In the so-called ‘Iliadic’ Aeneid (Books 7–12), Dido is scarcely mentioned. At first sight, Aeneas’ dalliance at Carthage is forgotten when he gets down to the serious business of establishing the Trojans in Italy. But the poem's last mention of Dido (at 11.74, when Aeneas places a tunic made by her on the dead Pallas) is enmeshed in a network of parallel passages elsewhere in the Aeneid relating to tunics and adoption. In the light of similarities between Aeneas and the superficially unimportant Trojan warrior Nisus, these passages bear crucially (I suggest) on the contrast between Aeneas’ public and private pietas: his obedience to imposed (or public) commitments and to chosen (or private) ones. In this way, Virgil provides guidance on what motivates Aeneas’ fury in Books 10 and 12.

At the beginning of Aeneid 12, a truce is agreed so that Aeneas and Turnus can fight each other in single combat (12.161-215). But this truce is violated through the instigation of Turnus’ sister Juturna (222–56), who in turn has been instigated by Juno (134–60). The Italian Tolumnius casts a spear that kills an Etruscan warrior (257–82). Aeneas pleads for calm and the maintenance of the truce, but he in turn is wounded by an arrow (311–23). Turnus, seeing the Trojans in disarray, rushes into battle, and a general engagement ensues (324–82). So Turnus, even if he did not instigate the breach, does nothing to heal it, and for that reason alone (in the eyes of some commentators) is a criminal, who deserves his ultimate death at the hands of Aeneas.

Hurford claims that empty variables antedated proper names in linguistic (not merely logical) predicate-argument structure, and this had an effect on visual perception. But his evidence, drawn from proper names and the supposed inability of nonhumans to recognise individual conspecifics, is weak. So visual perception seems less relevant to the evolution of grammar than Hurford thinks.

Corballis's claim that the origin of syntax lies in solely gesture is contested. His scenario does not explain why constraints on syntactic “movement” are apparently part of the human biological endowment for language. It also does not pay enough attention to the internal structure of sentences, and how they contrast with other linguistic units such as noun phrases.

The participants at the Montréal Roundtable included Paul Kiparsky, Wolfgang U. Dressler and Joan Bybee, all of them major figures in recent morphological debates, as well as Alan Ford and Rajendra Singh, the authors of a theory of morphology which is less well known but equally ambitious. The bulk of this book consists of target articles on these four theoretical standpoints followed by comments by one or two commentators, replies by the protagonists, and transcripts of discussion. The commentators are Heather Goad, Richard Janda, K. P. Mohanan and Douglas C. Walker, and in general they do a good job. But the discussion sections are what you will turn to first if you have ever asked yourself questions such as ‘I wonder how Kiparsky (or Dressler) would respond to that argument of Bybee (or Ford & Singh)?’. Singh and Desrochers are to be congratulated on producing such a full report of a conference with such high-profile participants.

Grodzinsky associates Broca's area with three kinds of deficit, relating to articulation, comprehension (involving trace deletion), and production (involving “tree pruning”). Could these be special cases of one deficit? Evidence from research on language evolution suggests that they may all involve syllable structure or those aspects of syntax that evolved through exploiting the neural mechanisms underlying syllable structure.

Clahsen shows that “combinatorial” inflection is processed differently from “irregular” inflection. However, combinatorially regular affixes need not coincide with “class-default” affixes, that is, affixes shared by more than one inflection class and all of whose rivals are peculiar to one class. This creates a tension that may help to explain the persistence of inflection class systems.

Dienes & Perner (D&P) link explicit knowledge of facts to predication. But predication is basically a linguistic notion. Their approach therefore makes it difficult to attribute knowledge of facts to non- language-users, such as animals. The explicit/implicit distinction, as D&P formulate it, is accordingly of little use for exploring the cognitive capacities of nonhuman primates – despite the increasing evidence for sophisticated social awareness among apes, implying mental representations of events in which participants are clearly distinguished. A revised formulation, less biased toward syntax as it happens to have evolved in humans, could avoid this drawback.

The frame/content theory suggests that chewing was tinkered into speaking. A simple extrapolation of this approach suggests that syllable structure may have been tinkered into syntax. That would explain the widely noted parallels between sentence structure and syllable structure, and also the otherwise mysterious pervasiveness of the grammatical distinction between sentences and noun phrases.