Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021, 140 pages, £ 26.99

In his latest book, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim examines the relationship between human rights, the lack of success in protecting them, and the continuing neocolonial infl uence of former colonial powers in international relations, but also in terms of the framing of human rights. The author analyses the reasons for the ineff ectiveness of global human rights protection and identifi es viable alternatives, on a theoretical and practical level, to overcome these challenges.

In the first two chapters, An-Naim argues that the main reason for the lack of success of existing human rights protection is that the treaties are not based on universally valid values, but, rather, are a product of postcolonial power relations created by the Global North to maintain its power relations. He therefore accuses Western Europe, Russia, and the United States in particular, of ‘protecting their strategic interests and expanding their geopolitical and economic hegemony’, while pretending to defend and promote universally valid human rights. He supports his arguments with realpolitik observations, and illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of international law by depicting the massive infl uence of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. According to his arguments, decisions and interventions of the Security Council are not aimed at improving the living conditions of the ‘protected’, but are instead primarily aimed at maintaining national interests. In this context, the author accuses the United States of hypocrisy when it comes to the protection of human rights by highlighting the paradox of having minimal ratification rates of human rights treaties, coupled with extensive reservations and other restrictions on the scope of the treaties, while at the same time the United States claims global leadership in this area.

A second inherent problem wiThexisting human rights frameworks is the Eurocentric theoretical concept on which they are based. The imposition of European (liberal) values, legal systems and institutions as the sole sources of human rights leads to two major implications: on the one hand, to a renewed projection of the normative authority of former colonial states, and, on the other hand, this exclusive framework protects only certain rights, namely those that follow the European narrative of liberal rights.

ABSTRACT

Refugee integration is a highly politicised topic and is rarely analysed from a legal perspective. This contribution aims to address this gap by tracing the potential of the right to be integrated in legal terms, analysing its legal sources in European human rights law, and in European Union (EU, the Union) law, using a doctrinal method. It answers the question: is there a state obligation to provide integration support for refugees? And, alternatively, is there a right for refugees to be integrated? While such an acknowledgement has a high value from a practical perspective, to further the rights of refugees by legally obliging states to build inclusive societies in line with democratic values and principles, it is also important from the point of view of ensuring legal certainty. By being sensitised to the different uses and underlying principles of integration, judges could ensure a higher level of legal consistency in cases pertaining to integration. The contribution reveals that there is a right for refugees to be integrated which has its source in EU law. However, as it has not been invoked so far, the current analysis proposes an interpretation of that right in terms of both its content and level of protection.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the study of integration has come under a lot of criticism in social sciences, with critics disparaging the concept altogether due to its inherent bias towards imposing a vision of society ruled by majority and white-privilege power structures. In response, other scholars have argued for the value of integration research, and for the need to distinguish between the analytic and policy concepts of integration, calling for a critical approach to the latter. Integration remains a highly politicised topic and, as such, is rarely analysed from a legal perspective, as much as there is a need for such analysis. Despite remaining a political concept, integration is often used in the case law both of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the two major supranational courts in Europe.

ABSTRACT

This contribution takes Turkey’s use of the derogation mechanism in the aftermath of the failed military coup of 15 July 2016 as a springboard to critically address the operation and the fallacies of the contemporary European derogation regime. The assessment will reveal whether the European system of human rights protection has succeeded in adopting an adequate and viable approach that can counterbalance the increased leeway accorded to derogating states, and formulate safeguards to mitigate human rights abuses. The contribution concludes by providing a road map proposal for adequate oversight marked by rigorous scrutiny of derogation claims that can be described as a ‘consultation and cooperation process’. This process would place the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in a more active and operationally focused position to influence state decisions, to counterbalance the increased leeway accorded to derogating states, and to formulate safeguards to mitigate human rights abuses.

INTRODUCTION

Emerging as they did from a long and terrible war, human rights for all were to become ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. To a considerable extent, international measures aimed at the protection of human rights are a success story. However, they frequently become vulnerable or inadequate in the face of the significant problems that arise when a state’s political survival is in danger. It is undeniable that states may be confronted wiThextraordinary situations posing fundamental threats to their territory, such as wars, terrorist attacks and natural calamities, and that, in such situations, they may resort to exceptional measures in order to overcome these perils and restore normality. More specifically, the expansive protections set forth in international human rights instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) can be subjected to derogation in times of national emergency.

Derogations, permitted under many human rights treaties, provide a ‘legal breathing space’ for states, enabling them to take ‘a rational response to domestic political uncertainty’ they are facing. In this vein, they do not conflict with the normative foundations and notion of human rights, but, rather, may contribute to their effective realisation and protection, given states’ positive obligations to protect the right to life.

ABSTRACT

Universities, as hubs of free exchange and analysis, and as cradles of new generations of change-makers, have always played a crucial role in contributing both a sound scientific basis for, and an analytical voice on, political decisionmaking. In recent years, when governments appear less capable and willing to protect democratic values and human rights, actors and institutions outside of governments are taking up an increasing responsibility towards achieving these objectives. In the context of the emergence of non-traditional human rights actors, this contribution analyses the human rights agency of universities. As a case study, it focuses on the recent crisis in Afghanistan, triggered by the Taliban takeover in August 2021, which resulted in a severe curtailing of academic freedom and an exodus of Afghans from the country. The crisis mobilised not only civil society, but also the academic world, to an exceptional degree. This translated into a variety of university initiatives and programmes, including protecting atrisk researchers, strengthening human rights education programmes, investing in practice- and advocacy-oriented research, and reinforcing academic interventions in political fora. Using the example of the response to the crisis in Afghanistan, this contribution thus analyses the developing role of universities as human rights actors, in particular their increasing human rights agency and evolving self-understanding, in a progressively challenging political climate.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most newsworthy crises of 2021 was the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, following the retreat of the US military after a 20-year presence in the country. In 2022, the war in Ukraine, following the Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory on 24 February, has swiftly replaced Afghanistan as the crisis situation dominating global news. Nevertheless, even though it is, by now, largely beyond the attention of the general public – with the exception of the continued closure of girls’ schools by the Taliban, which hit the news on 23 March 2022 – the humanitarian and human rights situation in Afghanistan remains concerning.

In the past year, the crisis in Afghanistan has triggered an exodus of international organisations and NGOs, as well as a movement of refugees out of Afghanistan, after hundreds of thousands of Afghan nationals found themselves at serious risk of losing their lives or liberty, or access to work and education, under a Taliban-led regime.

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU, the Union) budget for the period 2014–2020 proved insufficient to respond to the massive influx of refugees arriving from Syria in 2015. This deficiency led the European Commission and the Member States (MS) to resort to extraordinary measures, with more flexible and rapid instruments. Among those, the EU trust funds raised attention due to their lack of democratic accountability and financial transparency. The EU Trust Fund for Africa was particularly criticised for financing activities in third countries, which, like in the case of Libya, contributed to worsening the human rights situation for migrants. For the preparation of the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, the European Commission had to consider the shortcomings of the previous budget, as well as the lessons of the trust funds experience for the creation of new instruments. A new fund for EU external action was adopted. Due to its legislative nature, the ‘Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe’ (NDICI) contains major democratic safeguards, including provisions ensuring transparency. However, it sets a specific spending target of its financial envelope for migration management , and includes a form of migration conditionality to the external assistance, as well as elements of flexibility previously criticised, which could potentially lead to new human rights violations. This contribution aims at investigating to what extent the EU takes human rights into account in the management of external funds. The first section will try to identify the shortcomings of trust funds, through which the EU has indirectly contributed to human rights violations in third countries such as Libya. The second part of the contribution will address the strengths and weaknesses of the new NDICI-Global Europe fund, and particularly the risk of further potential violations.

INTRODUCTION

Since 2015, several shortcomings in the EU’s external border and migration policies have emerged. Due to new challenges, including increased migration flows, the COVID-19 pandemic and security concerns, the EU has adopted new strategies to protect its external borders. These strategies are inevitably linked to the Union’s budget and funds – one of the primary tools of the EU, contributing to its soft power.

ABSTRACT

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has long been subject to criticism from certain States Parties for its efforts to micromanage domestic courts in their adjudication of human rights cases. From Interlaken (2010) to Copenhagen (2018), an increasing focus on subsidiarity is evident in declarations from High-Level Conferences on the Future of the ECtHR. Overburdened by repetitive cases, and conscious of questions about its legitimacy, the ECtHR has responded to calls for increased deference to national authorities by adopting a more procedural approach in its jurisprudence. Thus, the ECtHR has begun to vary the intensity of its review, based on the quality of decision-making by both domestic courts and national parliaments. The procedural turn remains controversial, however. There are conflicting opinions, within the literature, on its potential and limits, while dissenting opinions from ECtHR judges indicate that there is a lack of consensus within the ECtHR itself as to how and when it should be applied. Furthermore, its application has been far from consistent. Through an examination of the relevant literature, publications and certain key cases, this contribution first explores the rationale behind the procedural turn. Cited justifications for its adoption are highlighted, and risks in its application are identified. Against this backdrop, the consistency of the ECtHR’s current application of the procedural turn, and the coherence of guidance given to domestic courts on its use, are considered through the analysis of a sample of 30 cases drawn from the ECtHR’s recent jurisprudence on the expulsion of settled migrants under Article 8.

INTRODUCTION

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has long been subject to criticism from certain States Parties for its alleged micromanagement of human rights cases. In 2013, the adoption of Protocol 15 amended the preamble of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) to include an explicit reference to subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation in its text for the first time. This amendment reflects the increasing focus on the subsidiarity of the ECtHR, seen in the 2012 Brighton Declaration, as well as declarations from other High-Level Conferences on its future, held in Interlaken, Izmir, Brussels and Copenhagen.

ABSTRACT

While the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides to its States Parties the possibility to lodge applications against other States Parties, so far the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered only a few judgments in such cases. Their execution has proven to be lengthy and incomplete, despite several efforts undertaken by the Committee of Ministers (CoM), supervising this process under Article 46(2) ECHR. The same concerns the few individual cases related to inter-state disputes, such as the group of cases Catan and others v Russia; and cases concerning the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between 1988 and 1994 – Chiragov and others v Armenia and Sargsyan v Azerbaijan.

Therefore, it would be useful to have a closer look at this problem, and to reflect on the adequacy of the reactions of the respondent states and the CoM. Are these judgments ‘executable’? Some of them are relatively recent (Georgia v Russia (I) and Georgia v Russia (II)), but the judgment Cyprus v Turkey has been pending before the CoM since 2001, although some of the aspects of this case have already been closed. This contribution will refer to all the abovementioned judgments, which are under ‘enhanced supervision’ of the CoM, and to the measures taken by the respondent states to execute them, in the context of the proceedings before the CoM on the basis of Article 46(2) ECHR. It will not focus on proceedings before the ECtHR in inter-state cases or individual cases related to inter-state disputes.

INTRODUCTION

Since the entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1953, the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have dealt with 31 inter-state cases, lodged on the basis of Article 33 ECHR.

ABSTRACT

This contribution focuses on the framework of human and fundamental rights related to science: on the one hand, scientific research has been heavily influenced by the impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and digital technologies; on the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic has made clear the need to strengthen the Right to Science, ensuring its effective enforcement and the maximum sharing of scientific knowledge. The aim of this contribution is to participate in the debate on the Right to Science by proposing a configuration of a Right to Open Science. It is suggested, therefore, to interpret European policies on Open Science as an explicit embodiment of the human Right to Science. This approach should be adopted as a benchmark in the forthcoming national and local implementations of European policies on Open Science, in order to increasingly guarantee the maximum sharing of knowledge and, at the same time, the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individuals involved.

INTRODUCTION

In the current era of the digital revolution, the impact of new technologies and digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) on scientific research is readily apparent. Technologies such as cloud computing, highperformance computing (HPC) and artificial intelligence (AI) are no longer exceptions in the world of scientific research; in many fields, they have become essential elements of scientific projects. This radical transformation, triggered by digital technologies, in the field of scientific research is represented by the emergence of the Open Science paradigm. Open Science can be generally defined as the new way of conducting science, which aims to foster the openness of every phase of the scientific research process from data collection to the dissemination of scientific results, within the scientific community, and externally, towards society. In recent years, European institutions and Member States have taken a clear stance in supporting and promoting the Open Science paradigm in Europe: projects such as the European Open Science Cloud confi rm the relevance of this matter at European level.

ABSTRACT

The vital role that National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) play in the domestication of international human rights law has long been documented. It is, therefore, surprising that only marginal attention has been given to how these actors can help implement judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court). Recently, however, there has been a promising change of course, as scholars have started to take note of the procedural involvement of NHRIs in the European Convention (ECHR) system. In particular, Rule 9(2) of the Committee of Minister Rules, which empowers NHRIs to formally participate in the execution process of the Court’s judgments, has become a topic of interest. In its 2021 Recommendation on NHRIs, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe affi rmed the importance of NHRI participation in the execution process of judgments of the ECtHR.

At this crossroads of scholarly and political attention to the importance of NHRI participation, this contribution discusses current and potential participation of NHRIs in the ECHR system to help advance the execution of judgments of the ECtHR. As such, it uses this momentum to revisit and add to proposals to further increase and strengthen their involvement. Against this background, this contribution sets out to provide insight into a wider array of procedural options available for NHRIs to participate within human rights systems with a view to contributing to effective human rights implementation. For this purpose, it studies the Inter-American Human Rights system, which is generally known for the strong participation of actors other than the state. Procedural possibilities for such actors, including NHRIs, are different from those under the ECHR system. A number of expert interviews with stakeholders of the Inter-American system carried out for this study help elucidate the role and impact of NHRIs. With due regard to institutional and contextual differences between the two systems, the contribution considers whether procedural opportunities and lessons learned from the Inter-American system can be kept in mind for bolstering and adding to proposals for further use of NHRIs in the European Convention context. In doing so, the present contribution seeks to help promote eff ective and full utilisation of NHRI potential in the European Convention system.

ABSTRACT

The present contribution analyses the developments in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2021. The relevant judgments and decisions have been selected on the basis of two criteria, namely qualifi cation as ‘key cases’ by the Court itself, and the attraction of the stakeholders’ attention and/or criticisms. Among the cases that met the above criteria, the author selected those cases that dealt with a common issue, namely the problem of the applicability (in terms of establishing states’ jurisdiction under Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights), and the interpretation and application (in terms of clarifying the content of states’ duties and determining whether they have been violated in the specific circumstances of the cases) of the Convention in situations of an international or cross-border nature. The analysis shows that the Court is, more and more, faced with similar situations. At the same time, although the Court is clearly willing to develop states’ Conventional duties and obligations in international and cross-border situations, a manifest preference for procedural instead of substantive obligation has been identified. In this regard, the specific topic dealt with in the present contribution confirms the more general tendency, identified by the literature on the Court’s case law, towards a ‘procedural review’ of Member States’ compliance with the Convention obligations.

INTRODUCTION

The point of departure for selecting the most relevant judgments and decisions issued by the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’) in one entire year seems to be the consultation of those that are qualified as ‘key cases’ by the Court itself. It can be assumed that those are the cases which raised complex legal issues and/or clarified, developed or overturned the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. From an academic point of view, however, the selection must also take into account cases which attracted attention and/or criticism from governments, NGOs, academics and other stakeholders.

ABSTRACT

The present contribution provides a broad overview over the fundamental and human rights law jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the year 2021. To that effect, seven Grand Chamber judgments in fields such as the rule of law, the right to remain silent, respect for private and family life and the best interest of the child, freedom to conduct business, the right to strike, and non-discrimination are discussed. As a general conclusion, it can be stated that the jurisprudence reveals a holistic approach, and a tendency towards a constitutionalist approach.

INTRODUCTION

In 2021, the CJEU delivered a number of important judgments in the field of human rights protection. The following contribution will discuss a selection of seven judgments which are of particular relevance. While the case selection is based on personal preference, and by no means provides a full account of the Court’s human rights jurisprudence in 2021, the contribution tries to give as broad an overview of the Court’s case law as possible. To that effect, judgments concerning the rule of law, the right to remain silent, respect for private and family life and the best interest of the child, freedom to conduct business, the right to strike, and non-discrimination are discussed. All judgments included are Grand Chamber judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that were delivered following a reference for a preliminary ruling. Each analysis starts with a brief introduction (1); followed by a short summary of the facts and background to the case (2); a summary of the judgment (3); and ends with a short comment highlighting specifi c aspects of the judgment (4).

THE RULE OF LAW : PROKURATURA REJONOWA W MIńSKU MAZOWIECKIM

INTRODUCTION

As in previous years, this contribution will begin with a case relating to the rule of law. The conception of the European Union (EU, the Union) as a ‘Union based on the rule of law’ is paradigmatic for the Union’s self-image. However, in recent years, the rule of law has deteriorated quite dramatically in a number of Member States.

ABSTRACT

Social media and the Internet have undisputable usefulness and potential. However, they also entail risks and dangers, which may produce repercussions on human rights. This is demonstrated by the growing litigation before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has dealt with novel questions, problematic issues and potential human rights violations associated with the use of social media. This contribution examines the Court’s approach to the use of social media as a new tool of communication. This is done by looking at three different perspectives, corresponding to the main sections of the text. The first section (section 2) is devoted to social media as used by the ECtHR itself, providing examples of how these means of communication are used in Strasbourg for different purposes. The second and third sections (sections 3 and 4) address the topic of social media in the litigation before the ECtHR from two angles: substantively, by looking at the relevant case law involving human rights violations; and procedurally, by considering the admissibility of the use of social media as a means of lodging an application with the Court, and the use of social media to maintain lawyer – applicant contact during the proceedings. In the analysis of the substantive and procedural issues stemming from the social media – human rights nexus, examples will be provided with regard to different tools, such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Twitter and WhatsApp. The case law considered here covers different areas involving social media, such as freedom of expression, the right to respect for private life, prohibition of discrimination, hate speech and cyberviolence. By way of conclusion, the article will provide an overall evaluation of the ECtHR’s approach to social media.

INTRODUCTION

Social media and the Internet have become part of our daily lives. While they have undisputable usefulness and potential, they also entail many risks and dangers, which may produce repercussions on human rights. This is demonstrated by the growing litigation surrounding social media, which has gradually started to reach the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR or the Court) from the domestic level.

Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2021, 224 pages, £ 80.00

‘What happens to the fundamentality of human rights when one of the right to health’s most crucial components becomes operationalized under a private logic, and what does that say about the alleged indivisibility and protection on an equal footing of all human rights?’ (p. xii). This fundamental question provides the impetus for Eduardo Arenas Catalán’s timely monograph The Human Right to Health: Solidarity in the Era of Healthcare Commercialization . Published in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, a medical state of emergency that has exposed the fragility of national health systems worldwide, this book aims at uncovering ‘healthcare commercialization’ as the central contemporary challenge to the equality of health care access as an essential aspect of the human right to health. In order to counter this ongoing commodification of health care under a neoliberal dogma, the author suggests moving beyond predominant interpretations of the human right to health that disregard, and thereby even reproduce, the issue. As an alternative perspective, Catalán proposes the application of the principle of solidarity in the context of the right to health, and social rights in general, allowing for a focus on the rights’ collective aspects and their implications for positive obligations pertaining to states.

Given the pervasive interplay between human rights law, public health policies and socio-economic developments within the core themes addressed by the author, it is highly appropriate that this monograph was published in the Elgar Studies in Health and the Law series. The book comprises 224 pages and is divided into six chapters that coherently illustrate the author’s proposed approach to the human right to health. As regards methodology, the book moves from a critical, yet descriptive assessment of the status quo of the human right to health’s interpretation, to a normative discussion of the topic, and ultimately proceeds to address practical implications in judicial and political realms.

In the Preface and Chapter 1, the author introduces the issue of ‘healthcare commercialization’ in a political context, assesses its problematic stance in the mainstream interpretative practice concerning the right to health, and highlights to what extent it may reinforce the inequality of health care access.

ABSTRACT

Memory laws , inscribing an official version of history into law, are often conceptualised as a manifestation (or distortion) of the ‘militant democracy’ concept which denies certain democratic rights to the ‘enemies’ of democracy. However, a closer look at the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a promoter of militant democracy, reveals ambiguities. Focusing on genocide denial bans, the strongest form mnemonic governance, this contribution seeks to illuminate the legal value that the ECtHR attributes to the militant democracy concept in the context of memory laws. It claims, first, that this doctrine’s significance for the justification of genocide denial bans is primarily only a conceptual one without clear normative value. Second, it argues that where the militant democracy concept is accorded normative value, it operates as an interpretative limit to genocide denial bans other than the Holocaust denial ban. Third, it is claimed that, on the grounds of the ECtHR’s reasoning, the identified conceptual value of militant democracy to justify genocide denial bans can be translated to other ‘self-inculpatory’ memory laws, i.e. laws promoting the memory of crimes for which the legislating state assumes responsibility. This excludes memory laws serving as means for self-exculpation or third-inculpation.

INTRODUCTION

Russian President Putin’s distortive drawing on history, in February 2022, to politically ‘justify’ the war of aggression against Ukraine was but a new momentous peak in the general ‘rise of memory’ that can be observed in politics, law and society in recent years. In particular, the increasing use of memory laws has led to veritable memory wars in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) during the last decade. The term ‘memory laws’ is used today to describe legal measures which inscribe a state-approved interpretation of history into law. At its core, the concept refers to laws that explicitly prohibit expressions deviating from this official version of history, oft en under the threat of criminal sanctions. The ban on Holocaust denial that exists in most European countries is a prominent example.

Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2021, 544 pages, € 281.00

With the publication of the latest, highly disturbing, report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), combating climate change has gained renewed relevance and public attention. In its multiple reports, the IPCC has repeatedly warned of the cascading effects of climate change, which is already causing widespread natural disruption and large-scale human rights violations. Still, the ever-alarming appeals of the scientific community, which require urgent action in the face of a closing window of opportunity, have not (yet) led to decisive political action. On the contrary, the international community is somewhat hesitant to implement ambitious climate protection measures, risking the occurrence of irreversible climate change: the so-called tipping points. Against this background, plaintiffs around the world file so-called climate lawsuits, seeking to oblige states and enterprises (mainly ‘carbon majors’) to implement more ambitious climate protection measures, or to try and obtain compensation for climate damage already suffered. The ultimate aim is to close the currently wide gap between scientific recommendations and projections, on the one hand, and climate policies implemented in practice, on the other, and to avert, or at least mitigate, dangerous climate change and its disastrous impacts on people and the environment. Climate change has, thus, become a legal issue that courts are increasingly concerned with. Even though climate lawsuits are oft en brought in national fora, there is a high degree of communication between different jurisdictions, and courts tend to reference each other’s arguments and reasoning on climate change to a large extent.

The publication at hand, edited by Ivano Alogna, Christine Bakker and Jean- Pierre Gauci, represents a most valuable contribution to this interjurisdictional communication. It provides profound insights into various litigation efforts and enables judges, lawyers, academics and representatives of civil society to map out possibilities and constraints in climate change litigation. The anthology, which emerged from a conference titled, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Comparative and International Perspectives’, held at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law in 2020, gathers high-profile climate change litigation experts from around the globe. It takes a comprehensive approach in combining academic and non-academic national and international perspectives.

ABSTRACT

The adverse effects of climate change on children’s life trajectories and human rights are widely recognised today. The negative impacts of climate change threaten children’s rights to life, health, food, water and sanitation, education, housing, culture, and development, among others. And while all children are exceptionally vulnerable to climate change, those who are already vulnerable or marginalised are, and will be, disproportionately affected. At the level of states, those whose populations are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change have generally contributed the least to its causes and have fewer resources to mitigate climate change and protect their populations. Our contribution analyses how these different dimensions of justice have been addressed, thus far, in climate litigation, with a particular focus on youth-led climate cases recently filed before regional courts and international human rights bodies. It observes that procedural obstacles have hindered access to justice for children and young people in early rights-based climate cases. It then proceeds to reflect on the extent to which human rights bodies and courts can grapple with the procedural requirements of human rights litigation in a manner that aligns with the letter and spirit of human rights treaties, and responds to the legitimate expectations of those at the forefront of the climate crisis.

INTRODUCTION

Children are disproportionately affected by climate impacts both within and across societies. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has stated that, of today’s 1.8 billion young people, approximately 1 billion children live in states at ‘extremely high-risk’ of climate disasters, half a billion children live in areas of extremely high flood occurrence, 160 million children live in areas of high or extremely high drought risk, and 115 million children live in zones of high or extremely high tropical cyclone risk. Climate-related heatwaves, droughts and floods increase rates of vector-borne diseases, which disproportionately affect children. Further slow-onset events, such as sea level rise and resultant saltwater intrusion, threaten children’s access to clean water.