Boundaries and Contents of Persons

Multiple scholars have engaged with questions about the boundaries of Classic period Maya human selves (e.g., Geller Reference Geller2012; Gillespie Reference Gillespie, Borić and Robb2008; Hendon Reference Hendon and Harrison-Buck2012; Houston et al. Reference Houston, Stuart and Taube2006; Meskell and Joyce Reference Meskell and Joyce2003), agreeing that Classic Maya bodies were dividual (or divisible), while also acknowledging the challenges and limitations of exploring this topic without living informants (Hendon Reference Hendon and Harrison-Buck2012; Houston et al. Reference Houston, Stuart and Taube2006:100). Using hieroglyphic, iconographic, and sculptural evidence, Houston et al. (Reference Houston, Inomata and Coben2006:98) suggest that the Classic Maya concepts of personhood involved a self that moved beyond the boundaries of particular bodies, yielding persons that were “extended and extendible.”

This extension of personhood beyond a particular human body is seen particularly vividly through carved stone monuments that impersonate—and, in fact, seem to contain elements of—human beings (e.g., Houston and Stuart Reference Houston and Stuart1998; Looper Reference Looper2003; Stuart Reference Stuart1996). Stelae thus embodied a “transcendence” or “essential sameness” between subject and object, or original and image (Houston and Stuart Reference Houston and Stuart1998:86–87; see analogous discussion of representations of gods in Houston and Stuart Reference Houston and Stuart1996). Discussion of the Maya ritual practice of impersonation (e.g., Houston Reference Houston, Inomata and Coben2006; Houston and Stuart Reference Houston and Stuart1998; Stone Reference Stone and Fields1991) indicates that “self” can be located in more than one location, can move from location to location, or can divide into multiple locations (Houston and Stuart Reference Houston and Stuart1998:81). The idea that personhood, or elements thereof, could move beyond the bounds of a particular human being and lodge in other locations is supported by the desecratory acts that were frequently visited upon such monuments in order to temper or deactivate their liveliness (e.g., Harrison-Buck Reference Harrison-Buck, Iannone, Houk and Schwake2017; Houston et al. Reference Houston, Stuart and Taube2006; O'Neil Reference O'Neil, Boldrick, Brubaker and Clay2013), recalling Strathern's (Reference Strathern1988) discussion of divisibility, and the flows of elements possible between dividuals. The presence of repeated representations of self (e.g., in the case of multiple Classic-era stelae representing a particular ruler [Looper Reference Looper2003]) also indicate a divisible self (Houston et al. Reference Houston, Stuart and Taube2006:101), though there is lack of clarity about whether all such representations would have been simultaneously and consistently persons, or if they were occasionally and contextually active as persons.

This divisible aspect of Classic Maya personhood is also evident through research into the multiple substances that constituted a Maya self, including things like the way (an animal co-essence), and k'uh (a concept of the divine) (Houston et al. Reference Houston, Stuart and Taube2006:79; Monaghan Reference Monaghan1998), some of which were able to enter and exit the body; ideas about parts of souls are evident in ancient Central Mexican concepts that may be relevant to the Maya, as well (Furst Reference Furst1995; López-Austin Reference López-Austin, Ortiz de Montellano and Ortiz de Montellano1988). Duncan and Schwarz (Reference Duncan, Schwarz, Osterholtz, Baustian and Martin2014) illustrated this sense of bodies that are not solidly bounded conceptually and materially in their discussion of a Maya mass grave, in which they argue for partible and permeable bodies and a sense of mosaic corporeality, thereby emphasizing the relational nature of Classic-era personhood in an embodied sense.

Personhood through Action and Interaction

The integrative relationships amongst multiple persons observed by Duncan and Schwarz (Reference Duncan, Schwarz, Osterholtz, Baustian and Martin2014), for example, is also discussed by scholars like Gillespie (Reference Gillespie2001:98) in the context of Maya socially constructed persons, who draw elements of personhood from a larger community (e.g., per the “house” concept), and Monaghan (Reference Monaghan1998:140), who argues for personhood as adhering not to individuals but rather within a collective (see also Houston [Reference Houston2014] and Hutson [Reference Hutson2010] for discussion of the importance of a relational stance in interpreting Maya contexts, and Harrison-Buck [Reference Harrison-Buck, Buchanan and Jacob Skousen2015] for thinking about the Maya cosmos through a relational lens). Hendon (Reference Hendon and Harrison-Buck2012:83) argues that objects have souls that can “enter into relations with other souls,” and participate in life cycles analogous to those of humans, suggesting another socially embedded commonality for persons no matter the form or type. This body of work points towards profoundly relational elements of personhood in ancient Maya contexts, and indicates the importance of examining how personhood operates between and among multiple entities. Indeed, some Mayanists have addressed what it means to be a person by focusing on action and interaction, and how appropriate actions and interactions define certain entities as meaningful members of the community (see Bachand et al. [Reference Bachand, Joyce and Hendon2003] for discussion of this in terms of precedent and citational practice). Houston et al. (Reference Houston, Inomata and Coben2006:174) have discussed bodily positioning (e.g., captives who are de-personed by being positioned beneath the feet of rulers) and expression (e.g., acceptable emotional displays; Houston Reference Houston2001) in terms of persons fulfilling their roles as community members; the implication is that those who do not position themselves correctly vis-à-vis others suffer some loss of standing in terms of their person-status. Other modes of relating that appear to be key in sustaining a person status include communication between persons (human and non-human), and the care-taking and addressing of person needs (such as feeding, dressing, and holding) in persons of both human and non-human form (Brown [Reference Brown and Aveni2015] discusses these topics using primarily ethnographic evidence). These observations underline personhood as being constructed and reinforced over time through ongoing interactions (Fowler Reference Fowler2001:148–149).

Location of Personhood in Non-human Entities

Both of the overviews above—of boundaries and contents of persons, and of action and interaction associated with personhood—indicate that personhood can be located in non-human forms. These forms can be human-like, as in the case of sculptured stelae (Gillespie Reference Gillespie, Borić and Robb2008; Looper Reference Looper2003; Stuart Reference Stuart1996) or clay figurines (Halperin Reference Halperin2014; Hendon Reference Hendon and Harrison-Buck2012); such examples are perhaps most easily recognizable to a Western observer by meeting formal qualities of a human person. In considering carved stone monuments as relational, Looper (Reference Looper2003) has discussed sculpture as animate and possessing power, and O'Neil (Reference O'Neil2010, Reference O'Neil2012, Reference O'Neil, Boldrick, Brubaker and Clay2013) has emphasized the ongoing engagement of sculpture in history, including their continuing changes over time. Such stony sculptural representations engage in relationships and are dynamic, both signs of person-like behaviors.

In Classic Maya contexts, however, non-human persons can include entities that are not human in form—Hendon (Reference Hendon and Harrison-Buck2012:88) cites bowls, jars, and grinding stones, for instance—but are persons in the modes of interaction in which they engage. Houston (Reference Houston2014:98) also talks about vitality in non-human substances in a more abstract vein, identifying stone and trees, for instance, as animate and unified by their warmth and rootedness in the earth. The recognition (on our part) of personhood in non-human entities is part of a larger comprehension of complexities in what it means to be a person, and indicates the need to think critically in Maya contexts about a stance of human exceptionalism, in which human beings are assumed to represent the reference for all types of persons. Hallowell's (Reference Hallowell1960) description of human persons as a subset of a larger category of persons, alongside rock persons and so on, provides an alternate model, in which personhood is not a resource that originates within, or is originally the purview of, human beings.

In sum, Maya research to date has clarified multiple important points about personhood, particularly non-human personhood, in Classic Maya contexts. These studies support the existence of non-human personhood in Classic Maya contexts: entities that are not human beings can act as persons, and be recognized as persons. Previous research has also indicated that there can be close connections between specific humans and non-human entities, with personhood (or parts thereof) passing between the two; this fits with dividual ideas of personhood, in which people are not completely bounded and in which elements may pass between persons (human or not). The relational elements of Classic Maya personhood also suggest that personhood is a contingent and enacted state that can be threatened or undone.

Faced Objects Reference Human Bodies

Multiple examples of faced objects demonstrate that their faces can originate directly from physical human bodies, thus explicitly indexing human beings. Examples of depictions of balls, shields, and bundles provide clear examples of this phenomenon (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Shields, balls, and bundles as examples of faced objects that originate directly from the human body: (a) K2695, (b) K4685, (c) K4118, (d) K5201, (e) K5384, and (f) K7838. Photographs © Justin Kerr (Kerr Reference Kerr2014), reproduced with permission.

When shields are depicted with facial features, they are shown as being made of flayed human facial skin (Houston et al. Reference Houston, Stuart and Taube2006:21; Schele and Mathews Reference Schele and Mathews1979:71). The linkage in this case is very direct: human skin removed from the face is stretched and dried to create these objects. This involves literal transference of a human face to a non-human object. While some shields were likely made of human skin, not all would have been, and as noted above, we might not interpret all shields that are depicted as faced as literally made of facial skin. Rather, recalling the positionality of the intended viewers of these images, such depictions might be understood as references to a prototypical version of a shield, which would have directly linked a human body and the faced object.

Balls are another type of faced object that originates in human bodies, specifically, the human skull. The referent for faced balls, and the symbolic connection for balls in ball games more generally, is the Popol Vuh story, in which the head of one of the Hero Twins is used as a ball in the ball game played with underworld lords (Tedlock Reference Tedlock1996). In the dataset I examined, faced balls are shown both as de-fleshed, skull-like images (e.g., K5201) and as living heads (e.g., K4118, K6064, and K9265; see contrasts in Figure 1). These faced balls seem to be non-literal references that evoke a prototype, and mark the status or capability of the object, since rubber balls seem to have been used for Classic-era ball game rather than actual human skulls (e.g., Scarborough and Wilcox Reference Scarborough, Wilcox, Scarborough and Wilcox1991). These examples indicate that objects that are depicted as faced can illustrate a conceptual category of faced (and personed) status for objects.

Some examples of bundles (e.g., K4485) also directly link to human faces and bodies, as seen in depictions of faced bundles as wrapped bodies with visible heads. These bundles seem likely to be representations of secondary burials (a recognized burial practice in the Maya area [e.g., Fitzsimmons Reference Fitzsimmons2009:76–80]), and thus are directly indexical in their relationship to the human body. The faces shown can be parsed as masks that are adhered to bundled human remains, or as actual heads emerging from the remains within the bundle; the faces on these bundles are shown as supernatural rather than human, raising questions about whether human versus supernatural faces shown on faced objects represent a difference in the meaning or nature of personhood in non-human contexts. While the face is emphasized, in comparison with the shield and ball examples above, these instances imply the involvement of a more complete body in personed objects. This observation should give us pause: are these bundles examples of faced objects, or is this a category error on our part, and these are not objects, but rather humans (or something in between)? This question points out some of our discomfort with fuzziness in the boundaries of these categories, and problems with translation of categories. While a burial is (or was) a human being, we have hints (e.g., the separation and/or dislocation of body parts through revisiting, the movement of bodies to secondary burials) that bodies can transition into different material statuses. Indeed, the faced bundles shown occupy a liminal space in these images, seated on benches in places that might typically be occupied by humans or by material offerings.

Representations of bundles require some additional examination, as not all faced bundles are represented in the same way. In some cases (e.g., as shown in six instances from a single vessel, K5384), bundles can be shown in a standard round style, coupled with other typical offering items. Compared to the “bodied” bundles described above, these faced bundles present as round heads, with eyes, nose, and sometimes mouth shown on the rounded surface of the bundle. These seem less likely to represent bundle burials. Ritual bundles, known through ethnographic, archaeological, and iconographic contexts (e.g., Guernsey and Reilly Reference Guernsey and Kent Reilly2006), do not always contain human remains, but nonetheless are considered animate entities (Brown Reference Brown and Aveni2015:53): the second type of faced bundle could represent this type of object. The two types of faced bundles, one of which seems to connect directly to deceased human bodies, the other of which seems to lack a direct connection to a referential human body, demonstrate that previously apparent human-object connections may be lost or may recede, but the face and personed status of the object can still endure.

For shields and balls, we see that a face can be transposed or translated from a human body to a non-human entity. In the case of shields, the face is lifted from a human context and adhered to an object. In the case of balls, we see a partition—actual, and then subsequently referenced—of a human body that allows for a human face to subsequently operate as an object. Faced bundles seem to indicate that even whole human bodies might cross boundaries in becoming objects. These instances indicate that faces—and personhood—can physically originate from humans, and can then move; that is, a face does not have to be attached to a human body in order to be meaningful. For these examples, it seems that the faces on faced objects point back directly to human beings, as a referential locus, though we must ask whether this is always the case for faced objects. Having identified this linkage, we should also ask: must personhood be linked directly to a specific human source? That is, what kind of resource is it? The successful movement of a face from a human to an object also raises questions about what the resulting capabilities are: does the face (as one indicator of personhood) indeed continue to operate in its object context? In what ways are objects changed by entering into a faced status?

Do Faced Objects Require Humans?

Above, we identified that faced objects can have a strong and direct connection with human bodies. These examples beg the question: do the faces on objects always derive directly from a human body? The simple answer is: they do not. Many instances (e.g., masks, seats, and handstones) show faced objects that are neither physically taken from a human body nor directly linked to a specific human body; nor do these examples seem to invoke a specific memory or prototype that would have been human-derived. Instead of relying on a direct connection, we see that person-ness can be invoked without a one-to-one link or correspondence. This opens the door in terms of the materials or objects in which we may see personhood, and the circumstances in which object personhood may be possible.

Not only do faced objects not have to come from a human body, some examples indicate that faces can actually be created from raw materials. Let us look for a moment at the most common of the faced objects: masks. As functional objects, masks, of course, represent visages; they also are granted close proximate access to human bodies by being layered over the face. Their functionally faced nature does not, however, discount them as “faced objects” in the sense of being candidates for person status. Mask usage has a long history in Mesoamerica (e.g., Markman and Markman Reference Markman and Markman1989), connected to ideas about masks’ active abilities to transform and impart identities. Depictions of masks, as shown in the painted vessel genre, represent the process of creation, with multiple examples showing active carving of masks (Figure 2). This may be in part a result of the courtly, indoor representations shown on these vessels, indicating that carving is an activity that would have occurred in these spaces, but for our purposes it indicates that faces and faced objects can sometimes be made, and that such acts of creation are in fact visually emphasized in some cases. This is also important because it means that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between humans and personed objects. In a broader sense, it means that the resource of personhood is not a limited one: it can be renewed, created, disseminated.

Figure 2. Masks represent faced objects that can be made or created; note the carving tool held in the hand in each example: (a) K8820, (b) K1836, and (c) K6061. Photographs © Justin Kerr (Kerr Reference Kerr2014), reproduced with permission.

What can we conclude for other objects that do not show a direct connection to humans, and whose faces are not specifically depicted as being “made” (e.g., objects like baskets or pots, handstones, and incensarios)? Is human intervention or input needed for an object to become faced, or personed? That is, are humans required for objects to be faced (and personed), even if the face (and person status) does not have to move directly between a specific person and an object? Or, could the acquisition of a face and of personhood for objects occur apart from human action, intervention, or contribution? Faced objects are typically shown in conjunction with humans, not solo, but this may be due to the types of scenes depicted on ceramic vessels. Multiple object categories noted above are neither shown as made nor as directly drawn from a human body (Table 3) and thus may be candidates for independent manifestation of personhood.

Table 3. Types of faced objects that do not derive directly from the human body, and that are not explicitly shown being made

These examples illustrate that faces on objects, and thus personhood, do not have to have a one-to-one correspondence with human bodies (i.e., they may not derive from a specific human body), and are not a limited resource—they can be created (e.g., carved or formed out of raw materials) from a larger pool of personhood. We see that object faces exist and persist outside of specific human linkages or sources.

Faces Continue to Function

Above, I wondered about the capabilities of a face on an object. Specifically, does the face, as a personhood marker, function in its object context? Or, is it a category marker without specific abilities?

If we examine the contexts of faced objects, we recognize examples of bodily needs and social interactions underscoring the enacted and relational nature of their personhood. We see several types of social interactions between human bodies and objects in the images under examination: caretaking through dress and physical touch, conversing, and feeding.

Object care is seen through the wrapping of objects, which serves to dress them, and also through touch and caress of these objects. Both types of bundles discussed are wrapped (for discussions of wrapping, see, for example, Houston and Stuart Reference Houston and Stuart1998:78; Houston et al. Reference Houston, Stuart and Taube2006:84; Stuart Reference Stuart1996:156). This wrapping, in addition to being a key part of the structure of bundles, is a type of dressing and is one of the signals of being treated in a person-like way. Other objects have cloth or bindings tied to them, as an alternative type of “dress” (e.g., the faced ball on K4118). Additionally, Scheper Hughes (Reference Scheper Hughes2016) suggests cradling as a long-term Mesoamerican mode of looking after and caring for objects, and another signal of objects being tended to. Images of faced bundles (Figure 3), for instance, are shown in profile, and cradled by the hands and between the forearms of the humans depicted.

Figure 3. (a–c) Examples of repeated motif of cradled bundles on K5384. Photographs © Justin Kerr (Kerr Reference Kerr2014), reproduced with permission.

Other objects that are frequently touched and held carefully in the hands include masks, showing physical closeness and skin-to-skin contact. Furthermore, the face-to-face (even, nose-to-nose) orientation of many masks orients the faced mask in implied conversation with human faces (Figure 4). Other faced objects can be seen as communicating through their exhalations, as is the case with censers; the smoke that emerged from such objects was understood as message-laden (e.g., Stuart Reference Stuart and Houston1998).

Figure 4. Masks being touched and engaging in implied conversation: (a) K5373, (b) K8457, (c) K7447, and (d) K9096. Photographs © Justin Kerr (Kerr Reference Kerr2014), reproduced with permission.

The exhalations or emissions of censers are also tied to their ability to ingest—that is, to consume and to eat, another hallmark of a person and person-like needs. Ethnographically, we are aware of incensarios’ (or god pots’) need to be fed (e.g., McGee Reference McGee1990:52); iconographically, we see this shown through the balls of copal or incense they are fed (albeit at the top of the head rather than in the mouth), coupled with smoky exhalations (again, through the top of the head; e.g., Houston and Taube Reference Houston and Taube2000). In this way, the burning of incense represents human-like needs/actions of input and output, consumption and exhalation. The presence of a mouth that we see here, and the associated processes of breathing and consumption, can also be thought of as being writ large on temples and their related landscape counterparts of caves (see discussion in Houston and Taube Reference Houston and Taube2000), pointing out that “object personhood” may be an unnecessarily limited descriptive category, with personhood manifesting in the built (not to mention natural) environment, as well.

Paying attention to social aspects of personed objects and their bodily needs raises an interesting conundrum for an article about faces: objects that are faced might better be understood as being embodied. I do not use the term “embodied” in a broad sense here; rather, I am referring to the possession of a body. In looking at the suite of faced objects, some actually seem to have bodies. These objects include bloodletters, staffs, scepters, and axes (Figure 5). The depictions of these items are similar, in that they each have a slender, elongated element of varying lengths as their main segment, with the face/head attached to it. These linear elements act in a body-like fashion by supporting the head like a neck and vertebral column. For the most part, these pole-like implied bodies are not further elaborated, with the exception of k'awil’s foot (e.g., in K8719) marking the lower extremity of the body in some scepter representations (e.g., Stone and Zender Reference Stone and Zender2011:48–49). These examples of heads and faces attached to body-like elements contrast with most of the previous ones, in which faces are applied to the form of objects, or heads stand alone like a severed or separated body part. These “attached” examples indicate that faces and heads are, ultimately, connected to bodies.

Figure 5. Faced objects with “bodies”: (a) K8719, (b) K1362, (c) K6649, and (d) K9073. Photographs © Justin Kerr (Kerr Reference Kerr2014), reproduced with permission.

These examples may indicate that when we see faces they are functioning synecdochically for an entire body; that is, faced objects—even those, the majority, that only show facial features—are referencing and implying an entire corpus, one that engages in bodily functions and has bodily needs. Faced objects are, in fact, embodied objects, and function in the ways we would expect for a living entity with a head and body.

Faced Objects Retain Elements of their Material Nature

In the preceding discussion of objects as embodied, we see faced objects not just looking like people but also acting like people. We might be tempted to think of faced, and personed, objects as simulacra of humans in their needs and capabilities. It does seem clear that objects are changed by entering into a state of personhood, through their relational needs and capabilities. Critically, however, depictions of faced objects indicate that they do not cease to be objects; they retain both base material properties and functions even as they become personed.

Depictions of faced handstones help to illustrate these points. First, we can observe that their function is sustained, even when they are faced. Handstones were used in the ballgame, and—as their name indicates—were made of stone and held in the hand (Borhegyi Reference Borhegyi and Lothrop1961). These handstones are shown as being very active—their mouths are open, they are grasped, touched, and moved around. The implied action of these handstones relates to their object nature: these are weapons used in hand-to-hand combat, and they continue to function as such in their personed aspect. That is, they do not discard their functional elements upon becoming faced. Additionally, in many cases faced handstones are visually marked as stony with a “stony” Maya property qualifier, a glyph-like visual marking that signals material affiliation (see discussion of property qualifiers in Houston et al. Reference Houston, Brittenham, Mesick, Tokovinine and Warinner2009; Jackson Reference Jackson2017; Stone and Zender Reference Stone and Zender2011). The stony property qualifier indicates a quality of the base material of the handstone. This is significant because it shows us that these objects, even when they become faced, retain essential elements of their object material identity. That is, an object-person does not cease to have elements of its object identity; rather, it combines elements of person-ness and object-ness. This indicates the possibility of co-existence of these two states: these are stony, person-like figures.

Stones, altars, and seats (Figure 6) are other faced objects that provide examples of objects explicitly retaining their function and material qualities when personed. They are often marked with stony markings, and they continue with their functions of cutting, supporting, and receiving offerings. Faced pots and baskets also retain their essential functioning: in each instance of a faced vessel, the pot or basket is shown containing something (e.g., a mask or shells), functioning in the same way that non-faced pots and baskets do, and confirming that the faced receptacle is able to continue to do its work in the expected manner.

Figure 6. Stones, altars, and seats retaining material qualities and object functions: (a) K2068, (b) K8351, and (c) K5847. Faced ceiba incensarios showing the layering of multiple qualities: (d) K5113, (e) K7838, and (f) K1645. Photographs © Justin Kerr (Kerr Reference Kerr2014), reproduced with permission.

We have noticed that objects can retain their material qualities even when becoming faced. Depictions of faced incensarios (Figure 6) include material markers that further layer our understanding of the multiple categories to which faced objects can belong. Multiple depictions of faced incense burners show “ceiba incensarios,” known from archaeological contexts (e.g., Zidar and Elisens Reference Zidar and Elisens2009) and intended to imitate the spiny bumps of the ceiba tree, a cosmologically important axis mundi for the Maya. This is intriguing because these faced incensarios illustrate objects inhabiting additional material domains: we have a clay, incense-burning object that is referencing both tree-qualities and person-qualities. We know from examples above that qualities can coexist (e.g., the handstones are still stony, and still act as ballgame implements, even while faced/personed). The incensario example pushes this further, as these objects are doing multiple types of simultaneous referential work (tree, person). This suggests that the multifaceted state that faced objects can inhabit, accompanied by the associated needs and capabilities, can include multiple components, and that the unstable person/object categories that emerge through the discussion in this article might be joined by porous boundaries between other apparent object or material categories, as well. While this article has focused on how personhood as a state can be extended to and experienced by both humans and objects, close examination of other categories, and the relational broaching thereof, will be productive in elucidating other elements of Classic Maya ontologies.