Introduction

The outbreak of COVID-19 in 2019 has affected the quality of life of individuals all over the world. The direct effects include being infected by the virus, whether asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, or being severely ill and even loss their life. Family suffering, financial loss, and the inability of health facilities to accommodate the rapidly rising cases have aggravated the misery of those being exposed to the virus.

The indirect effects are experienced through various health protocols, including restrictions on population mobility and universal face masking to limit the spread of the virus. These indirect effects may influence people's livelihood, day-to-day behaviour, and mental health. The vulnerable groups (such as the poor, older persons, pregnant women, and persons with disabilities) may suffer much more, facing difficult choices between being exposed to the virus by continuing their usual daily activities or going hungry by staying at home and losing their income.

Among these vulnerable groups, older persons with a hearing disability may suffer more. Policies to curb the spread of infection bring difficulties in face-to-face communication for persons with hearing disabilities (Sher et al. 2020). The mask muddles sound and hides the movement of the lip (Trecca et al. 2020; Huzlen and Fabry 2020). Physical distancing also prevents people with hearing disabilities from communicating well with others as distance reduces the clarity of voice (Huzlen and Fabry 2020). Furthermore, restriction on meeting other persons physically results in having fewer opportunities to obtain assistance in daily conversation.

Therefore, older persons with hearing disabilities are much more precarious, vulnerable and marginalized than others during the COVID-19 pandemic. The challenges are accentuated in the absence of affordable effective hearing aids and limited or even non-existence of sign language.

Nevertheless, hearing disability during the pandemic is one of the most often neglected topics in research and policymaking, although the disability has far-reaching consequences on the quality of life (Nuesse et al. 2021), prosperity of the community, and government policies (WHO 2021; McDaida et al. 2021). This study examines the magnitude and prevalence of hearing disability among older persons, their demographic diversity and hearing disability impacts on the quality of life.

This book is an attempt to understand socio-economic development in contemporary Brunei Darussalam, which highlights the country’s journey in diversification from the dominant oil and gas sectors. The book makes an important contribution to the handful of publications on Brunei and fills in the absence of a comprehensive analysis on socio-economic issues in Brunei.

The publication of this book comes at an important era of the twenty-first century, as Brunei is on its halfway mark towards its Vision 2035. The goal of economic diversification remains vital to Brunei’s long-term economic growth but, at the same time, is dramatically shifting toward a more varied structure of production and trade with a view to creating jobs, increasing productivity, and improving the resource efficiency of infrastructure and quality of life.

This is a reference book for students, academics, entrepreneurs, policymakers within and outside Brunei, as well as for general readers who are interested to know about the socio-economic conditions in contemporary Brunei.

The book is a product of the Centre for Advanced Research (CARe), under the leadership of former Director Dr Chang-Yau Hoon; in collaboration with the Institute of Policy Studies, under the leadership of Director Dr Mahani Hamdan; and with the support of colleagues from various faculties at Universiti Brunei Darussalam. As a premier empirical research centre at UBD, CARe has three missions: first is to develop research and data resources that address social issues in Brunei. Second is to be a platform for local and international interdisciplinary research collaboration. And third is to provide professional training to graduate students, university staff and researchers from various sectors. This book is a collective effort to address these missions at CARe.

This book would have never been possible without the strong dedication of the authors and conducive research environment provided by Universiti Brunei Darussalam. We are indebted to the unflagging support of the Vice Chancellor of UBD, Dr Hazri bin Haji Kifle; and the current Director of CARe, Dr Siti Mazidah binti Haji Mohamad. We would like to express our appreciation to the editorial team at ISEAS Publishing for providing us with constructive comments on the draft of the book and their willingness to co-publish it with UBD.

WHY DIVERSIFICATION IS NEEDED FOR OIL-DEPENDENT ECONOMIES?

The existence of oil and gas is often seen as a blessing for a country (Fasano 2002; Wright and Czelusta 2004). The revenue from oil and gas can be used to build human capital, including the promotion of entrepreneurship spirit and broadening of the economic base to create sustainable development. However, in most developing countries with abundant natural resources, the paradox of the plenty and resource curse (“Theory of Dutch Disease”) from huge reliance on revenue from oil and gas reserves may also distort the resource allocation of a country (including creation of dominance of public sector employment). It therefore jeopardizes future economic growth and stability of the country (Beblawi 1987; Mahdavy 1970). Based on a study on Saudi Arabia, Aljarallah (2021) concluded that the abundance of oil and gas will produce sustainable economic growth only when the country can utilize the current gain from oil and gas to enhance human capital, which eventually replaces oil and gas as the capital of economic growth.

Furthermore, the price volatility of oil and gas and its recent decline in the past decade, as well as the prospect of depletion of hydrocarbon reserves, and the global trend toward climate-neutral economies may endanger the energy future and sustainability of oil and gas exporting economies. Therefore, oil-dependent economies urgently need to diversify, while efficiently developing themselves using the remaining revenue from oil and gas (Alsharif et al. 2017; Callen et al. 2014; Filimonova et al. 2020; Hussein 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a decline in global demand for oil and gas, may have resulted in dual shock (i.e., economic and health crises) in oil-dependent countries. This situation further escalates the need for diversification from oil and gas sectors (Azomahou et al. 2021).

Brunei Darussalam (hereafter, Brunei), the least populous and the second richest country in Southeast Asia, is one of the examples of an oil and gas dependent economy (Asiyah az-Zahra 2017; Hamdan and Hoon 2019). Since independence in 1984, this country’s national income has heavily relied on hydrocarbon resources, although plans for diversification and investment in renewables have been underway for decades.

INTRODUCTION

There are three main characteristics of a rentier state. First, oil revenues are paid to governments in the form of rent. Second, oil revenues are externally generated from exports. Third, oil revenues are directly accumulated by the state (Benli 2014). Furthermore, in order to qualify as a rentier state, oil should account for at least 40 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Usually, only a small percentage deals directly with the extraction of the natural resources. The majority participates in the distribution and utilization of the natural resources (Belbawi 1987).

Brunei is therefore a rentier state; its vast income from oil and natural gas provides its basis as a rentier state. It is among the world’s most dependent economies on oil and gas, which accounts for around half of its GDP and 90 per cent of export revenues (Department of Economic Planning and Statistics 2020a). Revenues from oil and gas have made the GDP per capita levels in Brunei the second highest in Southeast Asia (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2018).

Mahdavy (1970) and Beblawi (1987) argued that overdependence on oil revenues can have negative political, economic and social impacts on a rentier state. On the economic side, it can cause enclaved development which is termed a “resource curse” or “Dutch Disease” whereby the booming oil sector distorts the growth of other sectors. The role of most rentier states is largely limited to the distribution of rent earnings among the population by providing goods and services for the community welfare and by acting as the major employer in the country.

Brunei is not an exception. Employment in the government sector entails high incomes and is a major vehicle for redistributing the rents from oil revenues. In 2019, the public sector employed 33.78 per cent of the country’s total employed persons. It employs more locals—49.53 per cent of the total locals employed—compared to non-locals who constitute 2.5 per cent of the total non-local employed persons in Brunei. It should be noted that the 66.50 per cent of the total employed persons are locals.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the population dynamics of a region is crucial to any examination of its socio-economic development. This chapter examines the population dynamics in the SIJORI (Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands) Cross-Border Region with a focus on the key years of 1990, 2010 and 2030. Official data is used for 1990 and 2010, and projections are made for 2030.

The accuracy and relevance of any statistical analysis depends on the data used. Therefore, understanding the sources and quality of the data is the first important step towards interpreting the demographic situation in any country or region. As SIJORI is an aggregation of three countries with different systems of collecting and publishing statistics, this chapter will devote some space to making these statistics consistent and comparable, as well as explaining their implications. The data will provide perspectives on the region's total population and its distribution within it from 1990 to 2010, as well as demonstrate how SIJORI will change demographically with respect to its population size, age-sex-ethnic composition, and geographical distribution by 2030. The projections for the year 2030 will be based mostly on official government projections, with some modifications. Three main demographic indicators will be examined, namely, fertility, mortality, and migration in SIJORI, followed by a discussion of the population's sex ratio, as well as age and ethnic composition from 2010 to 2030. This chapter will conclude with an evaluation of the implications of the changes in SIJORI's demographic characteristics.

TRANSIENT POPULATION AND POPULATION PROJECTION

There are two ways to measure population — de facto and de jure. De facto measurements entail counting all individuals who happen to be present in a given area at a given time. De jure refers to the “usual residence” of individuals by applying a minimum period of time in an area before they are recorded as living there. Individuals who do not meet the minimum period of stay are considered part of the “transient population” and are not recorded in the population census.

Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia follow the de jure approach, albeit with some differences. The threshold in Johor and the Province of Riau Islands (hereafter called PRI) is six months. In these cases, individuals who stay at least six months or who intend to stay for more than six months are recorded as part of the population (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2005; Badan Pusat Statistik 2009).

LIFE OF OLDER PERSONS

It is a very hot day in an overly-crowded and polluted street in Jakarta. When the traffic light turns red, out of nowhere a group of people emerge and start approaching the cars and motorcycles, begging for money. This group includes some older men and women who have resorted to begging so as to make ends meet. In Singapore, another big city in Southeast Asia, older men and women do “odd jobs” such as cleaning dirty tables at hawker centres and public toilets. Is this the kind of employment older people are expected to take on in some parts of Southeast Asia?

In contrast, there are many older men and women in Indonesia who do not do “anything”. They live in beautiful houses; they travel a lot for leisure; and they have rich children to support them. One older man works for a family business run by his son; he enjoys the work, not because of the money, but because of the nature of the job and also because it keeps him occupied. He also partakes in the profit from this business. Moreover his wife enjoys her leisure; she pursues her time exercising, visiting friends, meeting her children, children-in-law, and grandchildren. A question arises regarding the kinds of activities one would expect older persons to engage in. We could also ask if an older person who engages in wage work is better off than someone who does not? In essence, what kind of life should older persons be leading?

This chapter represents a preliminary attempt to provide the first and important step at answering that question, by analysing the employment patterns of older women in Indonesia. It provides information on what the older persons, particularly older women, do within and outside the labour market. The analysis relies on a national data set collected in 2007. Therefore, readers need to be careful when generalizing the findings in this chapter beyond 2007.

This chapter uncovers new demographic evidence of ethnic diversity in Indonesia. As listed in Chapter 3, the 2010 population census recorded a very large number of ethnic categories and we reclassified them into a New Classification of ethnic groups. With this classification, this chapter presents and discusses the ethnic composition in Indonesia as a whole and within each province. First, it examines the ethnic composition at the national level by limiting itself to the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia. These fifteen ethnic groups already formed a very large portion of the total citizens in Indonesia, accounting for 84.9 per cent in 2010.

Second, it analyses the ethnic diversity in each of the 33 provinces. This discussion at the provincial level better shows Indonesia's ethnic diversity. It details various degrees of heterogeneity amongst provinces. It then provides an expanded list of ethnic groups to capture a more comprehensive view of Indonesia's ethnic spread as a whole, by combining all large ethnic groups within the provinces. Finally, this chapter reveals the degree of “ubiquity” of the ethnic groups amongst the various provinces in Indonesia.

Amongst other things, this chapter also discusses local ethnic groups versus migrant ethnic groups in each province to provide a glimpse into migration phenomena. Local ethnic groups are defined as the people who originate in a province although nowadays they may live in many other provinces in Indonesia or overseas. On the other hand, migrant ethnic groups are defined as those who did not identify themselves as one of the local ethnic groups in the provinces where they live. They may just have arrived in Province A some years earlier, they may not have been born in this province, but it is also possible that they were born in Province A and have been in Province A for many generations. As long as they identify themselves with an ethnic group originating from outside Province A, these respondents are called migrant ethnic groups.

Furthermore, although the number and percentage of foreigners are still small, the presence of foreigners is likely to increase and hence play an important role in future interaction with the people of Indonesia (Ananta and Arifin 2014). Therefore, this chapter discusses the demography of the foreigners before elaborating on the ethnic composition in each province. This is the first detailed demographic study on foreigners in Indonesia, another first for this book.

This chapter elaborates on the various ethnic group populations, who can be seen as both consumers and producers of development. Specifically, the chapter examines the age-sex and geographical distribution of these ethnic groups. These data are especially useful for marketing and for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. In democratizing Indonesia, this knowledge is also very important for analysing electoral behaviour and understanding geopolitics.

In Chapter 4, we showed how we have classified 145 ethnic groups as belonging either to the ten largest, the fifteen largest or the twenty-five largest ethnic groups in the various provinces. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all of these groups in detail. Instead, we focus here on the age-sex structure (often called the population pyramid) and the geographical distribution of the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia in 2010.

LIFE-CYCLE APPROACH

Following a life-cycle approach, we disaggregate the population into different stages, each with a different impact on society and the economy. In this book, we classify a population into five age groups: infants and toddlers (0–4), children (5–14), youths (15–24), prime-working-age adults (25–59) and older persons (60 years and above).

Infants and toddlers (0–4) are highly physically and financially dependent and potential recipients of health services in their early years. They need caregivers to support them. Children (5–14) are also potential ‘customers’, as they are financially dependent on adults. At these ages, they cost their parents most in terms of their education. Altogether, the population aged 0–14 potentially burdens the economy with spending on health and education. At the same time, this expenditure can also be seen as investment in human capital for the nation.

Next to the dependent infants, toddlers and children are the youths (15–24). This group can be costly if the parents have higher aspirations to provide their children with tertiary education (until age 24). Therefore, youths may be added to the group of dependants (infants, toddlers and young children). In addition, youths are in transition to adulthood, ranging from entering the labour market, searching for a partner, starting a career and building a family. The youth bulge, often associated with negative things such as crime, is defined when the percentage of youths exceeds 20 per cent.

The top part of the population pyramid is the group of older persons, aged 60 years and above.