Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-zzh7m Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T08:31:30.879Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Bicameralism and government formation: does bicameral incongruence affect bargaining delays?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2020

Daniela Giannetti Open the ORCID record for Daniela Giannetti [Opens in a new window] ,
Andrea Pedrazzani Open the ORCID record for Andrea Pedrazzani [Opens in a new window]  and
Luca Pinto Open the ORCID record for Luca Pinto [Opens in a new window]
Daniela Giannetti
Affiliation:
Department of Political and Social Sciences, Università di Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Andrea Pedrazzani
Affiliation:
Department of Social and Political Sciences, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milano, Italy
Luca Pinto*
Affiliation:
Department of Political and Social Sciences, Università di Bologna, Bologna, Italy
*
*E-mail: luca.pinto@unibo.it
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The effects of bicameral legislatures on government formation have attracted scholarly attention since Lijphart’s (1984) seminal contribution. Previous research found support for the ‘veto control hypothesis,’ showing that bicameralism affects coalition governments’ composition and duration. However, the effects of bicameralism on the duration of the bargaining process over government formation have yet to be explored. Our work contributes to this area of research by focusing on the impact of bicameralism on bargaining delays. We show that the duration of the bargaining process over government formation decreases at increasing levels of partisan incongruence of the two chambers, especially in those legislative assemblies in which the upper chamber plays a relevant role in the policy-making process. Such empirical evidence is in contrast with the conventional expectation according to which bicameralism should delay the government formation process, as it introduces an additional element of complexity in the bargaining environment. We test our hypothesis by using a novel data set about the partisan composition of upper and lower chambers in 12 Western and Eastern European democracies over the postwar period.

Keywords

bicameralismbicameral incongruencegovernment formationbargaining delaysbargaining durationcoalition politics
Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , November 2020 , pp. 469 - 484
Copyright
© European Consortium for Political Research 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Andersson, S., Bergman, T. and Ersson, S. (2014), The European Representative Democracy Data Archive, Release 3”. Main sponsor: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (In2007–0149:1-E). Available at: www.erdda.seGoogle Scholar
Bergman, T., Gerber, E.R., Kastner, S. and Nyblade, B. (2008), ‘The empirical study of cabinet governance‘, in Strøm, K., Müller, W.C. and Bergman, T. (eds.), Cabinets And Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle In Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 85–122.Google Scholar
Bernhard, W. and Leblang, D. (2002), ‘Political parties and monetary commitments’, International Organization 56(4): 803–830.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernhard, W., & Leblang, D., (2006). Democratic Processes And Financial Markets, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binder, S.A. (2003). Stalemate: Causes And Consequences Of Legislative Gridlock, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Bowler, S., Freebourn, J., Grittersova, J., Indridason, I. (2017). Stocks, Bonds, and Bargaining Duration. Paper presented at the 7th European Political Science Association (EPSA) annual conference, Milan, June 22–24.Google Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, J.M., & Jones, B.S. (2004). Event History Modeling: A Guide For Social Scientists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Reiter, D. and Zorn, C. (2003), ‘Nonproportional hazards and event history analysis in international relations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(1): 33–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brambor, T., Clark, W.R. and Golder, M. (2006), ‘Understanding interaction models: improving empirical analyses’, Political Analysis 14(1): 63–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962), The Calculus Of Consent: Logical Foundations Of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conrad, C.R. and Golder, S.N. (2010), ‘Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies’, European Journal of Political Research 49(1): 119–150.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Curini, L. and Pinto, L. (2016), ‘More than post-election cabinets: uncertainty and the “magnitude of change” during Italian government bargaining’ International Political Science Review 37(2): 184–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cutrone, M. and Mc Carty, N. (2006), ‘Does bicameralism matter?’, in Weingast, B.R. and Wittman, D.A. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook Of Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 180–195.Google Scholar
De Winter, L. and Dumont, P. (2008), ‘Uncertainty and complexity in cabinet formation’, in Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds.), Cabinets And Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle In Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 123–157.Google Scholar
Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H. and Merlo, A. (2007), ‘Bicameralism and government formation’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2(3): 227–252.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diermeier, D. and van Roozendaal, P. (1998), ‘The duration of cabinet formation processes in western multi-party democracies’, British Journal of Political Science 28(4): 609–626.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Druckman, J.N. and Thies, M.F. (2002), ‘The importance of concurrence: the impact of bicameralism on government formation and duration’, American Journal of Political Science 46(4): 760–771.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Druckman, J.N., Martin, L.W. and Thies, M.F. (2005), ‘Influence without confidence: upper chambers and government formation’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 30(4): 529–548.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duncan, O. D. and Duncan, B., (1955). ‘A methodological analysis of segregation indexes’, American Sociological Review 20(2): 210–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ecker, A. and Meyer, T.M. (2015), ‘The duration of government formation processes in Europe’, Research & Politics 2(4): 1–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ecker, A. and Meyer, T.M. (2020), ‘Coalition bargaining duration in multiparty democracies’, British Journal of Political Science 50(1): 261–280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eppner, S. and Ganghof, S. (2015), ‘Do (weak) upper houses matter for cabinet formation? A replication and correction’. Research & Politics 2(1): 1–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eppner, S. and Ganghof, S. (2017), ‘Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: the veto control hypothesis reconsidered’, European Journal of Political Research 56(1): 169–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fernandes, J. and Magalhães, P. (2016), ‘Government survival in semi‐presidential regimes’, European Journal of Political Research 55(1): 61–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fortunato, D., König, T. and Proksch, S.-O. (2013), ‘Government agenda-setting and bicameral conflict resolution’, Political Research Quarterly 66(4): 938–951.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Golder, S.N. (2010), ‘Bargaining delays in the government formation process’, Comparative Political Studies 43(1): 3–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grofman, B. and van Roozendaal, P. (1994), Toward a theoretical explanation of premature cabinet termination: with application to post-war cabinets in the Netherlands, European Journal of Political Research 26(2): 155–170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heller, W.B. (2001). ‘Political denials: the policy effect of intercameral partisan differences in bicameral parliamentary systems’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17(1): 34–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heller, W.B. (2007), ‘Divided politics: bicameralism, parties, and policy in democratic legislatures’. Annual Review of Political Science 10(1): 245–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heller, W.B. and Branduse, D.M. (2014), ‘The politics of bicameralism’, in Martin, S., Saalfeld, T. and Strøm, K. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook Of Legislative Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 332–351.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, K. (1996), ‘Institutional and partisan sources of gridlock: a theory of divided and unified government’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 8(1): 7–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979), ‘“Effective” number of parties. A measure with application to West Europe’, Comparative Political Studies 12(1): 3–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. (1996), Making And Breaking Governments: Cabinets And Legislatures In Parliamentary Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leblang, D. and Mukherjee, B., (2005). ‘Government partisanship, elections, and the stock market: examining American and British stock returns, 1930–2000’, American Journal of Political Science 49(4): 780–802.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levmore, S. (1992), ‘Bicameralism: when are two decisions better than one?’ International Review of Law and Economics 12(2): 145–162.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lijphart, A. (1984), Democracies: Patterns Of Majoritarian And Consensus Government In Twenty-One Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lijphart, A. (1987), ‘Bicameralism: Canadian senate reform in comparative perspective’, in Bakvis, H. and Chandler, W. M. (eds.), Federalism And The Role Of The State, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 101–112.Google Scholar
Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns Of Democracy. Government Forms And Performance In Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Martin, L. W. and Vanberg, G. (2003), ‘Wasting time? The impact of ideology and size on delay in coalition formation’, British Journal of Political Science 33(2): 323–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, L. W. and Vanberg, G. (2020), What You See Is Not Always What You Get: Bargaining Before an Audience Under Multiparty Government. American Political Science Review, forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merlo, A. (1997), ‘Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment’, Journal of Political Economy 105(1): 101–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Müller, W. C., Bergman, T. and Strøm, K. (2008), ‘Coalition theory and cabinet governance’, in Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds.), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle In Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–50.Google Scholar
Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (2008), ‘Coalition agreements and cabinet governance’, in Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds.), Cabinets And Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle In Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 159–99.Google Scholar
Riker, W.H. (1992), ‘The justification of bicameralism’, International Political Science Review 13(1): 101–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saalfeld, T. (2008), ‘Institutions, chance, and choices: the dynamics of cabinet survival’, in Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds.), Cabinets And Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle In Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 327–368.Google Scholar
Schofield, N. (1993), ‘Political competition in multiparty coalition governments’, European Journal of Political Research 23(1): 1–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sjölin, M. (1993), Coalition Politics And Parliamentary Power, Lund: Lund University Press.Google Scholar
Strøm, K., Budge, I. and Laver, M. (1994), ‘Constraints on cabinet formation in parliamentary democracies’, American Journal of Political Science 38(2): 303–335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strøm, K., Müller, W.C. and Bergman, T. (Eds.). (2008), Cabinets And Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle In Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Tsebelis, G. (2002), Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsebelis, G., & Ha, E. (2014). ‘Coalition theory: a veto players’ approach’, European Political Science Review 6(3): 331–357.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsebelis, G., & Money, J. (1997), Bicameralism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S. and Werner, A. (2016), The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR): Version 2016b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).Google Scholar
Warwick, P.V. (1994), Government Survival In Parliamentary Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar