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“Just Because”: Taking Belief Bases Seriously

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 March 2017

Hans Rott
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam
Samuel R. Buss
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Petr Hájek
Affiliation:
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague
Pavel Pudlák
Affiliation:
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague
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Logic Colloquium '98 , pp. 387 - 408
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2000

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References

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