To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The Jewish leftist lawyer Ernst Fraenkel was one of twentieth-century Germany's great intellectuals. During the Weimar Republic he was a shrewd constitutional theorist for the Social Democrats and in post-World War II Germany a respected political scientist who worked to secure West Germany's new democracy. This book homes in on the most dramatic years of Fraenkel's life, when he worked within Nazi Germany actively resisting the regime, both publicly and secretly. As a lawyer, he represented political defendants in court. As a dissident, he worked in the underground. As an intellectual, he wrote his most famous work, The Dual State – a classic account of Nazi law and politics. This first detailed account of Fraenkel's career in Nazi Germany opens up a new view on anti-Nazi resistance – its nature, possibilities, and limits. With grit, daring and imagination, Fraenkel fought for freedom against an increasingly repressive regime.
The first two decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed a rise of populism and decline of public confidence in many of the formal institutions of democracy. This crisis of democracy has stimulated searches for alternative ways of understanding and enacting politics. Against this background, Tessa Morris-Suzuki explores the long history of informal everyday political action in the Japanese context. Despite its seemingly inflexible and monolithic formal political system, Japan has been the site of many fascinating small-scale experiments in 'informal life politics': grassroots do-it-yourself actions which seek not to lobby governments for change, but to change reality directly, from the bottom up. She explores this neglected history by examining an interlinked series of informal life politics experiments extending from the 1910s to the present day.
Copy number variants (CNVs) play a significant role in disease pathogenesis in a small subset of individuals with schizophrenia (~2.5%). Chromosomal microarray testing is a first-tier genetic test for many neurodevelopmental disorders. Similar testing could be useful in schizophrenia.
To determine whether clinically identifiable phenotypic features could be used to successfully model schizophrenia-associated (SCZ-associated) CNV carrier status in a large schizophrenia cohort.
Logistic regression and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves tested the accuracy of readily identifiable phenotypic features in modelling SCZ-associated CNV status in a discovery data-set of 1215 individuals with psychosis. A replication analysis was undertaken in a second psychosis data-set (n = 479).
In the discovery cohort, specific learning disorder (OR = 8.12; 95% CI 1.16–34.88, P = 0.012), developmental delay (OR = 5.19; 95% CI 1.58–14.76, P = 0.003) and comorbid neurodevelopmental disorder (OR = 5.87; 95% CI 1.28–19.69, P = 0.009) were significant independent variables in modelling positive carrier status for a SCZ-associated CNV, with an area under the ROC (AUROC) of 74.2% (95% CI 61.9–86.4%). A model constructed from the discovery cohort including developmental delay and comorbid neurodevelopmental disorder variables resulted in an AUROC of 83% (95% CI 52.0–100.0%) for the replication cohort.
These findings suggest that careful clinical history taking to document specific neurodevelopmental features may be informative in screening for individuals with schizophrenia who are at higher risk of carrying known SCZ-associated CNVs. Identification of genomic disorders in these individuals is likely to have clinical benefits similar to those demonstrated for other neurodevelopmental disorders.
Nearly half of care home residents with advanced dementia have clinically significant agitation. Little is known about costs associated with these symptoms toward the end of life. We calculated monetary costs associated with agitation from UK National Health Service, personal social services, and societal perspectives.
Prospective cohort study.
Thirteen nursing homes in London and the southeast of England.
Seventy-nine people with advanced dementia (Functional Assessment Staging Tool grade 6e and above) residing in nursing homes, and thirty-five of their informal carers.
Data collected at study entry and monthly for up to 9 months, extrapolated for expression per annum. Agitation was assessed using the Cohen-Mansfield Agitation Inventory (CMAI). Health and social care costs of residing in care homes, and costs of contacts with health and social care services were calculated from national unit costs; for a societal perspective, costs of providing informal care were estimated using the resource utilization in dementia (RUD)-Lite scale.
After adjustment, health and social care costs, and costs of providing informal care varied significantly by level of agitation as death approached, from £23,000 over a 1-year period with no agitation symptoms (CMAI agitation score 0–10) to £45,000 at the most severe level (CMAI agitation score >100). On average, agitation accounted for 30% of health and social care costs. Informal care costs were substantial, constituting 29% of total costs.
With the increasing prevalence of dementia, costs of care will impact on healthcare and social services systems, as well as informal carers. Agitation is a key driver of these costs in people with advanced dementia presenting complex challenges for symptom management, service planners, and providers.
Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time1 begins with a famous anecdote about a “little old lady” who challenges a scientist’s public lecture on astronomy, insisting that in fact the earth is flat and rests on the back of a giant tortoise. When the scientist asks what holds the tortoise in its place, the lady is ready for him: “You’re very clever, young man, very clever … but it’s turtles all the way down!” Too often, it seems to us, both the guiding assumption and core insight of sociopsychological accounts of mass opinion is that “it’s groups all the way down.”
There is little doubt that, in the abstract, Americans are wary about the number of immigrants coming into the United States.1 Gallup began asking in 1965 whether the level of immigration should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. For most of the last half century, support for increasing immigration hovered in the single digits or low teens. As of 2019, it has never exceeded 30%.2 Wariness about rising levels of immigration is evident even when surveys clarify that they are asking about legal rather than illegal immigration, a distinction to which we return at length in Chapter 4. For example, a Fox News3 poll conducted in April 2013 asked a national sample “Do you think the United States should increase or decrease the number of LEGAL immigrants allowed to move to this country?” The majority, 55%, said the number should be decreased, compared to 28% who said it should be increased, with 10% volunteering that the number should not be change and 7% unsure. These numbers were little changed from earlier polls conducted in 2007 and 2010, though other time series do show marked increases in support for preserving and even increasing legal admissions in the last several years.4 Despite recent rises in public support for increasing immigration and drops in support for decreasing it, Peter Schuck’s pithy phrase remains true of a broad cross-section of the public: “Americans do not oppose immigration in principle, in general, or unalterably, but they do want less of it (or at least no higher).”5
In this chapter, we develop a framework for understanding how Americans’ opinions about immigration policy issues emerge from their conceptions of civic fairness. We then review leading theories of immigration attitudes that are premised on group-centrism, with an eye to considering (1) what questions they leave open about the relative influence of considerations rooted in political values and group allegiances and animosities, (2) what challenges they pose to the civic fairness framework, and (3) where they lay claim to empirical phenomena that could also be explained by conceptions of civic fairness. Finally, from this discussion we derive several hypotheses that guide the empirical tests in the chapters that follow. These hypotheses apply to situations where values collide with group loyalties to race and nation, which is to say instances in which the civic fairness and group-centrist perspectives make distinct predictions about what immigration policy alternatives Americans will choose.
Mark Twain often transgressed the sexual limits of his Victorian era, pushing the boundaries of sex and sexuality in his writing. Although he generally was more reticent in his public writing, deferring to the taste of his age, he had private writings that explored sexual and taboo topics. Throughout his writing career, he played with themes of cross-dressing, often couched in comedy, but revealing an interest in the fluidity of gender roles. In his later unpublished writings, he wrote more frankly about sex and sexuality, topics that clearly fascinated him.
What does a nation of immigrants want from its immigration policy, and why? The evidence from decades of public polling defies simple answers. Scholars and journalists reflexively label people as “pro-immigrant” or “anti-immigrant” and seek to situate them along a spectrum running between these two poles. But most Americans hold seemingly idiosyncratic mixes of “pro-” and “anti-immigrant” opinions across the range of controversies that make up contemporary immigration debates. Their opinions about specific policies routinely deviate from their more general feelings about immigrants and immigration and confound familiar explanations based on “economic” or “cultural” threat. Their views about different facets of immigration policy diverge to the point that the great majority of Americans at once endorse some policies that would greatly expand immigrant admissions and rights and others that would sharply curtail them.
Chapter 1 showed that much of the American public differentiates sharply between its views on the appropriate level of legal immigration and its views about how to address the status of the estimated 11 million illegal immigrants living in the United States. Americans certainly like legal immigration more than illegal immigration, and enforcement measures to stem the flow of illegal immigration or prompt some illegal immigrants to return to their countries of origin tend to be very popular as long as they do not involve heavy-handed or sweeping attempts at mass deportation.1 And illegal immigrants themselves are unfailingly viewed more “coldly” than immigrants generally. On the other hand, as we documented in Chapter 1, the most salient policy proposal for dealing with illegal immigrants already in the country – furnishing some sort of earned legal status or a “path to citizenship” for some or all in this group – receives overwhelming support in many polls.
The previous chapters demonstrated that liberal assimilationist norms are among the most powerful influences on American public opinion about immigration. Here, we examine two competing accounts of why this is so. As in the earlier chapters, we adjudicate between civic fairness and group-centrism. But having repeatedly shown that support for assimilation generally overrides ethnic group-centrism, we turn our attention to a different variety of group-centrism – one predicated on feelings of attachment to fellow members of the national ingroup and solidarity with immigrants who are seen as belonging within it.
Civic fairness and group-centrism both expect significant ethnic biases in White’s immigration policy opinions in everyday politics. What they differ on is why. Group-centric models tied to racial identities and prejudices argue that negative stereotypes flow out of defensiveness of white dominance and fear and loathing of minority groups. The civic fairness model argues that negative stereotypes may also serve a heuristic purpose for a far wider universe of people, “filling in the blanks” about whether immigrants are likely to meet criteria tied to civic fairness. Both of these interpretations imply that prejudice plays a role in the formation of opinions about immigration. They disagree about what kind of prejudice is at work: group-centric prejudice is motivated simply by one’s (explicit or implicit) dislike of Latinos, whereas civic fairness-driven prejudice occurs because people assume that Latinos violate civic fairness norms. Accordingly, our goal now is to illustrate how civic fairness plays a role in the anatomy of ethnic discrimination itself.
Congenital renal and urinary tract anomalies are common, accounting for up to 21% of all congenital abnormalities . The reported incidence is approximately 1:250–1:1000 pregnancies  and the routine use of prenatal ultrasonography allows relatively early detection, particularly for the obstructive uropathies, which account for the majority. According to the latest UK renal registry report in 2015, ‘obstructive uropathy’ was the second leading cause (19%) of chronic renal failure in children under 16 years of age after renal dysplasia +/− reflux . The obstructions may occur within the upper or lower urinary tract, and their prognosis varies significantly, with obstructions at the level of the bladder neck being associated with the majority of neonatal mortality and renal failure. In untreated cases, perinatal mortality is high (up to 45%, often because of associated severe oligohydramnios and pulmonary hypoplasia) , and 30% of the survivors suffer from end-stage renal failure (ESRF) requiring dialysis and renal transplantation before the age of 5 . The overall chance of survival in childhood is lowest if renal support therapy or transplantation is commenced before 2 years old when compared with starting at 12–16 years old (hazard ratio [HR] of 4.1, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.7–9.9, P = 0.002) . Therefore, in utero intervention, by the insertion of a vesicoamniotic shunt, or therapeutic treatment by fetal cystoscopy and valvular ablation, has been attempted to attenuate in utero progression of these pathologies (and their consequences) and to alter the natural history of congenital bladder neck obstruction in childhood. In this chapter, we discuss the etiology, pathophysiology, prenatal presentation and diagnosis of congenital bladder neck obstruction. Suggested algorithms for screening and the prenatal prognostic evaluation in selecting candidates for in utero therapy will be discussed.
What do Americans want from immigration policy and why? In the rise of a polarized and acrimonious immigration debate, leading accounts see racial anxieties and disputes over the meaning of American nationhood coming to a head. The resurgence of parochial identities has breathed new life into old worries about the vulnerability of the American Creed. This book tells a different story, one in which creedal values remain hard at work in shaping ordinary Americans' judgements about immigration. Levy and Wright show that perceptions of civic fairness - based on multiple, often competing values deeply rooted in the country's political culture - are the dominant guideposts by which most Americans navigate immigration controversies most of the time and explain why so many Americans simultaneously hold a mix of pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant positions. The authors test the relevance and force of the theory over time and across issue domains.