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This unique introduction to the foundational concepts of cyber-physical systems (CPS) describes key design principles and emerging research trends in detail. Several interdisciplinary applications are covered, with a focus on the wide-area management of infrastructures including electric power systems, air transportation networks, and health care systems.Design, control and optimization of cyber-physical infrastructures are discussed, addressing security and privacy issues of networked CPS, presenting graph-theoretic and numerical approaches to CPS evaluation and monitoring, and providing readers with the knowledge needed to operate CPS in a reliable, efficient, and secure manner. Exercises are included.This is an ideal resource for researchers and graduate students in electrical engineering and computer science, as well as for practitioners using cyber-physical systems in aerospace and automotive engineering, medical technology, and large-scale infrastructure operations.
The current phase of globalisation entails interdependence between spaces and regions of productions at a much higher scale compared to earlier phases of expansive growth realised through trade and commerce. The significant feature of the current phase is the breaking down of production tasks into multiple phases and the international division of labour is no longer based on the average factor intensity of final products. Instead, comparative advantages of production location are driven by factor intensity of particular components or intermediate inputs. The regime of production appears to be inclusive as it offers greater opportunity to developing countries in becoming a part of global production structures. It is no longer necessary to build a single-nation supply chain producing a final product for export. Instead, the process of industrialisation can be short-circuited by specialising in the production of particular inputs or assembling a final product. Hence, it is possible for a country to export a technology-intensive final product while contributing to only a labour-intensive task required for that particular product. This is often termed as ‘second unbundling’ of production. The first one relates to spatially separating spaces of consumption and production facilitated by steam-power and the use of railways and steamships. This separation soon became inevitable because of scale economies and comparative advantages derived from a particular factor intensity matching the abundance in factors of a region. Such division of labour that emerged in the early nineteenth century facilitated increased global trade and migration due to fall in transportation costs, but it also led to concentration of production in certain regions in the form of clusters and industrial districts. The dual trend existed as coordination costs increased with the dispersion of production sites. The ‘second unbundling’ was caused by the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution as ICTs allow the coordination of production from a distance. Hence, the spatial scale of production is no longer fixed and networks of production span beyond national boundaries with simple or complex architecture of transactions.
The change in the organisation of production has altered the pattern of global trade. Today, almost 60 per cent of world trade consists of intermediate goods and services that are incorporated in global production networks. This has given rise to a wide divergence between a country's export figures and its actual contribution in adding value.
Diffusion of capital in the realm of global production structures as well as in financial mediations seems to be the defining feature of the current phase of globalised capitalism. Capital relations tend to make every economic activity of the world subservient to the imperatives of global capital. It imposes a monitoring structure ensuring financial transactions and various forms of mediations between supply of inputs, production and sale commensurate to the norms defined by the global architecture of finance. Production and finance often appear to be separated and financial returns accrue to ‘monied’ capital operating at a distance from production, but profit in any case originates in productive activities that transform and enhance use-values. The relative importance of circulation, as blown out of proportion, and the relative shift of profit share moving away from productive activities to financial transactions is typical to the current phase of capital accumulation.
Notable is the fact that growth of profit seems to move faster than the growth of investment and a trade-off between growth and profitability constrains the decision-making process of an individual firm. It has wider ramifications, giving rise to a puzzle at the macro level which is that profit-making gets increasingly disconnected from production and, as a result, accumulation occurs without commensurate increase in productive employment. A profit growth being increasingly delinked from production and employment inevitably leads to asymmetric distribution and rising inequality in income that ultimately affects the economy's demand structure. But financialisation also permeates household income and savings by creating liquid asset markets which can be readily transacted at reasonable values. Therefore, instead of holding idle money, economic agents will be willing to direct their income to accumulate productive assets. The financial accelerator generates income that is supposed to have a positive feedback on demand for both consumption and investment and hence expected to take care of the widening demand gap emerging out of unequal distribution. In fact, the relative dominance of finance in the current phase of capitalism has been appreciated as nothing new. It happens to be the feature emerging in every systemic cycle of accumulation in the long history of capitalism.
We often acknowledge the fascinating changes around us – changes embedded in a globalised world with increased trade and interdependence between nations, speed and depth of communication, innovation in technology, sharing of knowledge, movement of people across borders, rise of the global middle class, and homogenisation of culture and lifestyles. Glitches in the growth process, episodes of slowing down, rising inequality, delinking growth and employment, financialisation, and dwindling growth in physical investment are seen as reconcilable perturbations within the larger picture of a stable and ubiquitous capitalism. The Indian story appears to be even more exciting. It is no longer about just ‘catching up’ with the North. With consistent high growth, the two Asian giants, India and China, seem to have emerged as the drivers of global growth in the recent past. In the case of India, a major concern of policy-makers and experts is the industrialisation conundrum amid high growth. Though services contribute a major share, in terms of output and employment, a stagnant manufacturing sector is worrisome. In large democracies like India, the distribution of growth is directly linked to the electoral fortunes of contesting political parties as rising inequality beyond a point leads to social tensions and resentment against the ruling establishment. Though the relation between political outcome and economic performance need not be linear, pitting growth against distribution, the doctrine of gains trickling down, and the patience of the majority of people waiting for market-driven desired outcomes seem to have lost steam.
The policy discourse in this regard has been largely confined to certain broad binaries: state versus market when it comes to economic mediation; to promote public or private sectors; services or manufacturing sector to drive the desired growth path; inward- or outward-looking policies on the question of degree of openness; regulate finance to redirect capital flow towards productive sectors or enjoy the swings of speculation; relax labour laws for flexibility, or provide social security to unprotected workers; and so on. Industry requires land and minerals and the state has to be decisive in releasing the supply side constraints. Therefore, land that has so far been used for low-productivity agriculture has to be transformed – forcibly, if required – towards high-productivity industrial activities.
Capitalism proved itself to be a peculiar organism that survived cycles of expansion and crisis, mutating with new challenges and giving rise to innovative sparks that kindled the new wave of expansion. Spheres of production and finance attracted capital in successive phases and at predictable sequence in search of profit, giving rise to a dynamism often supplemented by the rise of a new technological paradigm. It seems we arrived at a phase of capitalist growth that manifests contradictory tendencies in its various aspects – ignoring those might indulge pragmatic pretence but actually do not contribute to resolving persistent problems. We need industrial growth, but industrialisation cannot be a goal in itself. Delinking of industrial production from employment is not a problem of industry per se, but of a mode of industrialisation that invokes an exclusionary trajectory. It is indeed true that the communication and information revolution reduces transaction costs to almost zero and, therefore, human interaction is bound to be globalised. Developing countries participate in global trade and production, ideas flow across borders, workers migrate, capital's movement becomes seamless, but all these transactions are embedded in a structure of asymmetry in which human contributions are valued in different ways, exploitation and expropriation continue with a recreated institutional structure. Capitalism, in its highly financialised phase, can earn profits without producing and it appears that financial transactions and profits emerging out of it do not require labour exploitation as it used to be in twentieth-century factories. The apparent invisibility of labour and exploitation in the maze of financial transactions is because it is seen as separated from the ‘dirty’ world of production, a real non-hazardous, technical, neutral face of capitalism. It is also notable that the information revolution has permeated every bit of productive activity and is increasingly corrosive to the institution of private property and appropriation of private gains. Information is abundant and, hence, price mechanisms which are only capable of sensing scarcity are gradually losing acceptability in many social transactions. Knowledge commodities, being ‘non-rival’ in nature, can only be owned through a continuously growing monopoly structure which prevents use of knowledge, excluding its potential users. Neoliberal capitalism falls apart as newer technologies demand less hierarchical collaborative production structures that rising monopolies fail to offer.
Early development discourse emerged on acknowledging the fact of unevenness of capitalist growth, with underdevelopment syndromes persisting in large parts of the world simultaneously with advanced economies recording high industrial growth. The general observation was that persistent gap in development indicators between advanced and lagging economies would not mend automatically with time. In other words, although it appears that some of the social and economic symptoms of underdevelopment resemble the past of advanced economies, they may not logically transform into the present of those economies and, therefore, asymmetry, structural dependence and strategic intervention crept into economic analyses of making and unmaking of under-development. The central problem was to transform economies by moving people from low-productivity segments to high-productivity activities. Spontaneous innovation of technology, facilitated by competition that would continuously replace less productive processes, requires the creation of capital relations, and industrialisation epitomised the process of rapid diffusion of development. In developing countries, transition was subject to attaining autonomy from the imperialist powers and, in many cases, the post-colonial state became an active protagonist in mobilising capital, infrastructure and technology, initiating an independent path of industrial development. There were successes and failures which had been analysed from different perspectives including the view that failures manifest the limitations of the ruling combination who were hesitant to fully utilise the potential of redistributive justice. But more importantly, over time, the discourse of development was increasingly subsumed into the neoliberal doctrine which essentially establishes overwhelming faith in the market.
From such a perspective, societies or economies are nothing but neutral containers and the role of respective states should be restricted to facilitating free flow of inputs and outputs according to price signals. Its fascinating attraction seems to flow from the ‘objectification’ of social relations that are reified as an uncompromising verdict of market, as the rational choice for efficient allocation of resources and rewards to factors. Hence, solution to the problem either of inequality within countries or of divide between advanced and developing countries at the global level have relied on the cardinal faith that through free flow of factors, and because of the instinctive impulses of private gains, disparities in productivity and, therefore, of returns to factors would eventually be wiped out.
The splurge of land grab across the world in the backdrop of financial crisis, rising food and energy prices and in India, particularly since 2005, several issues related to acquisition of farm land and consequent dispossession caused a huge furore and public debate. The primary concern expressed in the World Bank reports of 2008 and 2010 was that poverty alleviation needs to be linked to reducing ‘yield gap’ in agriculture and the necessary transformation of generating productive employment at least for the rural population has to be mediated by large land holdings engaging in commercial agriculture. Investment on land also became important due to a rise in food and energy prices and large capital investment moved on to acquire land to ensure food and energy security for the future. Apart from these stated goals of ‘rational planning’ in using resources of the planet, the discourses in favour of acquiring farm land for more productive use largely revolves on the modernist logic of transforming agricultural land either from small-holding, subsistence agriculture to agribusiness linked to the new commodity regime or to provide spaces for industry that would evict unproductive rural labour and employ them in more productive activities. Essentially, both these rationales invoke a teleology or an imagery of linear progress which is more or less decided by the past of advanced capitalist countries.
The Lewis–Kuznets process of moving people out of agriculture, the classical trajectory of modernity where people of labour-surplus countries need to be pushed out from traditional low-productivity segments to high-productivity industry and service activities is the underlying teleology broadly invoked in these discourses. Because of surplus labour, real wage remains more or less the same, despite labour being drawn in more productive activities and the rising gap between wage and productivity becomes the source of capital accumulation in modern sectors. The process of accumulation in the modern sector will pull more labour from low-productive agricultural activity and absorb them in high-productive segments, eventually leading to an exhaustion of surplus labour which will cause rise in wages. This path of ‘modernity’ from ‘backward’ agriculture was conceived in a classical setting when demand was not thought of as a problem and technological growth was supposed to engage more people through its direct and indirect effects rather than causing a scenario of net redundancy of labour.
Binaries hardly capture the complexities of real life, particularly of the world of work in which human labour using brains and brawns creatively engage with nature, change its surroundings and realise their existence in the course of changing themselves. Indeed, it is necessary sometimes to break down and categorise a complex whole to understand the relationship between the simple categories conceptually created and the way they constitute the complex totality. However, the progress of conceptual categories rarely follows the time sequence of history; instead, it may indicate opposite movements. The way we understand informal–formal relationship is a case in point. Informality is an empirical category representing heterogeneous forms of unprotected labour. Petty-producers, street vendors, construction workers, home-based workers, domestic workers, contract labourers, sex-workers, delivery boys, ragpickers and a range of other activities that provide earnings to a majority of the workforce in urban space come under the rubric of informality. The category of informality is predicated on the notion of formal, but according to the sequence of history, ‘informality’ predates the ‘formal’. Just as people were unemployed before being employed. It is only since a particular juncture of history, one could find that a human being is being employed by the other or a class of few propertied people who engage the large number of property-less in the services of the few. But informal is defined as a negation of formal and unemployed as the state of not being employed. Similarly, life had been wageless for the larger part of human civilisation. It is only in capitalism that wage labour emerges to be the predominant form of work relation and non-wage labour appears to be pre-modern or pre-capitalist. Paradoxically, what came later in the course of history, defined earlier forms according to its own image. Centring of capital relations reign our conceptual space and a false boundary, implicitly identifying capital relations with the ‘formal’, imparts violence to the informal in the realm of thought.
The politics of conceptualising categories, therefore, sometimes reverses the order of history. The primacy of the ‘formal’ in defining the informal in itself makes the informal seem as if it is something abnormal, weak, cannot stand on its own feet, a deviation from the norm, an unwanted appendage continuing from the pre-capitalist past that capitalism wants to get rid of.
One of the most startling features of capitalist development in India is that more than half the working population is engaged in non-wage employment. However, one can account this to the high share of employment in agricultural activities that had largely remained a site bearing marks of ‘pre-capitalist’ production relations. Nevertheless, self-employment and other precarious forms of non-wage employment assume a large share even in non-agriculture. This is quite peculiar since capitalism is largely characterised by an economic space in which not only produce is turned into commodities, but labour-power itself assumes the commodity form as wage labour. The worker works under the capitalist to whom the labour power belongs and the product of labour is appropriated by the capitalist net of wages. The problem is further complicated because wage employment, in the Marxian sense, is the only source of surplus-value that the labourer creates in the process of earning his/her living, precisely creating value beyond necessary labour time. The persistence of high share of non-wage employment in India and in other developing countries as well as a non-declining floor, if not a rising trend even in developed capitalism, is worrying at the conceptual level as well. Sometimes, the fact is attributed to cyclical fluctuations. That is, self-employment mushrooms in periods of economic downturn when employability of the economy declines and non-wage segment swells as a micro-level, counter-cyclical response. But this explanation is only partial because studies focus on a historical trend of declining influence of unemployment on self-employment.
How do we appreciate this apparent unity of producer with the means of production in the context of capitalism which is primarily defined as a system reproducing the alienation of the direct producer from the means of production? At a conceptual level one needs to comprehend the fact of rise in non-capital space within capitalism. It manifests articulation of various modes of production while capital relation assumes dominant position within the totality of social organisation. Neoliberalism is the paradigmatic mode of articulation in which capital relations intend to entangle and hegemonise every other mode of production by creating a market society. In fact, the withdrawal of the state in neoliberalism is never meant to be a state remaining passive.
Appropriation of ‘fictitious commodity’ labour is the terrain of contestation between labour and capital throughout the history of capitalism. Labour is not produced for sale and, hence, marketisation of labour power entails a ‘double movement’ of reclaiming the social substance in the Polanyian sense. The conflict between labour and capital is mediated through complex processes and multiple identities, the degrees of resistance and its articulation take various forms depending on particular contexts and histories. Nevertheless, capital is not the sole author of history, as it appears to be, as if the labour passively responds to capital's domination for the sake of survival. Instead, history has also shown that cycles of crisis, either of profitability or that of legitimacy, prompted structural changes in capitalism which are primarily responses to the way labour impacted capital. Moments of crisis in capitalism are, therefore, always preceded by high tides of labour resistance, and if it does not lead to a radical rupture, it would necessarily be followed by the introduction of new dimensions of technology or labour arrangements that ultimately empower capital. In the current phase of globalisation, there is hardly any doubt that as global capital gets access to global labour reserve, the bargaining power of labour declines drastically. Neoliberal regime and the resulting withdrawal of the state from the economy is essentially supplemented by a conscious effort to intervene and create market society. It is an intervention on the part of the state to dislodge the social compact once capital had to live with during the Golden Age of capitalism, accepting institutions that de-commodify labour to some extent. The retreat of labour in the twenty-first century is effected through contradictory tendencies in the sphere of production. On the one hand, concentration in ownership was effected through mergers and acquisitions within the North and, on the other, global assembly line involves low-wage workers of the South in a de-centred network of outsourcing and subcontracting. The emergent structural divide between the stable working class and the overwhelming majority of precarious labour demands a relook at the idioms of resistance.
The diffusion of production and increased fragmentation of labour defines the new regime of capitalist accumulation which not only involves changes in the production process, but also in the reproduction of labour power.
The global edifice of capitalism is hierarchical in nature and the relative position of a particular capital in this structural hierarchy defines its returns. The returns are uneven as the development of capitalism pans out unevenly across the globe. Indeed, the positions of different capital are not fixed forever either in absolute terms or in relative measures. Hence, the relative development of positions in terms of ‘catching up’ or moving up the ladder has been the dominant discourse in various theories within the broad genre of development literature. Presuming the unreal world of perfect competition as the never-existing ‘ideal’, economic theory captures such unevenness arising out of concentration and centralisation of capital as sources of rents. Rents accrue to legal proprietorship of resource that is scarce. Capital and land become sources of rent not because they are scarce due to natural reasons, but because of the institution of private property that makes resources scarce. Hence, the distribution of property rights is fundamental to the accumulation of rents. If ground rent is the return to the landlord owning land, profit is also the return to the capital-owning class. Notably, in all sorts of property, income owners receive an extra return without surrendering the ownership of property altogether and simply the act of lending the resource fetches the owner a return in the form of rent. The absolute rent that emerges because of proprietary ownership of land and capital were termed by Ricardo as landowner's rent and capitalist's profit respectively. Ricardo, however, makes a distinction between landlord's income and capitalist's profit. Capitalists save and do not waste wealth by way of luxurious consumption. Hence, they create resources for investment assuming that all resources saved would be invested in the future. Also, the capitalist was considered to be ‘internal’ to the process of production as against a ‘functionless investor’1 because s/he manages the production process. But this distinction was meaningful so long as the separation of ownership and control in capitalist enterprise did not reach the level of joint stock companies. Further, the proposition that supply of savings automatically creates demand for investment had not been challenged in theory as well as in the real world. Keynes was rather explicit in identifying the ‘absentee owner’, the parasitical ‘third’ class, the rentiers who thrive on returns that come without any genuine sacrifice.
Trajectories of economic development, particularly industrialisation, have largely been conceived in terms of stylised phases marked by structural changes in output and employment. The sequential pattern of the relative importance of sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and services in terms of output and employment in advanced countries spanning the second half of the nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century seems to provide the benchmarks of industrial progress for late industrialisers. Different versions of the classical theories of development assume a virtuous circle of rising productivity translated into capital accumulation in a labour-surplus scenario together with declining production costs diffused across the economy by way of rising real income and, hence, higher demand. The idealised path of moving people from low-productivity agriculture to manufacturing activities with a subsistence-plus wage begins with an initial extensive phase when the industrial sector absorbs labour. This is followed by an intensive phase of employing people in higher productivity manufacturing. With rising income and consequent changes in demand due to varying income elasticities, the importance of agriculture and then manufacturing declines and that of services rises. However, barring China, the experiences of most post-colonial latecomers do not conform with the assumed sequence. The deviation from the stylised sequence for most developing countries where de-industrialisation sets in at a low level of per capita income and at a low peak has been a major concern for policy makers. Contemporary debates on development underline the fact that colonial structures and the imperatives of imperial power led to a peculiar growth trajectory for ex-colonies, making their future completely different from that of advanced countries. It became important eventually to recognise that growth and structural change engage in a double causation rather than in a linear relationship, where the pattern of growth and relative importance of sectors in terms of output and employment are mutually constitutive of each other.
The immediate concern for policy makers in developing countries was primarily to deal with the problem of delinking of employment from growth. In most developing countries, huge supply of unskilled labour remains unutilised which makes high growth politically unsustainable.
We study the effects of food safety awareness on consumers’ milk purchasing behavior in Nepal. We conducted consumer survey and employed an instrumental variable regression. We find education, income, and social network to influence food safety consciousness (FSC). Our results indicate the positive impact of FSC on weekly milk expenditure and probability of purchasing milk from milk cooperatives. Any policy that helps to improve the FSC levels will likely increase the purchase of safe milk from the modern market outlet, and lack of such awareness raising policies has prevented the market for safe food from evolving and expanding.