To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The topic of anomaly detection in networks has attracted a lot of attention in recent years, especially with the rise of connected devices and social networks. Anomaly detection spans a wide range of applications, from detecting terrorist cells in counter-terrorism efforts to identifying unexpected mutations during ribonucleic acid transcription. Fittingly, numerous algorithmic techniques for anomaly detection have been introduced. However, to date, little work has been done to evaluate these algorithms from a statistical perspective. This work is aimed at addressing this gap in the literature by carrying out statistical evaluation of a suite of popular spectral methods for anomaly detection in networks. Our investigation on the statistical properties of these algorithms reveals several important and critical shortcomings that we make methodological improvements to address. Further, we carry out a performance evaluation of these algorithms using simulated networks and extend the methods from binary to count networks.
Modal and non-modal stability analyses are performed for Poiseuille flow of a Bingham fluid overlying an anisotropic and inhomogeneous porous layer saturated with the same fluid. In the case of modal analysis, the resultant Orr–Sommerfeld type eigenvalue problem is formulated and solved via the Chebyshev collocation method, using QZ decomposition. It is found that no unstable eigenvalues are present for the problem, indicating that the flow is linearly stable. Therefore, non-modal analysis is attempted in order to observe the short-time response. For non-modal analysis, the initial value problem is solved, and the response of the system to initial conditions is assessed. The aim is to evaluate the effects on the flow stability of porous layer parameters in terms of depth ratio (ratio of the fluid layer thickness
to the porous layer thickness
), Bingham number, Darcy number and slip coefficient. The effects of anisotropy and inhomogeneity of the porous layer on flow transition are also investigated. In addition, the shapes of the optimal perturbations are constructed. The mechanism of transient growth is explored to comprehend the complex interplay of various factors that lead to intermediate amplifications. The present analysis is perhaps the first attempt at analysing flow stability of viscoplastic fluids over a porous medium, and would possibly lead to better and efficient designing of flow environments involving such flow.
To articulate what is past does not mean to recognize ‘how it really was.’ It means to take control of a memory, as it flashes in a moment of danger.
The last two years have seen some significant anniversaries being celebrated – one hundred years of the Bolshevik Revolution, fifty years since May 1968, two hundred years since the birth of Karl Marx and, most recently, the birth centenary of Rosa Luxemburg. As a student activist more or less masquerading as an amateur theatre historian, I have never felt more in need of the tools of my so-called trade than during these interesting times when I found myself assiduously attending conferences, memorials, re-enactments and commemorative performances earmarking moments of radical histories. David Wiles's article, charting the contours – often clear and sometimes obscure – of the field of theatre history as it stands at the moment brings into relief some of the questions that have been running in the background of the heady extended solidarity party that has been my engagement with the field in recent times, resonating with his conclusion of history-writing as ‘practice, not product’. I will attempt to glean from Wiles's reflections some points that I feel may be important for scholars for whom history writing is most certainly a ‘social practice’, if not also a deeply political act.
The present work aims to explore the mechanism of action of C-cinnamoyl glycoside as an antifilarial agent against the bovine filarial nematode Setaria cervi. Both apoptosis and autophagy programmed cell death pathways play a significant role in parasitic death. The generation of reactive oxygen species, alteration of the level of antioxidant components and disruption of mitochondrial membrane potential may be the causative factors that drive the parasitic death. Monitoring of autophagic flux via the formation of autophagosome and autophagolysosome was detected via CYTO ID dye. The expression profiling of both apoptotic and autophagic marker proteins strongly support the initial findings of these two cell death processes. The increased interaction of pro-autophagic protein Beclin1 with BCL-2 may promote apoptotic pathway by suppressing anti-apoptotic protein BCL-2 from its function. This in turn partially restrains the autophagic pathway by engaging Beclin1 in the complex. But overall positive increment in autophagic flux was observed. Dynamic interaction and regulative balance of these two critical cellular pathways play a decisive role in controlling disease pathogenesis. Therefore, the present experimental work may prosper the chance for C-cinnamoyl glycosides to become a potential antifilarial therapeutic in the upcoming day after detail in vivo study and proper clinical trial.
In 2017, the World Health Organization published new nomenclature for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). They renamed the procedure preimplantation genetic testing (PGT), with PGT-M for monogenic diseases and PGT-SR for structural rearrangements. Preimplantation genetic screening (PGS) was renamed PGT-A (aneuploidy). In this chapter, PGT-M and PGT-SR will be referred to as PGT.
Judicial independence, like rule of law or accountability, is a slogan of our times. The Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, fundamentally altered the judicial apparatus in the United Kingdom with the intention of providing a firm statutory basis for judicial independence; the Indian Supreme Court regularly cites the need for judicial independence in response to questions regarding accountability for its internal working; it is even provided express constitutional recognition in section 165 of the Constitution of South Africa. In addition, it has been considered by the International Bar Association, numerous inter-governmental fora and, on several occasions, by the United Nations.
Concern for judicial independence is near-universal, extending to developed and developing countries, old legal systems and new. However, the interest in judicial independence, despite appearances, is not a modern phenomenon. Historically, in the common law world, judicial independence has been seen as a necessary prerequisite both for maintaining the rule of law and for ensuring adherence to a scheme of separated powers. During the reign of the Stuart kings in seventeenth century England, early signs of judicial independence could be seen with the growth of an independent legal profession removed from politics and the consequent functional specialisation that became the hallmark of the courts. Subsequently, the Act of Settlement of 1701 represented the first institutional incorporation of judicial independence in the late middle ages, abolishing the pleasure doctrine which had made judges subservient to the Crown, and replacing it with the doctrine of good behaviour which ensured security of tenure. Blackstone developed this conception of judicial independence further, as the foundation on which separation of powers and consequently public liberty rested. The culmination of these developments was the Federalist Papers, key documents in the drafting of the Constitution of the United States, which established the judiciary as a co-equal and independent branch of government whose independence was constitutionally secured.
Unsurprisingly, elucidations of judicial independence by different authors in different countries have led to distinct understandings of the term. Furthermore, owing to its conflation with ideas of checks and balances, separation of powers and rule of law, all of which have been used as justifications for judicial independence, its conceptual core is nebulous.
During the career of Judges, many carrots are held out to deflect judicial performance from the path of rectitude. Judicial afternoons and evenings are sensitive phases, the incumbent being bothered about post-retiral prospects. The Executive plays upon this weakness to bend the integrity or buy the partiality of the elderly brethren.
—Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, former judge, Supreme Court of India
The employment of retired Supreme Court and High Court judges in government-appointed positions following their retirement is an increasingly common phenomenon in India today. Retired judges are called upon to preside over tribunals, chair statutory commissions and conduct commissions of enquiry, besides fulfilling a number of other key governance roles. The government justifies such post-retirement employment on the grounds that these positions require judicial personnel of the highest integrity and nothing in the Constitution prohibits employing retired Supreme Court and High Court judges who are considered suitable for the purpose. At the same time, from the point of view of retired judges, such employment gives them an opportunity to contribute to the public good at an age when their mental faculties are still sharp and provides them with a standard of living comparable to their previous entitlements as a Supreme Court or High Court judge.
Though mutually beneficial for retired judges and the government, from the point of view of public interest, the matter is much more serious and subtle than such a simplistic summary might suggest. Most crucially, as Justice Krishna Iyer's trenchant observation demonstrates, the prospect of post-retirement employment can severely damage judicial independence. Justice Krishna Iyer is not alone in identifying these insidious effects of post-retirement remunerative employment of judges by government. P. K. Sen, K. T. Shah, H. V. Kamath, K. Santhanam, M. A. Ayyangar, Naziruddin Ahmad and Jaspat Roy Kapoor spoke in the Constituent Assembly of the specific need for the Constitution to prohibit such employment; the seminal 14th Report of the Law Commission of India came down heavily on the practice, arguing that it not only affected judicial independence but also eroded the dignity and high status of the judicial office; Seervai too advocated a complete prohibition, conditional on an increase in judicial salaries and pensions, reasoning that the independence of the judiciary was more significant than the need to have judicial members presiding over tribunals and commissions.
No Supreme Court and no judiciary can stand in judgment over the sovereign will of Parliament representing the will of the entire community. If we go wrong here and there it can point it out, but in the ultimate analysis, where the future of the community is concerned, no judiciary can come in the way.
—Jawaharlal Nehru, 1st Prime Minister of India, 1949
The judicial system has an important role to play ultimately in ensuring better public governance…. There is no area where the judgments of the Supreme Court have not played a significant contribution in governance—good governance—whether it be environment, human rights, gender justice, education, minorities, police reforms, elections and limits on constituent powers of Parliament to amend the Constitution. This is only illustrative.
—Justice Y. K. Sabharwal, 36th Chief Justice of India, 2006
At the time of the Constitution of India coming into force, few could have imagined the public prominence the Indian higher judiciary, comprising the Supreme Court of India and 24 High Courts in the states, would achieve seven decades hence. Nehru's conceptualisation of the judiciary as a hands-off guardian, pointing out governmental errors ‘here and there’, is today a relic that has been consigned to the entrails of history. Today, the higher judiciary, the Supreme Court in particular, as Justice Sabharwal's opinion proclaims, is an institution integral to the governance of the country. With liberalised rules of standing, wide powers and a range of remedies, the court is frequently called upon to decide knotty questions, on matters affecting everyday life in India. It sees itself as a court with a duty ‘to ensure the rule of law’ wherever and whenever infractions may occur. Consequently, in public perception, it has, in the evocative words of a commentator, transformed itself into a ‘Supreme Court for Indians’.
For an institution as powerful and prominent in the public mind, it is curious that concomitant attention has not been paid to analysing its internal processes. Key internal processes—appointment of judges, transfer of judges between High Courts and impeachment of judges—have seldom been the subject of sustained critical attention. The last analytical account to critique the system of judicial appointments and transfers was published in 1996.
Appointment of judges in India has been the site of the most fractious battles over the independence of the higher judiciary. To provide a coherent account of this narrative, this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2A deals with the constitutional position on judicial appointments as determined by the Constituent Assembly. Section 2B analyses the constitutional practice in the post-independence phase of appointments led by the executive. Section 2C deals with constitutional adjudication, analysing the three seminal cases pertaining to judicial appointments— SP Gupta v. Union of India (hereinafter ‘ Gupta ’); SCAORA and In re: Presidential Reference (hereinafter ‘ Presidential Reference ’), with specific focus on critiquing the collegium method of appointment that is in use at present. The consequences of such constitutional adjudication are highlighted through a case study of the proposal to appoint Justice Dinakaran as a judge of the Supreme Court of India. The case study is not intended to serve as a generalisable example; nonetheless, it is illustrative of the grave deficiencies from which the collegium system suffers. Section 2D analyses how the Supreme Court struck down the NJAC in the NJAC Case, thereby thwarting a parliamentary attempt to reform the process of judicial appointments. The last, Section 2E, deals with developments relating to the memorandum of procedure post the NJAC Case which have characterised the stalemate between the executive and the judiciary over judicial appointments. It also looks at the internal dissensions within the judiciary, led by Justice Chelameswar advocating for reform and greater transparency. Together, these sections analyse the legal basis of the different systems of appointment that have been used as well as identify the conceptual questions that the operation of such systems raise.
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION: THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ON JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
Debates in the Constituent Assembly regarding appointments to the higher judiciary were brief. However in the discussions that took place, there was a keen perception of the ends which had to be achieved—the independence of the judiciary and safeguarding the dignity of the institution, the interests to be accommodated—a balance between governmental oversight and judicial autonomy in administration, a sharp awareness of the constitutional position in other jurisdictions and equally a realisation of the need to institute a system that would be effective in India's political culture.
We are now in a position to tie the strands from Parts I and II of the book together. In Part I, a close analysis of systems of appointments, transfers, impeachment and post-retirement employment of judges of the higher judiciary in India revealed grave doubts about the legal basis for the operation of appointments and transfers. It pointed out the ineffectiveness of impeachment as a disciplinary mechanism and the pervasive practice of post-retirement employment of judges in government-appointed positions, often very shortly after retirement. It also documented the widespread concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary and its tension with judicial accountability, while at the same time highlighting that these concepts were being used in a number of diverse ways, often with divergent meanings.
This necessitated a closer conceptual enquiry of judicial accountability and independence in Part II. This was done through a fivefold enquiry into both concepts through which their diverse elements were captured. Fleshing out the rationales for judicial independence and accountability, it was argued that both are necessary for creating ‘an effective judiciary’. The various components of an effective judiciary were delineated together with how judicial independence and accountability impacted them.
On the basis of this normative assessment, in Section 8A a putative doctrinal device—whether the measure in question leads to an effective judiciary—can now be advanced. The purpose of such a device is purely analytical—to provide researchers and observers of judiciaries with a useful tool with which to analyse the justifiability of measures that affect or promote judicial independence or accountability.
Section 8B applies this doctrine to the working of appointments, transfers, impeachment and post-retirement employment of judges in India. It examines the impact each of these mechanisms has on judicial independence and accountability as understood in Part II. On this basis, it infers whether the said measure is justifiable on independence–accountability grounds. No implication ought to be drawn regarding the justifiability of such a measure in terms of other virtues deemed desirable for the judiciary—that is a distinct analytical exercise.
For measures found unjustifiable, Chapter 9 advocates necessary reforms. The proposals advanced do not seek to reinvent the wheel as far as reforms are concerned. Much work has been done on reform and several reform proposals are pending consideration of the government and widely discussed publicly.
The advent of judicial accountability as a widespread phenomenon is a relatively modern development. It grew as an institutional response to the growing power of courts in adjudicating matters that were hitherto not considered within the ambit of judicial resolution. Its intellectual progenitor, from which it derived both its terminology and its conceptual moorings, is the concept of public accountability, which itself underwent a new wave in the latter half of the twentieth century. Previously, public accountability was an under-theorised and seldom discussed concept. In democratic theory, it had a settled meaning, applicable to elected representatives, who had to be accountable to their constituents; in public administration, it denoted a traditional book-keeping function, true to its etymological roots. However, caught at the confluence of the twin developments of the multiplication of power centres within the state requiring multiple sites of accountability and theories of New Public Management redefining traditional public administration understandings, the concept of public accountability exploded, suddenly being used in a variety of ways, with multiple meanings and diverse objectives.
To document and analyse each of these meanings and objectives is the task of an accountability historian and beyond the scope of this chapter. I am concerned with the limited task of sifting through these multiple understandings in order to delineate a plausible conceptual core of judicial accountability. This conceptual account is bolstered by jurisdiction-specific examples that demonstrate the various ways in which judicial accountability is used in practice. Such an account will provide a matrix to understand the particular dimensions of judicial accountability which are, much to our intellectual detriment, significantly under-theorised today.
Two parallel developments in governance and public administration are responsible for the profusion of the uses of public accountability in the latter half of the twentieth century. In governance, there was an increasing realisation that the traditional conception of public accountability of elected representatives, that is, ministerial responsibility to parliament in the Westminster tradition, was inadequate for a number of reasons. Thus, direct bureaucratic accountability to parliament, administrative accountability to courts and accountability of various governmental authorities directly to the people were offered as necessary supplements.
This book is being written in the aftermath of a press conference by Justices Chelameswar, Gogoi, Lokur and Joseph convened ‘to communicate to the nation to take care of the institution (of the judiciary)’. In the annals of India's judicial history, this was an unprecedented event. Judges, by tradition and training, speak only through their judgments. Communicating with members of the press, let alone calling a press conference in the middle of a working day in the Supreme Court, is anathema. Yet the four seniormost justices of the Supreme Court chose to openly share their grievances about the functioning of the judiciary, the lack of independence and courage shown by the chief justice of India, and thinly veiled suggestions of governmental interference in the judiciary. It is a ‘discharge of a debt to the nation,’ said Justice Gogoi; ‘[we] don't want someone to say 20 years later that the four judges sold their souls and did not take care of this institution so we place it before the people of this country,’ remarked Justice Chelameswar.
What they placed before the people of India was a letter written by them to the chief justice of India alleging a breach of well-established judicial conventions regarding allocation of cases. The letter, while revealing in part, appeared to say much more by implication. It underlined the fact that the chief justice of India was the first among equals, with no superior authority over other judges of the Supreme Court. He functions as the master of the roster to allocate cases because such allocation is necessary in a court that convenes in multiple benches. In this allocation, he is guided by time-tested conventions regarding strength of the bench and its composition. The letter goes on to allege that such conventions were breached in the case of RP Luthra v . Union of India (hereinafter ‘ Luthra ’). In this case, a two-judge bench ordered that there should be no further delay in finalising the memorandum of procedure in public interest and listed the matter for further hearing.
That the case was assigned to a two-judge bench, the letter implies, was wrong, since the order to the government to finalise the memorandum of procedure taking into account public suggestions had earlier been given by the five-judge bench that heard the NJAC Case in a consequential hearing.