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The “rule of law” is a relatively recent addition to the development project.1 Only after the end of the 1980s, when the Cold War was over, history had ended,2 and three worlds had putatively become “one,” did it also become commonsensical for law, institutions and “governance” to be understood as integral to “development.”3 Since that time, not only have developmental institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and regional development banks explicitly taken up promotion of the rule of law as a core aspect of their mandates, but a significant marketplace of international, transnational, government, and domestic actors has emerged.4 The result is a multi-billion dollar industry that is centrally concerned with “the rule of law” as instrument, end, and indicator of “development,” positioned at the heart of state-making more broadly.
This chapter focuses on psychology in South Africa as a discipline and profession embedded in a history of colonialism and apartheid. It a describes South African psychology as a site of epistemological contestation shaped by historical racial identities and relations of power and asserts that liberation psychology is central to the contribution of the profession to eliminating human rights violations and fostering well-being. National student protests in 2015–2016 called for the “decolonization” of the curriculum, bringing into sharp focus the decades-long debate about the relevance of psychology and the need for transformation. While the focus is psychology in South Africa, the chapter broadens the discussion of decolonizing the field to other nations plagued by histories of racial oppression such as Australia and the United States. Changes in the decolonizing process are not without their challenges, yet in a field of study that is one of the most popular among students, a cogent move toward decolonizing the psychology curriculum entails the invention of new voices and theories as well as liberation psychology practices that center squarely on the needs for equity, violence prevention, and social justice.
This paper examines the determinants of financial industry actors’ regulatory preferences—examining why some financial industry actors prefer less stringent financial regulations while others prefer more stringent regulations. The determination of preferences, we argue, can be understood as mutually dependent. How an organization is connected to other organisations through network ties may help to explain its regulatory preferences. Our empirical point of focus is financial industry lobbying in the context of the European Union (EU). Using data from nearly nine hundred lobbying letters related to legislation on banking, insurance, and securities regulation, we map out a “socialization network” that models connections between financial industry firms, their associations, as well as a broad range of other organisations and actors that are auxiliary to this community of organizations. Using these data we find evidence that organizations’ preferences are informed by their location within this socialization network. Controlling for a range of other plausible factors, we find that 1) those connected via common associational ties, 2) those closer to one another in the network and 3) those more “embedded” in this network are all less likely to diverge in terms of their preferences from one another.