After 8 Years of United States unilateralism in Central America and ideological confrontation on Capitol Hill, by 1989, newly-elected leaders in Latin America and Democrats in Congress yearned for a US president who would listen to their concerns, not just lecture them on the contras. George Bush's pragmatic style was therefore a welcome departure from the ideological intensity of his predecessor. With the democratic and pragmatic leaders of Latin America, Bush grappled with debt, democratic transitions, and drug trafficking, and together they sought new ways to relate the Hemisphere to a rapidly changing world.

On 11 March 1990, Patricio Aylwin took office as Chile's first elected president since 1970. Chile thus joined the list of Latin American nations making a transition from military to civilian government. Like the civilian governments in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala, Chile's new government faced the challenge of returning the armed forces to a less central role in politics and reducing their institutional prerogatives.

Brazil began the 1990s the same way it began the 1980s: in crisis. A decade ago, popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the political system was at an all-time high. As the legitimacy of the military regime installed in 1964 gradually dissipated, political and military elites turned their attention to the question of what kind of regime would be able to replace the one which was disintegrating. In one important aspect their vision coincided with the aspirations of the general population: the new political regime would have to be based on increased competition. Military elites would yield executive power, and the civilian politicians replacing them would agree to submit themselves to the popular verdict.

In July 1989, as Carlos Menem awaited his inauguration as president, Argentina was experiencing a situation very different from that of the early days of the Alfonsín administration. Much water had passed over the dam since the transition. The crunch of economic crisis — and the failure of the Radical administration to overcome it even minimally — had brought economic questions to center stage and relegated political claims to second place. In this setting, Argentina's new foreignpolicymakers put aside the practice, set by their predecessors, of standing on principle. From the beginning, their rhetoric emphasized three keywords realism, pragmatism, and “normality,” — as the basis of a policy which focused on the economy (Argentina, 1989a: 1).

According to Domingo Cavallo:

The foreign exchange market in Peru experienced the same kinds of overwhelming volatility and severe shocks as the rest of the national economy during the 1980s. Beginning in 1980, Peru's economy was buffeted by a severe decline in copper prices followed, in 1982, by a huge increase in real debt servicing costs as a result of the drop in industrial-country inflation and remaining high dollar interest rates. This simultaneous squeeze on export earnings and hike in debt service cost led to an inability to meet foreign debt commitments and, essentially, a cutoff from access to foreign capital.

Few events have captured the imagination of progressive countries and parties worldwide as did the July 1979 Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Many of these parties became strong supporters of the Ortega government and were thus quite taken by surprise — as were most of those involved and engaged in Central American politics — by the outcome of the Nicaraguan election in February 1991. One such party, one of the most determined in its support of the Sandinistas, was Sweden's Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiska Arbetare Partlet or SAP), even though Sweden may not immediately come to mind as a natural participant in Central American politics. How can this intense Swedish Social Democratic involvement and partisanship be explained? How has Swedish support been translated into practical positions? Did the election victory of Violeta Chamorro, who was supported by the United States (a country whose Central American policy came under relendess fire by the SAP), signal the end of Swedish Social Democratic engagement in Nicaraguan politics?