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Civil war has been a fact of political life throughout recorded history. However, unlike inter-state wars, international law has not traditionally regulated such conflicts. How then can we explain the post-1945 emergence and evolution of international treaty rules regulating the conduct of internal armed conflict: the 'Civil War Regime'? Negotiating Civil War combines insights derived from Realist, Rationalist, Liberal, and Constructivist approaches to International Relations to answer this question, revisiting the negotiation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols, and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This study provides a rigorous, critical account of the making of the Civil War Regime. Sophisticated and persuasive, it illustrates the complex interplay of material, ideational, social, and strategic factors in shaping these rules with important lessons for the making and unmaking of international law in a rapidly shifting international political, economic, and security environment.
The search for mechanisms in personality disorders (PDs) is of growing importance, because PDs are prevalent, costly, and challenging to treat. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of compelling mechanistic research on PDs and psychopathology more broadly, due to equivocal definitions of a “mechanism” and study designs that are atheoretical and/or ill-suited for causal inferences.This chapter defines mechanisms as elements of possible causal sequence, which not only increase the probability of observed outcomes but also reveal how the outcomes occur. In addition, the authors argue that it is not always necessary to break down a mechanism to its most elemental physical parts; rather, it is important to consider how mechanisms act as complex, interacting components of a causal chain, with a focus on those that could serve as viable targets for prevention and intervention. Considering this broader definition of a “mechanism,” it is crucial that PD researchers ground their work in testable theories, such as those considering dimensional, transdiagnostic precursors to PDs. In this chapter, the authors also address various design and statistical considerations in PD mechanistic research and highlight promising developments in identifying mechanisms of PDs across multiple levels of measurement (e.g., biological, contextual, environmental) and across the lifespan.
This rejoinder addresses commentaries by Markon and Bornovalova and colleagues. Markon highlighted challenges associated with determining cause and effect in mechanistic research. He theorized that “weak emergence” may account, in part, for the complex development of personality pathology. Bornovalova and colleagues addressed transactional relations between various phenomena that may influence development of personality pathology over time. In this rejoinder, the authors build upon these commentaries to further highlight challenges associated with identifying true mechanisms in psychopathology. They hypothesize that dynamical systems models, which conceptualize people as systems open to incalculable environmental influences, may provide an alternative approach through which researchers can examine complex mechanisms more accurately. Although such models are nascent in clinical research, particularly in the context of personality disorders, these approaches may provide more nuanced interpretations of mechanisms and may ultimately enrich our understanding of processes underlying the emergence of personality disorders.
A series of eleven patients prescribed intramuscular clozapine at five UK sites is presented. Using routinely collected clinical data, we describe the use, efficacy and safety of this treatment modality.
We administered 188 doses of intramuscular clozapine to eight patients. The remaining three patients accepted oral medication. With the exception of minor injection site pain and nodules, side-effects were as expected with oral clozapine, and there were no serious untoward events. Nine patients were successfully established on oral clozapine with significant improvement in their clinical presentations.
Although a novel formulation in the UK, we have shown that intramuscular clozapine can be used safely and effectively when the oral route is initially refused.
Two crucial human cognitive goals are to understand and to learn. Both goals often require active management, actively questing for knowledge. Children’s questions, both purposeful and incidental, both verbal and nonverbal, do this. Questions start early in life, change in nature and influence, but powerfully impact cognitive development all along the way. Often they do so as an antecedent and a consequence of children’s investment in explanatory understanding. I use my research and the research of my collaborators to address these topics as well as describe several of the steps and processes whereby questions and explanations drive the development of children’s comprehension and learning.
In this research, we analyze the economic effects across various crop insurance subsidy and policy scenarios to determine producer insurance choice response, total premium and subsidy payments and study their economic implications on dryland corn, soybean, and winter wheat producers. We rely on the expected utility maximization framework to rank policy combination sets that are available to a typical producer to analyze the impacts of crop insurance subsidy changes and elimination of certain insurance policies across the three crops. Several scenarios were analyzed across subsidy and policy options and were found to have noticeably different farmer behavioral responses and economic implications.
Use of antipsychotic drugs in long-term aged care (LTC) is prevalent and commonly exceeds the recommended duration, but contributors to this problem are not well understood. The objective of this study is to provide a snapshot of the features of and contributors to prolonged use of antipsychotic medications (>12 weeks) among a sample of LTC residents.
We present retrospective and baseline data collected for the Australian Halting Antipsychotic Use in Long-Term Care (HALT) single-arm longitudinal deprescribing trial.
Twenty-four long-term care facilities in Sydney, Australia.
The HALT study included 146 older people living in 24 Sydney LTC homes who had been prescribed a regular antipsychotic medication for at least 3 months at baseline.
Detailed file audit was conducted to identify the date and indication recorded at initial prescription, consenting practices, longitudinal course of prescribing, and recommendations for review of antipsychotic medication. Behavioural and psychological symptoms of dementia (BPSD) and functional dependence at baseline were assessed via LTC staff interview. Cognition at baseline was assessed in a participant interview (where possible).
Antipsychotics were prescribed for 2.2 years on average despite recommendations by a doctor or pharmacist for review in 62% of cases. Consent for antipsychotic prescription was accessible for only one case and contraindications for use were common. Longer use of antipsychotics was independently associated with higher dose of the antipsychotic drug and greater apathy, but not with other BPSD.
Antipsychotic medications appeared to be prescribed in this sample as a maintenance treatment in the absence of active indicated symptoms and without informed consent. Standard interventions, including recommendations for review, had been insufficient to ensure evidence-based prescribing.
Seed dispersal is an important ecological process that structures plant communities and influences ecosystem functioning. Loss of animal dispersers therefore poses a serious threat to forest ecosystems, particularly in the tropics where zoochory predominates. A prominent example is the near-total extinction of seed dispersers on the tropical island of Guam following the accidental introduction of the invasive brown tree snake (Boiga irregularis), negatively impacting seedling recruitment and forest regeneration. We investigated frugivory by a remnant population of Såli (Micronesian starling – Aplonis opaca) on Guam and two other island populations (Rota, Saipan) to evaluate their ecological role as a seed disperser in the Mariana archipelago. Using a combination of behavioural observations, nest contents and fecal samples, we documented frugivory of 37 plant species. Native plants comprised the majority (66%) of all species and 90% of all seeds identified in fecal and nest contents. Diet was highly similar across age classes and sampling years. In addition, plant species consumed by Såli comprised 88% of bird-dispersed adult trees and 54% of all adult trees in long-term forest monitoring plots, demonstrating the Såli’s broad diet and potential for restoring native forests. Overall, we provide the most comprehensive assessment to date of frugivory by the Såli and confirm its importance as a seed disperser on Guam and throughout the Marianas.
For about a century there has been a modest research effort to explain the nature of prodigies and savants. Savant research emerged out of the medical field and centered on deficit/remediation. Research with prodigies generally consists of case studies by psychologists with an interest in the manifestation and development of extreme talent, sometimes as part of the “gifted child” movement in the United States, more recently as anomalies in developmental psychology.
Research into both phenomena evolved to incorporate new questions, including debates over the role of general versus specific intellectual abilities in talent development. This chapter summarizes and reviews research on prodigies and savants. It also reviews what, to date, has been found about the nature and interplay of general and specific intellectual strengths and weaknesses more generally, offering a possible role for both specific talent and general ability.
Experiments allow researchers to determine cause and effect relations between variables. As such, they are a critical component in the advance of scientific psychology. In this chapter, we discuss the theory behind the design of good experiments, and provide a sample study for evaluation. We outline three important types of replication, and give an overview of historical events that led to a renewed vigilance regarding replicability. Finally, we discuss generalizability of research in terms of four factors: Subjects (or participants), materials used in the experiment, dependent measures, and the experimental situation. Effects that generalize across these sets of factors are robust. We end the chapter with a set of 18 critical-thinking questions that should be borne in mind while reading and evaluating experimental research. Referring to these questions will help to sharpen critical thinking skills about experimental research.
Kant begins the second Critique by explaining its title. Noting that the aim of the first Critique was to restrict the use of pure, i.e., a priori, reasoning to phenomena, and that this might suggest that its successor be termed a critique of pure practical reason rather than simply a critique of practical reason, he points out that its aim is to show that there is such a thing as pure practical reason and this requires a critique of reason’s entire practical capacity (KpV 5: 32–7; 139). As he did in the first Critique, Kant uses the term ‘critique’ in both its positive and negative senses. Taken positively, it means examining practical reason as a distinct source of a priori cognitions; whereas taken negatively it means examining the pretension of empirically conditioned practical reason, which presupposes given desires, to be the only legitimate use of practical reason. In other words, Kant’s negative target is the view that there is no such thing as a pure use of practical reason; just as his main target in the first Critique was an all-encompassing empiricism, which denies that there is any synthetic a priori knowledge.1 Since the practical function of reason is to determine the will, this means that Kant’s positive goal in the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, which is the counterpart of the Transcendental Analytic in the first Critique, is to ground the claim that reason of itself can determine the will, which is to say that pure reason can be practical. But rather than providing a demonstration of this in the form of a deduction of the moral law/categorical imperative, as he attempted unsuccessfully in the Groundwork, Kant now claims that this capacity can be shown to be a fact, which he refers to as the “fact of reason.”
Having completed our survey of Kant’s thoughts on free will during the “Silent Decade,” we are in a position to examine his account in the first Critique. The task is complicated, however, by the fact that Kant discusses the issue in two distinct places in the work: the Transcendental Dialectic in connection with the Third Antinomy and the Canon of Pure Reason in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Moreover, these two accounts have often been thought to be incompatible, with the former containing the genuinely “critical” view and the latter vestiges of Kant’s earlier views discussed in Chapter 5, which has led to the application of the so-called patchwork thesis to his accounts of freedom in the first Critique. In previous discussions of this issue, I have argued against this view, claiming that the two accounts are compatible and that in order to recognize this it is necessary to view them in light of the distinct tasks of the portions of the Critique in which they are located.1 I shall adopt the same strategy here, though I shall focus not only on the discrepancies, real and apparent, between the two accounts, but also on the relation of both to Kant’s fragmentary accounts in the “Silent Decade,” which exhibited many of same tensions. Inasmuch as it is not only the first and most important discussion of the topic in the Critique, but also the foundation for all of Kant’s subsequent treatments of it, the former account will receive the bulk of our attention. The chapter is divided into five parts, with the first four devoted to the account in the Dialectic. These deal respectively with the nature and source of the antinomial conflict, the thesis and antithesis arguments of the Third Antinomy, Kant’s claim that transcendental idealism is the key to the resolution of this conflict, and the lengthy account of freedom based upon this analysis.
For most philosophers, including Kantians of various stripes, the importance of the third Critique rests primarily in its containing a systematic account of Kant’s aesthetics, while others focus their attention on its presentation of his views on teleology and the philosophy of biology, and still others, including myself, pair its two introductions with the Appendix to the Dialectic in the first Critique in order to find therein Kant’s vindication of inductive reasoning against a Humean skepticism.1 But despite this variety of concerns, which speaks to the complexity of the work, it may seem strange to find a full chapter devoted to it in a book supposedly concerned with Kant’s account of free will. The explanation for this is that among the main concerns of the third Critique is the relation between nature and freedom, which we have already seen was a central concern of Kant throughout his philosophical career. The problem takes three forms. The first, which finds its definitive formulation in the first Critique, is to show that freedom, considered as a mode of causality involving absolute spontaneity or a capacity for first beginnings, is compatible with the causality of nature, conceived as mechanistic in a broad sense, wherein every “beginning,” conceived as a coming to be in time, preceded by an occurrence from which it follows necessarily in accordance with a rule. Since these modes of causality are deemed mutually exclusive, the task is to show that they could be predicated simultaneously, without contradiction, of the same action and agent, which Kant does by appealing to transcendental idealism. And we further saw that, while the first Critique is content to establish merely the logical possibility of such predication, since that is all that is thought necessary to resolve the Third Antinomy, the second Critique considers this as a starting point and by appealing to the fact of reason takes the further step of arguing for the reality of such freedom through the practical use of pure reason.
Kant’s initial major treatment of the free will problem after that in the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason was in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). It is marked by the introduction of the conception of the autonomy of the will, which is Kant’s attempt to provide a foundation for morality after his realization of the inadequacy of his position in the Canon, where it was provided by a rational faith based on the hope that happiness will be rewarded in proportion to the worthiness of it. As was noted, this appeal to hope was intended to provide an incentive or principium executionis for obeying the dictates of morality, with these dictates being themselves grounded in the moral law (the principium diiudicationis), which is a product of pure reason. And, as was also noted, it was precisely because the latter was located in pure reason that the principium executionis was regarded as problematic; for it raises the question of how pure reason, which, ex hypothesi, abstracts from any considerations of self-interest, could have a motivating power, particularly when its dictates conflict with the agent’s perceived self-interest. In Kant’s terms, this became the question: How can pure reason be practical, i.e., determine the power of choice? But while the central focus of this chapter will be on this thesis and its implications for both Kant’s account of freedom and the project of grounding the categorical imperative as principium diiudicationis as delineated in the Groundwork, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the development of Kant’s thought on these issues, it is necessary to preface the discussion with a brief consideration of two texts that stem from the period between the publication of the first edition of the Critique and the Groundwork, namely, Kant’s review of a work that attempted to provide a deterministic grounding for morality (1783) and the account of freedom in the transcription of the Metaphysic Mrongovius, which is a set of lectures dated between 1782 and 1783.
During this extended period Kant published only one work of philosophical import: On Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (1770) [De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis] (henceforth referred to as the Dissertation); and it does not contain a single direct reference to the free will problem. Nevertheless, it is evident from the transcripts of his lectures and the Reflexionen from this period that it was a time in which Kant paid considerable attention to this topic, as well as many others that became central to his later thought. Moreover, despite Kant’s silence on the topic in the Dissertation, which followed shortly after the epiphany of the “Great Light,” (1769), the main results of this work cannot be ignored here, since they played a decisive role in Kant’s subsequent treatment of the problem. The aim of this chapter is to trace the development of Kant’s thoughts on free will during this period and it is divided into four parts. The first considers the nature and significance of the “Great Light” and its bearing on the Dissertation; the second and lengthiest, largely (but not always) following the chronology adopted by Adickes, examines the accounts contained in Kant’s numerous Reflexionen from the period; while the third and fourth analyze his views expressed in his lectures on metaphysics and practical philosophy respectively,