The relationship between liberalism and democracy is notoriously paradoxical. On the one hand, the justification for democratic procedures most commonly rests on liberal assumptions. Standard liberal arguments for democracy range from the importance of consent due to the moral primacy of the individual, to the role of critical argument and the diversity of opinion for the discovery of truth. On the other hand, liberal institutional arrangements, such as the separation of powers and the rule of law, have frequently been interpreted as constraints upon democracy, albeit necessary ones if democracy is not to undermine itself. The paradox arises from the fact that liberalism provides a philosophical basis for regarding democracy as the only valid source of law whilst apparently appealing to some higher law in order to limit democracy itself. This paradox is embodied in the constitutions of most liberal democratic states. For generally these documents contain provisions – such as a bill of rights guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, assembly and association – designed to secure popular participation in the democratic process, alongside others – such as rights not obviously intrinsic to democratic decision making and mechanisms for judicial review – which seek to limit the power of democratic assemblies.

This article considers how parties can decide on policy when there is no reliable information about the effect of these decisions on voting. Where this is the case they must base their stands on a priori assumptions about appropriate priorities, namely on political ideologies. These indicate the general policy area a party should occupy, but do not give detailed guidance on which position to take within it. Five different ways of deciding on this, within ideological constraints, are specified. The predictions derived from these models well anticipate the actual decisions made by post-war parties in twenty democracies, as summarized in the unique spatial maps of policy movements published by the Manifesto Research Group of the European Consortium for Political Research.

German unification has revived earlier scholarly debates about the nature of the German political culture and the ability of the nation to rise above its cultural heritage – now focused on the cultural inheritance from the German Democratic Republic. This article examines popular support for democratic attitudes as a prerequisite for successful political unification and the development of democracy in a unified Germany. Our evidence focuses on a study of democratic attitudes conducted in West Germany and East Germany by the Mannheim Research Unit for Societal Development in early 1990, with supplemental data from more recent surveys. We find that East Germans voice support for democratic attitudes that rivals or excels the expression of democratic norms in the West. The correlates of these opinions suggest that democratic norms in the East developed from an on-going process of counter-cultural socialization and from judgements about the relative economic strength of the Federal Republic.

Attitudes towards a departing administration can help shape attitudes towards candidates, especially when the incumbent vice-president is one of the candidates. This succession effect was apparent in the 1988 presidential election, when Vice-President Bush benefited from the enduring popularity of retiring President Reagan. This article develops a model in which succession effects, the net candidate score and party identification affect the general election vote. Analysis shows that this effect remains when controls are instituted for retrospective voting more generally. Attitudes towards Reagan also had an indirect impact by affecting the net Bush-Dukakis candidate score; altogether the estimated impact of the Reagan effect in 1988 was to turn the vice-president's predicted loss into his observed victory. Additionally, a succession effect was detected in the 1988 nominating campaign, with Bush's popularity over Dole benefiting from reactions to the Reagan administration. There is evidence of succession effects in other presidential elections, particularly a Johnson effect in 1968.

On 3 November 1992 the American electorate dismissed President George Bush after a campaign in which his opponents repeatedly criticized his management – or mismanagement – of the nation's sluggish economy. Although the salience of economic issues in the 1992 election is consistent with the emphasis placed on economic conditions in most studies of presidents' job approval ratings, the results of these studies have recently been challenged. Based on analyses of quarterly data for the 1953–88 period, MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson conclude that voters' subjective evaluations of the long-term performance of the national economy are crucial. Controlling for such expectations, retrospective judgements about economic performance and objective economic conditions are not important determinants of approval of the president. These conclusions are at odds both with the traditional ‘reward-punishment’ theory that emphasizes the importance of retrospective economic evaluations for approval of the president and with the revisionist ‘issue-priority’ theory which contends that inflation and unemployment rates have differential effects on support for Republican and Democratic presidents.

In a recent Note we investigated the incidence of tactical voting in the British election of 1987. A major hypothesis was that in situations where it made sense (i.e., in which voters preferred a party that was a long way from contention, so that a vote for that party was likely to be ‘wasted’), tactical voting would be much more frequent than had hitherto been assumed. We discovered that this was indeed the case; in what we called ‘objectively tactical situations’, tactical voting was as high as 25 per cent or more in the general case, rising to more than 50 per cent among highly educated weak partisans who had strong negative feelings about the winning party. In the process, however, we discovered what appeared to be an anomaly in need of further exploration.

At the end of this series of comments, rejoinders and second thoughts on tactical voting it may not be entirely clear what is actually in dispute. The aim of this Note, therefore, is simply to take stock and to try to elucidate the points on which there is agreement and disagreement.