Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies are considered as transformative for corporate governance and enabling decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that challenge hierarchical structures. However, legal, governance, and liability issues surround DAOs. Despite the aim for decentralization, practical implementation often reveals centralized elements. The chapter also explores blockchain’s impact on traditional corporations, emphasizing improvements in share issuance, trading, and decision-making. Blockchain can also address custody chain problems, enhancing transparency in securities and stock ownership. Yet, transitioning to blockchain, exemplified by ASX CHESS Replacement, is complex. While blockchain holds promise in fostering shareholder and stakeholder rights, a nuanced assessment of limitations and practicalities is crucial. More classical alternatives like secure and transparent centralized systems should also be considered in corporate governance.

As in many other countries, shareholders in French companies have only those powers that are conferred upon them or upon the general meeting. Nevertheless, the general meeting is vested with important rights: it is in charge of the election of the board of directors, has a say-on-pay and a say on related party agreements as well as a number of ‘fundamental decisions’ of the corporation. Shareholders make active use of their (voting) rights. In practice, shareholder participation remains relatively stable over time, with higher participating rates of shareholders with double voting rights and an increasing number of shares voted by mail. Most voting items are approved with a large majority of the votes, although those on remuneration, related party agreements and share issuances are sometimes heavily contested. Engaged shareholders make regularly use of shareholder proposals and shareholder questions. Further, every year, a number of French companies are confronted with activist shareholders who want to effect changes in the strategy or governance of the company, albeit with varying degrees of success. To meet their requests, an increasing numbers of companies are appointing a director with special responsibilities vis-à-vis shareholders.

This chapter addresses the voting and other engagement practices in the 19 jurisdictions in this Handbook on Shareholder Engagement and Voting. First, it is shown that shareholder participation in AGMs differs significantly between countries, which is related to differences in ownership structures, ownership concentration, the powers of the general meeting of shareholders and the other means shareholders have for voicing their interests. Similarly, the powers of the general meeting of shareholders differ substantially between the different countries. Common shareholder voting items are relatively few but include some kind of vote on board nominees and some say over pay although in some countries compensation is an exclusive business of the board of directors. Shareholder proposals seem to be more common in common law countries where it is relatively easy to table a proposal. Questioning the board at general meetings is a widespread practice of especially small shareholders, contrary to many other shareholder engagement techniques commonly used by (institutional) investors. The wide diversity of engagement practices shows that an optimal and efficient division of powers between shareholders and board has not yet been found.