Legal procedure does not enjoy great popularity. The layman resents it, since it prevents him from conducting his case by himself and forces him to resort to professional advocates. But even the jurist's attitudes to procedure is far from positive: he sees it as a mere “adjective” branch of the law that detracts from the importance of “substantive” law. Moreover, it has often emerged that the labyrinth of procedure does not lead to the triumph of the substantive law, but rather to the perversion of justice. A person expert in procedure has, as it were, wide scope in which to prevent, or, at least to distort, the revelation of the truth.

From time to time, a judge may be heard speaking out against such abuse of legal process, but mostly, his is a voice crying out in the wilderness.

In this article we will attempt to clarify a number of basic constitutional principles as they are reflected in the Israeli system of civil procedure. In so doing, we do not purport to be exhaustive as to the constitutional principles discussed. Rather, we will be selective, and shall place our emphasis on those principles that are most basic to the Israeli system. First, however, we must briefly describe the Israeli constitutional structure. Israel has no written constitution. Nor do any of the Basic Laws, which have a quasi-constitutional standing, specifically treat the issues discussed in this article. Yet, this does not mean that constitutional principles do not influence civil procedure in Israel.

First, it should be noted that many constitutional principles, in the broad meaning of this term, i.e., fundamental, structural principles, are embedded in positive Israeli legislative provisions, both of primary and of secondary legislation.