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The Whole Class Ensemble Tuition (WCET) is a model of teaching and learning music which takes place in many English primary schools. It is a relative newcomer to music pedagogy in the primary school. In the groundbreaking study reported in this paper, two new models of teaching and learning music are proposed. These are (a) Music education starts with the instrument and (b) Music education takes place via the instrument. Conceptualised descriptions of classroom music pedagogies are not commonplace, and so this paper makes a significant contribution to the music education research literature by delineating, describing and labelling two of these with reference to the WCET programme. These distinctions are of international significance and are useful to describe differences between programmes, which constitutes a major contribution to music curricula discussions. The paper concludes that clarity on the purposes of teaching and learning is fundamental to effective musical pedagogy and that this is a matter that education systems worldwide should be considering.
I explore the construction of women as the secret for the ‘successful’ prosecution of war in Afghanistan. To do so, I take up the mobilization of gender in the US counterinsurgency doctrine as deployed in Afghanistan. I draw on the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, human rights and humanitarian reports, and scholarly works to identify and analyze this mobilization, paying attention to the colonial histories upon which COIN explicitly and implicitly relies. By critically integrating these sources and the paradigmatic moments that exemplify COIN, I demonstrate the constitutive relationship of gender and COIN. The valence of the secret – of women as concealing, revealing, being, and bearing the secret – is still a lesser explored element in the analysis of the gendering of COIN and of its ‘military orientalism’. Even as scholars have powerfully shown how, in the case of Afghanistan and elsewhere, the veil functions as an overdetermined and ‘multilayered signifier’ in its own right, symbolizing the ‘tension between disclosure and concealment that defines the dominant conception of the secret’, less subject to detailed analysis in case of Afghanistan is the ways in which Afghan women are constituted through COIN in polysemous relation to the notion of the secret.
In this article, we focus on the subset of evolutionary theorising self-identified as Feminist Evolutionary Analytic (FEA) within security studies and International Relations. We offer this accounting in four sections. First, we provide a brief overview of the argument that reproductive interests are the ‘origins’ of international violence. Second, we break down the definitions of gender, sex, and sexuality used in evolutionary work in security studies generally and in FEA specifically, demonstrating a lack of complexity in FEA’s accounts of the potential relations among the three and critiquing their essentialist heteronormative assumptions. Third, we argue that FEA’s failure to reflect on the history and context of evolutionary theorising, much less contemporary feminist critiques, facilitates its forwarding of the state and institutions as primarily neutral and corrective bulwarks against male violence. Fourth, we conclude by outlining what is at stake if we fail to correct for this direction in feminist, IR, and security research. We argue that FEA work misrepresents and narrows the potential for understanding and responding to violence, facilitating the continued instrumentalisation of women’s rights, increased government regulation of sexuality, and a more expansive form of militarism.
Coming so soon after the defeat at Aughrim, the surrender of Galway in July 1691 was a crushing blow to the Jacobite army. Galway was long recognised as a weak point in Jacobite resistance and several of the town's inhabitants, including the Jacobite judge, Denis Daly, had maintained contact with the Williamite forces from late 1690. Others, such as Sir John Kirwan (a former mayor), Arthur French (mayor in 1691) and Oliver Martin were instrumental in convincing Ginkel to approach the town in July 1691 without waiting for his artillery. Their motivation was the retention of their estates in return for the surrender of the town without a siege. The articles of Galway were significantly more comprehensive than previous terms of surrender, indicating the importance of Galway to the Jacobite war effort, the pressure on Ginkel to conclude the war that year and the presence of skilled lawyers on the Irish side. The agreed terms related only to the residents and officials of Galway and the soldiers garrisoned there. Throughout the 1690s the Galway articlemen doggedly pursued the rights promised them by the articles. On several occasions their efforts led to the creation of an informal lobby group or committee, which met with qualified success. Concurrently, individual claimants petitioned for their rights under the articles. Their efforts were concentrated on the four principal articles: 8, 9, 12 and 13.
The articlemen of Galway, no less than those of Limerick, lobbied throughout the decade to ensure that the terms signed in July 1691 were honoured. Two separate bills were drafted by the Irish government in 1692 in an attempt to implement in part the articles of Galway. Of these, the indemnity bill has already been discussed in chapter 4. Section I of this chapter discusses the second bill, which related to the right of lawyers claiming the articles of Galway to continue practising after the war, alongside the reaction of the Galway articlemen to article 13 of Limerick. Several other issues arose in the 1690s that required the close attention of the Irish and English governments. Three men played prominent roles as lobbyists and advocates for the articles of Galway: Arthur French, Denis Daly and John Bourke, Baron Bophin and future earl of Clanricarde. French and Daly were instrumental in the negotiation of the articles, while article 13 of Galway was designed with Lord Bophin in mind.
The 1689 parliament and its legislative achievements represented the high point of the brief Catholic resurgence of James II's reign. The time and space necessary to implement the new Catholic polity's programme of reform could only be afforded by the restoration of James II to the throne. Following William and Mary's coronation in London as king and queen of England, Scotland and Ireland in April 1689, it became increasingly clear that an invasion of Ireland was imminent. Much to the frustration of Irish Protestants sheltering in England, preparations for that invasion took longer than anticipated and it was not until August 1689 that Williamite forces landed at Bangor Bay, under the command of the duke of Schomberg. The war of the two kings had commenced, and the future of the Catholic counter-revolution hung in the balance.
This chapter provides a fresh analysis of the Jacobite war effort up to and including the negotiation of the articles of Limerick, the terms of surrender signed in October 1691 that brought the war to an end. As the owner of substantial ironworks in the west of Ireland, John Browne became increasingly important as a supplier of raw iron, tools and weaponry to the Jacobite army. Though relations between the Jacobite administration and Browne were strained throughout 1690, his importance to the war effort and his legal expertise led to his inclusion in the commission appointed to negotiate a Jacobite surrender in September 1691. Conscious of his still dire financial position, Browne took full advantage of the negotiations to spread liability for his personal debts to every Catholic landowner in Ireland.
Irish Jacobite preparations for a possible invasion from England began in earnest in December 1688, when Tyrconnell issued commissions for raising 50,000 men. Tyrconnell's aims were overly ambitious on several fronts, not least of which was the near impossibility of moulding such a large body of inexperienced men, for the most part commanded by wholly unqualified officers, into a functioning, disciplined army. Realising the logistical challenges that his actions had presented, Tyrconnell sought to reduce the Jacobite army to more manageable proportions throughout the first months of 1689, causing friction with the newly commissioned officers.
The articles of Galway and Limerick were considerably more complex than the surrenders previously negotiated and, owing to the number of Catholics expected to claim their benefit, were much more important to the Williamite settlement in Ireland. As a consequence both sets of articles – particularly the articles of Limerick – were subjected to intense scrutiny by the Irish and English administrations. Moreover, the greater number of claimants to the articles of Limerick allowed the articlemen to fund and direct a lobbying effort more concentrated in nature than that of the minor articlemen. Throughout the 1690s, the interpretation and implementation of the articles of Galway and Limerick provoked controversy. This chapter examines the articles of Limerick, with a particular focus on their early interpretation by the Irish and English governments. The articles of Limerick were viewed with deep suspicion and hostility by Irish Protestants, who feared a repeat of the Catholic resurgence of the 1680s. The Irish government came under intense pressure, both from the articlemen and the Protestant polity, to interpret the articles in different ways. Protestants argued for as narrow an interpretation as possible, while the articlemen naturally pressed the opposite case.
Section II identifies the leading Catholic lobbyists in London and analyses the inconsistent attitude adopted by the Irish government to the implementation of the articles. The king's official attitude to the articles of surrender during the 1690s was that they should be interpreted with ‘justice but not favour’. Justice was, however, a fluid concept and the Irish and English administrations sought ways to exploit the weaknesses of the articles. The potential for instability in Ireland was enormous, and the Williamite authorities were mindful that to revoke the articles entirely was potentially catastrophic. They were required to tread a fine line between pandering to Protestant hostility to the articles, and appearing overly sympathetic to the recently defeated Jacobite rebels. Section III addresses attempts in 1692 to give legislative protection to the articles of Limerick through a proposed bill of indemnity, while Section IV provides an overview of continued hostility to the articles among Protestant politicians, up to the passing of the act confirming an abridged version of the articles of Limerick in 1697 and the opening of the third and final court of claims.
It is difficult to gauge the overall effect of article 13 of Limerick, and the prolonged sale of the estate, on John Browne's family and on the wider Connacht community. From 1698 Browne's eldest son Peter became increasingly involved in the management of the family's debts. Browne's four other children (Valentine, Bridget, Elizabeth and Mary) were largely peripheral figures in this business, though the marriages of two of his three daughters and their consequent dowries placed him under further financial burdens and brought Browne into conflict with their husbands. As Browne's most important legal representative in the 1690s and 1700s, Edmund Malone played a prominent role in the management of his affairs, including disputes with Lord Athenry and Viscount Mayo, Browne's sons-in-law. In Dublin, Luke Hussey's diligence was important to the management of Browne's business. This chapter examines the impact of John Browne's debts on the lives of his children, as well as the agency of his nephew Edmund Malone on behalf of several Catholic and Protestant families in Counties Galway and Mayo. The first section analyses Malone's work in London as he managed the affairs of the Brownes of the Neale, the Blakes of Moyne, County Galway, and the Veseys of County Galway, as well as Malone's occasionally tense relationship with his uncle. The lives of Browne's children are discussed in section II, through the prism of their relationship with their father. Though Peter Browne's correspondence is relatively well preserved among the Westport papers, the same cannot be said of Valentine Browne and his three sisters. Section III examines the conversion to Protestantism of two of John Browne's grandsons: Francis Bermingham, future Baron Athenry, and Peter Browne's son, John Browne, future earl of Altamont. Francis Bermingham's conversion in particular allows an insight into the pressure brought to bear on the Catholic gentry of Ireland by the penal laws.
The main branch of the Browne family remained at the Neale after the death of Colonel John Browne's father in 1670, with the estate inherited by George Browne, the eldest son. Like his father and several of his direct descendants, George Browne never assumed the baronetcy bestowed on the family in 1636 – that title was not assumed until 1762, by George Browne's great–grandson (also named George) whose brother John was in turn elevated to the peerage as Baron Kilmaine (second creation) in 1789.
The trajectory of John Browne's career, between the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 and the death of William III in 1702, mirrored that of the wider Catholic ‘new interest’. None of his contemporaries were, however, able to match Browne's extreme levels of success and failure. Between 1666 and 1680 Browne created an enormous estate in the west of Ireland, consisting of more than 155,000 acres. Not content with this accomplishment, he also set out to establish himself as an ironmaster, rapidly accumulating debts as he sought to build a profitable business. This was to prove his undoing. Heavily indebted by the mid-1680s, Browne never again enjoyed a period of financial stability. Given time he may have been able to recover his position, but James II's reign introduced a period of instability in the three kingdoms that culminated with William of Orange's invasion of England in November 1688. Browne's subsequent support for the Jacobite cause was as wholehearted as any, though the underlying motive is clear. In the event of a Jacobite victory, James II would have written off at least a portion of those debts in payment for Browne's services. Trusting in this eventuality, and on the acquisition of a new estate from forfeited Protestant lands, Browne did not join with other prominent ‘new interest’ landowners who actively assisted the Williamites during the war. His loyalty ensured a place at the negotiating table in 1691 as a representative of the Jacobites, and offered an opportunity that Browne gladly took. The resulting articles of surrender set the course of the remainder of his life.
Article 13 of Limerick ensured that Browne was unique among the articlemen. The article itself was exceptional in that the legislative and executive branches of government made repeated attempts to ensure its implementation and to secure parliamentary ratification, beginning with the very first parliament of the post-war era. On their side too, the motive is clear – the vast majority of the beneficiaries of article 13 were Protestant and many were members of parliament or officeholders. Beyond the confines of his immediate family, it is difficult to know how Browne was regarded by Catholics in Connacht, or indeed the rest of Ireland. His sons-in-law clearly looked to him for advice and counsel, even if relations with both were occasionally strained.
One of the most controversial aspects of the articles of Limerick was the protection, enshrined in article 13, for the payment of debts owed by John Browne to his Protestant creditors and which predated the outbreak of the war. The article stated that the assets Browne had put aside to pay his debts had been commandeered by Tyrconnell and Sarsfield, and put to use supplying the Irish army. Browne had been promised compensation, but this was an undertaking that obviously could not be fulfilled following the defeat of the Jacobites. Article 13 transferred responsibility for the Jacobite administration's debt to Browne to all estates held by Irish Catholics after the war, by virtue of ‘articles and capitulations’. Sarsfield was required to certify the amount of money owed to Browne by the Jacobite government within twenty-one days of the signing of the articles. By 1692 the majority of the articlemen had reluctantly agreed to honour the terms of article 13 through the payment of a special levy, equivalent to one year's quit-rent. The intended beneficiaries were, uniquely under the articles of surrender, mostly Protestant. Browne too stood to gain by staving off financial ruin, but article 13 was, in theory and eventual implementation, punitive to his fellow Catholic landowners.
As a result, the usual pattern of Catholic lobbying in relation to the articles of surrender was reversed. Article 13 created an anomalous situation where articlemen actually sought to prevent the implementation of one of the articles of Limerick. The quit-rent levy imposed by the article was, however, vital to John Browne's efforts to repay his debts and he pursued its implementation vigorously. Between 1692 and 1705, Browne joined forces with his creditors to lobby for legislation to implement the article and to thwart any opposition. Browne and his creditors employed agents in Dublin and London to argue their case, where they were opposed by the articlemen. Rather than lobbying for as broad an interpretation as possible, as they had done with the remaining articles, the articlemen sought to restrict the scope of article 13 as narrowly as possible.
The articlemen and protectees argued against article 13 before the Irish and English privy councils. They were in fraught territory. Objections had to be carefully worded so as not to appear to question the legality or binding nature of the articles as a whole.