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The planning of United States policy toward Africa is no different from the planning of United States policy toward the other major areas of the world, for which the five regional bureaus of the Department of State have responsibility. Africa competes with Europe, East Asia, Latin America, the Near East and South Asia, for personnel, for resources, and for the attention and energies of those who are involved in the policy flow.
Africa's participation in the international system, by whatever measures it is gauged, skyrocketed during the 1960s from a level close to zero to its present extensity, intensity, and complexity. The difficulty of analyzing the American response to Africa's participation arises from at least two intellectual — but not merely intellectual — problems: First, there have been many different — and differentiated — American responses rather than a single one. Second, much of what is often described as American responses actually may have been triggered by American initiatives to which Africans responded, setting off a kind of chain reaction of reciprocal interactions, which have neither a clearly discernible beginning nor a definable end in time.
E-navigation poses significant challenges for shipping. The analysis of the legal norms in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and court decisions supports the use of information technology on the bridge for the purpose of improving navigational safety. However, the current regulatory and standardisation requirements hamper the introduction of new information streams in navigational systems and remove the incentives for investment in navigation technology. The liability arising from navigational failures will remain on the employer of the crew irrespective of how the additional navigational information is provided to the navigational systems. The shipowner's liability may depend on the way information streams are provided to the ship only within the context of the Civil Liability Convention (CLC) 1992 and other similar pollution conventions where the characterisation of the navigational system as a navigational aid or an aid to navigation may decide the issue of liability. Research on the legal background of these terms underlines the need for a clear distinction between the two terms to be made. An interpretation is proposed which ensures that the CLC liability exception operates in accordance with the underlying legal requirements.
In Trump v. Hawaii, the United States Supreme Court upheld admissions restrictions imposed by the Trump administration on nationals of certain countries for putative security reasons. In so doing, the Court's opinion reaffirmed judicial deference to the president on matters relating to immigration. Although the decision marked a Trump administration victory at the end of a protracted judicial clash, the lower courts are likely to continue operating as a check on aggressively restrictionist policies pursued by the administration on other fronts.
We describe a mechanism for coronal heating. The basic idea is that since the photospheric flux is observed to consist of a complex pattern of positive and negative polarity regions, the topology of the coronal magnetic field (in particular the connectivity) must be discontinuous over a complex network of surfaces and magnetic null points in the corona. Consequently, photospheric motions of the field line footpoints, even if arbitrarily smooth, result in discontinuous stressing of the field. This produces coronal current sheets, reconnection at the null points, and rapid heating.
Five ice cores have been retrieved from a transect close to the terminus of Glacier de Tsanfleuron, Switzerland. The cores extend from the ice surface to the glacier bed, and are 3.5–44.8 m long. Stratigraphic logging based on bubble size and density reveals the presence of a highly metamorphosed basal ice layer, about 10 m thick, from which all traces of bubble-rich ice have been removed. This bubble-poor ice, which corresponds closely with clear-facies ice observed in cavities beneath numerous temperate-based glaciers, contrasts with the overlying bubble-rich or bubble-foliated englacial ice and the underlying debris-rich and bubble-free dispersed-facies basal ice.
Down-core patterns in major-ion composition, stable-isotope composition and total gas content and composition are generally consistent with formation of clear-facies ice by deformation-related metamorphism of bubbly, englacial ice. In addition, isotopic data suggest that storage of downward-percolating meltwaters occurs close to the upper surface of the clear-facies ice layer, perhaps reflecting a local variation in ice permeability across the transition from englacial to clear-facies ice. Enrichment in crustally derived ionic species is noted in the lowermost decimetres of the debris-free, clear-facies ice that immediately overlies debris-rich dispersed-facies basal ice. This ionic enrichment in debris-free ice is interpreted in terms of active inter-granular meltwater flow within some decimetres of the glacier bed.
Part I of this symposium on framing global migration law introduced broad conceptual parameters of a new field, looking back to its international law roots and forward to a new orientation beyond the strictures of refugee law. Part II looks to situate global migration law along a range of theoretical dimensions. Jacqueline Bhabha establishes the continuities of human movement in a historical context, modern and premodern. Far from representing a radical departure, the current migration “crisis” is consistent with massive migrations over the ages. Tendayi Achiume considers migration through the lens of colonization and decolonization. Out-migration from Europe was a core economic element of the colonization project; Achiume suggests that contemporary migration from former dependencies to metropolitan powers will correct co-dependencies that continue to advantage postcolonial powers. Focusing Achiume's lens on the problem of human trafficking, Janie Chuang complicates the binary depictions of economic migration that underpin contemporary international law. She suggests that global migration law's grounding in a migrant-centered perspective could help state actors to understand the structural causes of modern-day exploitation, enabling a shift from a crime control approach to a human mobility paradigm.
When I started teaching international law more than twenty years ago, it was
still possible to be an international law generalist. In the U.S. legal academy,
the likes of Henkin, Schachter, Franck, and McDougal covered the full range of
public international law subjects. (Some even managed to stay on top of private
international law, too.) Today, being an international law generalist is
impractical; it's simply too difficult to keep current with the breadth
of international law. From the scholar's perspective, it's a case
of “be careful what you wish for.” A generalist international law
orientation used to be possible because there was so little of it, both on the
ground and in the scholarship. Those mid-century saplings—the various
distinctive fields within international law—have grown to mature oaks,
and expert knowledge of their many crevices and branches is beyond the capacity
of any single observer. Not only does international law defy individual mastery,
but the level of specialization now makes it difficult to talk across these
different areas. My colleague in international criminal law might as well be a
domestic family law person for purposes of professional points of connection. We
both attend the ASIL Annual Meeting, but we no longer really speak the same
These have been heady times for those interested in foreign relations law. The last twenty years have seen the field transformed. In the 1970s and 1980s, Vietnam had triggered significant attention on constitutional war powers, but that interest was more political than scholarly. Other foreign relations law issues were debated only at the margins. The Restatement (Third) supplied a largely unchallenged conventional wisdom in the area, even if some of its main points were more aspirational than descriptive. The courts had long been missing in action; though they had been active in the first century or so of the Republic on international law and foreign relations law issues, probably the most important Supreme Court ruling in the area from the second half of the twentieth-century merely served to confirm the judicial timidity. On many of the most important issues of foreign relations, sparse judicial precedents (such as they existed) had no more than oracular application to contemporary questions. Other actors nonetheless managed to achieve constitutional equilibria with little help from the courts or scholars. The second half of the twentieth-century was characterized by a remarkable level of constitutional stability regarding the allocation of foreign relations powers.
IF MEDIEVAL ROME, IN ITS LONG HISTORY, HAD ANYTHING LIKE A MORAL and administrative focus, it was the Lateran palace and the basilica Constantiniana, now called S. Giovanni in Laterano, St. John Lateran, which Constantine, freshly victorious at the Milvian Bridge, built to serve the pope, bishop of Rome. From that moment the fate of medieval Rome was bound to this remote corner of the city, which grew steadily in girth and importance even as the inhabited core contracted away from it. By the ninth century the Lateran complex had become to papal Rome what the Palatine had been to imperial Rome, the supreme seat of administration and political power. Despite ravaging invasions and other adverse conditions, despite the search for alternative seats of papal rule, the Lateran remained inarguably preeminent until the official move to the Vatican in 1420 following the return of the papacy to Rome.
Our investigation into the Lateran's first 1,100 years must be brief, and sadly there is little left to see of this once-magnificent theater of autocratic rule. Other than the baptistery, some adjacent structures, the rebuilt and relocated Triclinio Leonino, and the largely thirteenth-century Sancta Sanctorum, new construction between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries devoured or covered over nearly the entire medieval scheme. Still, the Lateran was relatively lucky. In an exhaustive study of the physical and literary documents that Rohault de Fleury published in 1877, we have a compelling plan and reconstruction drawing of the complex at the end of the Middle Ages, as it stood in 1300 – the first jubilee year, which drew Giotto and Dante to Rome – pristine and isolated from its environment (Figs. 125, 126).
But because our environmental approach privileges process over the culminating product, our task is to peel back the layers of time so that we can see the matrix of streets, the Aurelian Wall, aqueduct arcades, and other elements that spawned a whole urban quarter we call, by the common Italian term for such a compound, the Lateran Borgo. To aid our reconstructive surgery, Rodolfo Lanciani's Forma Urbis Romae (1893–1901), which shows the modern streets and buildings over the medieval and ancient Lateran neighborhood, is essential (Fig. 127).