All but one WTO member currently trade under one or more preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Despite the concern since the early 1990s that these agreements may be a stumbling block to multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) their numbers have risen at an increasing rate in the last 15 years. As preferential liberalization appears to become the rule rather than the exception, it is essential to ask whether there is evidence that it affects MTL. To do so we analyze recent empirical research that finds the US's and EU's PTAs were a stumbling block to their MTL in the Uruguay Round. We also propose new empirical work to answer more definitively whether PTAs are a stumbling block to worldwide MTL.

Although developing countries vary significantly in terms of trading profiles, they generally face three primary challenges if they are to participate effectively in the WTO dispute settlement system. These challenges are: (i) a relative lack of legal expertise in WTO law; (ii) constrained financial resources, including for the hiring of outside counsel; and (iii) fear of political and economic pressure. We can roughly categorize these challenges as constraints of law, money, and politics. This article explores various strategies for responding to these challenges, none of which involves a modification of the rules of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding.

Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal (2000), we construct a synthetic index (R-index) intending to capture the restrictiveness of rules of origin in preferential trading agreements. The R-index is applied to NAFTA and the Single List of the EU's PANEURO system covering all of the EU's preferential trade agreements. The R-index highlights how a common set of rules of origin can affect countries differently depending on their export structures, and how their complexity varies across sectors. Having controlled for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, the R-index contributes to explain differences in the rate at which preferences are used. Finally, we compute estimates of the compliance costs associated with rules of origin under NAFTA and under PANEURO and find them to be between 6.8% of good value (NAFTA) and 8% (PANEURO).

Recent analyses suggest that the impact of agricultural trade liberalization on developing countries will be very uneven. The Doha Round focuses on tariff issues, but some developing countries currently have practically duty-free access to European and North American markets under preferential regimes. Multilateral liberalization will erode the benefits of these preferences, which are presently rather well utilized in the agricultural sector. While South American and East Asian countries should benefit from an agricultural agreement, African and Caribbean countries are unlikely to do so. The main obstacles to the exports of the sub-Saharan African and Least Developed Countries appear to be in the non-tariff area (sanitary, phytosanitary standards), which increasingly originate from the private sector and are not dealt with under the Doha framework (traceability requirements, etc.). An agreement in Doha is unlikely to solve these problems and open large markets for the poorest countries. While this is not an argument to give up multilateral liberalization, a more specific and differentiated treatment should be considered in WTO rules, and corrective measures should be implemented.

Various aspects of trade and investment in air transport services are regulated by a series of bilateral agreements in which rights of market access are exchanged. Industry commentators have identified this system and the associated national ownership rules as well as the prevailing attitude of competition authorities (on merger policy and on airport pricing) as the most important factors limiting adjustment in the international air transport industry. These ‘pillars of stagnation’ are examined here. Features of the bilateral agreements in aviation that are similar to those of other preferential trading agreements are noted and linked to the slow pace of policy reform in this industry. The three ‘pillars’ are not independent, and effective liberalization of trade and investment in air transport services depends on complementary regulatory reform. Options are presented on ways in which these changes might be designed and introduced, and in what sequence that might be done. Air transport services are currently excluded from the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and an important enquiry is how multilateral commitments recorded in the GATS might support reform.

This paper reviews the panel report on Mexico-Measures A.ecting Telecommunication Services. The panel considered claims by the United States (US) that Mexico acted inconsistently with its obligations with respect to the liberalization of the market for telecommunication services. It is the .rst panel to consider solely the rules agreed in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is also the .rst panel to deal with telecommunication services and its complex layers of legislation, in particular the rules agreed in the Telecommunications Reference Paper (TRP)onpro-competitive regulatory principles. Viewed fromthis perspective, this report is because of its potential precedence value, of particular signi.cance.