and high volatility, that is, a high volatility–volume ratio (VVR). Central banks react to state shifts, but their actions are uncertain. Therefore, a higher state shift likelihood implies larger bond risk premia. These arguments together imply that VVR should positively predict bond excess returns. We empirically test and confirm this prediction, both in- and out-of-sample.

We examine the role of macroeconomic uncertainty in the cross section of corporate bonds and find a significant uncertainty premium for both investment-grade (IG) (0.40% per month) and non-investment-grade (NIG) (0.81% per month) bonds. The economic-uncertainty premium declines as we progressively remove downgraded bonds, indicating that the premium represents an increase in required returns for bonds with higher credit and macroeconomic risk. The economic-uncertainty premia vary across equities and bonds in a manner consistent with the heterogeneous risk-aversion levels of dominant players in equities (retail investors) versus bonds (institutional investors).

Corporate bond returns exhibit predictability in a manner consistent with efficient pricing. Many equity characteristics, such as accruals, standardized unexpected earnings, and idiosyncratic volatility, do not impact bond returns. Profitability and asset growth are negatively related to corporate bond returns. Because firms that are profitable or have high asset growth (and hence more collateral) should be less risky, with lower required returns, the evidence accords with the risk–reward paradigm. Past equity returns are positively related to bond returns, indicating that equities lead bonds. Cross-sectional bond return predictors generally do not provide materially high Sharpe ratios after accounting for trading costs.

Price declines over the previous quarter lead to stronger reversals across the subsequent 2 months. We explain this finding based on the dual notions that liquidity provision can influence reversals and that agents who act as de facto liquidity providers may be less active in past losers. Supporting these observations, we find that active institutions participate less in losing stocks and that the magnitude of monthly return reversals fluctuates with changes in the number of active institutional investors. Thus, we argue that fluctuations in liquidity provision with past return performance account for the link between return reversals and past returns.

Efficiency in the capital markets requires that capital flows are sufficient to arbitrage anomalies away. We examine the relation between flows to a quantitative (quant) strategy that is based on capital market anomalies and the subsequent performance of this strategy. When these flows are high, quant funds are able to implement arbitrage strategies more effectively, which in turn leads to lower profitability of market anomalies in the future, and vice versa. Thus, the degree of cross-sectional equity market efficiency varies across time with the availability of arbitrage capital.

We consider whether sentiment affects the profitability of momentum strategies. We hypothesize that news that contradicts investors’ sentiment causes cognitive dissonance, slowing the diffusion of such news. Thus, losers (winners) become underpriced under optimism (pessimism). Short-selling constraints may impede arbitraging of losers and thus strengthen momentum during optimistic periods. Supporting this notion, we empirically show that momentum profits arise only under optimism. An analysis of net order flows from small and large trades indicates that small investors are slow to sell losers during optimistic periods. Momentum-based hedge portfolios formed during optimistic periods experience long-run reversals.

This paper examines the relation between information transmission and cross-autocorrelations. We present a simple model, where informed trading is transmitted from large to small stocks with a lag. In equilibrium, large stock illiquidity induced by informed trading portends stronger cross-autocorrelations. Empirically, we find that the lead-lag relation increases with lagged large stock illiquidity. Further, the lead from large stock order flows to small stock returns is stronger when large stock spreads are higher. In addition, this lead-lag relation is stronger before macro announcements (when information-based trading is more likely) and weaker afterward (when information asymmetries are lower).

Previous studies of Treasury market illiquidity span short time periods and focus on particular maturities. In contrast, we study the time series of illiquidity for different maturities over an extended period of time. We also compare time-series determinants of on-the-run and off-the-run illiquidity. Illiquidity increases and the difference between spreads of long- and short-term bonds significantly widens during recessions, suggesting a “flight to liquidity,” wherein investors shift into the more liquid short-term bonds during economic contractions. Macroeconomic variables such as inflation and federal funds rates forecast off-the-run illiquidity significantly but have only modest forecasting ability for on-the-run illiquidity. Bond returns across maturities are forecastable by off-the-run but not on-the-run bond illiquidity. Thus, off-the-run illiquidity, by reflecting macro shocks first, is the primary source of the liquidity premium in the Treasury market.

We study the consumption-investment problem of an agent with a constant relative risk aversion preference function, who possesses noisy information about the future prospects of a stock. We also solve for the value of information to the agent in closed form. We find that information can significantly alter consumption and asset allocation decisions. For reasonable parameter ranges, information increases consumption in the vicinity of 25%. Information can shift the portfolio weight on a stock from 0% to around 70%. Thus, depending on the stock beta, the weight on the market portfolio can be considerably reduced with information, causing the appearance of underdiversification. The model indicates that stock holdings of informed agents are positively related to wealth, unrelated to systematic risk, and negatively related to idiosyncratic uncertainty. We also show that the dollar value of information to the agent depends linearly on his wealth and decreases with both the propensity to intermediate consumption and risk aversion.

A significant but unresolved question in the current debate about the role of intermediaries in financial markets is whether intermediaries behave as passive traders or whether they actively seek and trade on information. We address this issue by explicitly comparing the informational advantages of intermediaries with those of other investors in the market. We find that intermediaries account for greater price discovery than other institutional and individual investors in spite of initiating fewer trades and volume. Furthermore, intermediary information does not arise from inappropriate handling of customer orders by intermediaries. We propose that our findings are consistent with noisy rational expectations models, where agents extract valuable information from past prices. Intermediaries bear little or no opportunity cost of monitoring market conditions, which gives them an advantage in making profitable price-contingent trades. Lower trading costs may also enable intermediaries to trade more effectively and frequently on their information.

We analyze the price reaction to analysts' revisions by testing the Griffin and Tversky (1992) hypothesis that agents place emphasis on the strength of the signal (the dramatic nature of the event) and may de-emphasize the weight (the ability of the analyst making the recommendation). Two attributes, namely, years of experience and the reputation of the analysts' brokerage houses form proxies for analyst ability (or weight) that we validate by documenting that revisions by high ability analysts outperform those by low ability ones. We find evidence of return persistence following small (low strength) revisions by high ability analysts and the opposite return pattern following large (high strength) revisions of low ability analysts, consistent with the arguments of Griffin and Tversky (1992). Our study provides an empirical link between evidence on individual decision making and stock market returns, and also helps promote an understanding of the analyst industry as well as its interaction with the investing population.

This paper investigates the effect of company brand perceptions on investor propensities to hold stocks. We find that, after controlling for other determinants of stockholdings, there is a negative and significant cross-sectional relation between institutional holdings and brand visibility, which is consistent with the notion that individual investors prefer to invest in stocks with easily recognized products. Furthermore, we find that institutional holdings are positively related to firm size and beta. Our analysis supports the notion that institutional portfolios eschew relatively neglected small firms, whereas individuals prefer holding stocks with high recognition and, consequently, greater information precision.

Data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange identify the originator of each submitted order, and there are no designated dealers or specialists. We study marketable order imbalances, i.e., the net order flow resulting from trades that demand immediacy. We distinguish imbalances by trader type (individuals, domestic institutions, foreign institutions) and by the usual size of each trader's order. Day-to-day persistence in order imbalance is strongest for small foreign institutions and weakest for large individual traders. Such persistence emanates both from splitting orders over time and from herding, and there is little evidence that aggregate price pressures from such persistence last beyond a trading day, indicating that de facto market making is quite effective. We attempt to discern which types of traders are de facto liquidity providers, which are likely to be informed, and which trade for liquidity reasons. The evidence indicates that all trader classes are successful market makers, large domestic institutions conduct the most informed trades, and large individuals are noise or liquidity traders.