Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack's article is an important and very welcome contribution to the discussion about judicial values. The authors argue that with respect to judicial independence, transparency, and accountability “judicial systems face inherent trade-offs, such that any given court can maximize two, but not all three, of these features.” In our eyes, the article's most important contribution is its holistic view: it shows why these three judicial values can only be understood in their interconnectedness. It is, for instance, not meaningful to make a statement about the correlation between transparency and independence without also taking accountability into the equation. This is because the effect of transparency on independence can only be understood if information about judicial accountability is at one's disposal. In the past, these judicial values have often been analyzed in an isolated manner, thereby leading to wrong conclusions. The Judicial Trilemma will hopefully help in shifting the discourse from isolated to holistic views on independence, transparency, and accountability. Moreover, Dunoff and Pollack lay the groundwork for a meaningful normative discussion of these three judicial values. Any debate about how to structure (international) courts should henceforth take Dunoff and Pollack's holistic view as a basis for discussion.

Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack's Judicial Trilemma is a refreshing challenge to prevailing narratives about judicial decision-making in international courts and tribunals and is part of a growing wave of scholarship deploying empirical, social science-driven methodology to theorize the place of judicial institutions in the international legal field. Seeking to peek behind the black robes and divine the reasoning behind judicial decisions without descending into speculation and actively trying to thwart considerations of confidentiality is a fraught endeavor on which I have expressed skepticism in the past. The Judicial Trilemma admirably seeks to overcome these challenges, and I commend the authors for tackling the hard question as to whether one can truly glance behind the black robe.

The Judicial Trilemma, by Jeff Dunoff and Mark Pollack, studies the dynamic relations between accountability, transparency, and independence, and suggests that designers can only maximize two of these three values at once. They can create a court that has high levels of (1) independence and accountability, (2) transparency and independence, or (3) accountability and transparency, but only at the cost of having a low level of the third value. The article explores these ideas using four different international tribunals, but its insights are not limited to international courts. Domestic designers also have to decide what levels of accountability, independence, and transparency their courts should have, and in making a decision they will face the Judicial Trilemma and confront the hard choice of selecting primarily two out of three values.

Dunoff and Pollack's timely article on The Judicial Trilemma offers a constructive paradigm through which to examine and assess the design and the behavior of international courts and tribunals and, in particular, their members at a time when, despite the increasing judicialization of international law and relations, the legitimacy and function of such courts and tribunals are being questioned in political and public discourse. The focus of this response is on the application of the paradigm to the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system, which is one of the international courts and tribunals examined by the authors.

World Trade Organization (WTO) members have, once again, been unable to agree on the appointment of new members to the Appellate Body (AB) in a timely fashion, as one member's term expired on June 30, 2017, another member resigned in August 2017, and a third member's term will expire in December 2017, with no consensus on a process to fill those posts. The 2017 standoff follows on the heels of a fractious debate during the summer of 2016 over the United States’ decision to block the reappointment of AB member Sueng Wha Chang of Korea to a second term. Given that the AB has just seven members, the inability to quickly appoint new members to replace those whose terms have expired only adds to the difficulty of rendering decisions within the tight time frames called for in the WTO rules.