Cognitive theory of depression

Cognitive theory of depression (Beck, 1963) holds a prominent place in the history of clinical psychology as one of the first systematic statements of assumptions that have shaped the cognitive revolution in psychopathology (Clark and Steer, 1996). These tenets have since informed cognitive conceptualizations of many other disorders, as evidenced by the diversity of models described in this volume. Most fundamentally, all cognitive theories of psychopathology assert that people notice, recall, and interpret their experiences idiosyncratically – in accordance with their personal learning histories – and that these cognitive styles play a role in the genesis of specific psychological disorders.

There are numerous cognitive theories of depression (Ellis, 1987; Abramson et al., 1989), and a detailed description and review of each of these models and their implications for treating depression would exceed the scope of this chapter. We have elected to focus specifically on Beck's theory because more than other cognitive models it has both generated substantial empirical research on the psychopathology of depression and led to the development of an empirically supported treatment for depression (Clark et al., 1999).

In cognitive theory of depression, Beck proposed that rigidly negativistic beliefs regarding personal inadequacy or loss (e.g., “I am all alone in the world”) in combination with overvaluation of certain outcomes (e.g., “Life is not worth living if I am all alone”) are vulnerability factors for the onset and maintenance of depression.