Search

from Part II - Perceptual Development

Edited by Jeffrey J. Lockman, Tulane University, Louisiana, Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda, New York University
Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Infant Development
Published online: 26 September 2020
Print publication: 13 August 2020, pp 238-262
- Chapter
- Export citation
View extract

Summary

Touch occupies a greater extent of our bodies than all other senses put together (see Gallace & Spence, 2014, for a rich characterization of touch). The skin, our organ of cutaneous touch, is thought to account for 16–18% of body mass (Montagu, 1978). As such, touch can certainly be considered the bodily sense, being distributed not just in our haptic organs (typically our hands; see Radman, 2013), but throughout and covering our bodies. Partly as a result of this, touch is pervasive in sensory experience. It is also our first sense: At 7 weeks of gestation, a human fetus will move if its lips are touched (Hooker, 1952).

from Part IV - Perceptual and cognitive development

Edited by Brian Hopkins, Lancaster University, Elena Geangu, Lancaster University, Sally Linkenauger, Lancaster University
Book: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Child Development
Published online: 26 October 2017
Print publication: 19 October 2017, pp 330-338
- Chapter
- Export citation

Calling for a developmental perspective on action-based consciousness
Hana D'Souza, Andrew J. Bremner
Journal: Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 39 / 2016
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2016, e174
Print publication: 2016
- Article
- Export citation
View abstract

Human newborns can resolve some response conflicts in order to adapt their behaviour, suggesting that the newborn has consciousness according to Morsella et al.'s framework. However, we pose a range of developmental questions regarding Morsella et al.'s account, especially concerning the role of consciousness in the development of action.

Unimodal experience constrains while multisensory experiences enrich cognitive construction
Andrew J. Bremner, Charles Spence
Journal: Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 31 / Issue 3 / June 2008
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 June 2008, pp. 335-336
Print publication: June 2008
- Article
- Export citation
View abstract

Mareschal and his colleagues argue that cognition consists of partial representations emerging from organismic constraints placed on information processing through development. However, any notion of constraints must consider multiple sensory modalities, and their gradual integration across development. Multisensory integration constitutes one important way in which developmental constraints may lead to enriched representations that serve more than immediate behavioural goals.

Search Results