Hostname: page-component-7bb8b95d7b-cx56b Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-09-27T02:51:28.610Z Has data issue: true hasContentIssue false

Management and Enforcement Theories for Compliance with the Rule of Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 September 2024

Roila Mavrouli*
Affiliation:
CNRS GREGHEC, Jouy en Josas, France
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Following the contemporary debate surrounding two alternative perspectives on compliance – enforcement and management – this article suggests an analysis through the lens of the rule of law crisis. Specifically, the financial and techno-managerial strategy developed by the EU for the indirect protection of the rule of law relies on mechanisms that combine characteristics from both the enforcement and management approaches. This article will identify these mechanisms, namely the European Semester, the Conditionality regulation, the European Structural Investment Funds and the Recovery and Resilience Facility, in order to determine their nature, features, and tools for ensuring compliance with the rule of law. The hypothesis of this article relies on the idea that the EU’s tools are characterised by a mismatch between the causes of the identified problems and the chosen solutions. Considering that the deployment of the above measures has not re-established compliance, the EU strategy toes between inducing rule conformity on the one hand and deterring rule of law violations on the other. However, it seems that only the former can restore the rule of law, as the latter is considered ill-equipped to reverse or at least halt instances of backsliding. This mismatch explains why the Justice Scoreboard, the Framework, and the Review Cycle with its Annual Report have not made any difference, and more generally, why management strategies are unfit for dealing with deliberate backsliding.1

Type
Articles
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

I. Introduction

In the face of the systemic violations of the rule of law by certain Member States, the EU institutions may have recourse to Article 7 TEU, though it has not been effective in combating the decline of the rule of law. Due to the specific voting procedures, those Member States concerned by the Article 7 procedure have found themselves in a position to protect one another and thereby prevent any sanctions.

In addition to Article 7 TEU, a number of other mechanisms have been progressively implemented by the EU institutions to address rule of law issues in Member States. For example, after the creation in 2007 of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania, the Commission in 2014, established a Rule of Law Framework aimed at preventing emerging threats to the Rule of Law that could potentially escalate to the point where Article 7 TEU must be triggered (COM(2014) 158 final). Specifically, it has provided an avenue for dialogue with the concerned Member States that is structured via opinions and recommendations from the Commission. In addition, since 2016, the Council has organised a Rule of Law Dialogue annually. This dialogue is currently divided into two political discussions: a horizontal discussion regarding general rule of law developments in the EU, and country-specific discussions covering key developments in the Member States. However, Article 7 TEU, the CVM, the Rule of Law Framework, and the Rule of Law Dialogue in the Council, as well as the various resolutions adopted by the European Parliament, have not led to any decisive results that would have hampered the decline of the rule of law.

In light of the ineffectiveness of the rule of law’s political protection mechanisms, the CJEU has been invoked and identified serious rule of law problems in Hungary and Poland in relation to, inter alia, the independence of the judiciary, the situation of migrants, refugees and asylum standards, the financing of NGOs, and respect for academic freedom.Footnote 2 It has also recently signaled that it is inclined to use certain provisions – in particular Article 19 TEU – that do not directly touch on the rule of law in order to link the principles contained therein to said rule of law. However, these condemnations have failed to stem the crisis.

The EU has since launched a new strategy which relies on financial and techno-managerial mechanisms that would complete and strengthen the existing political and judicial mechanisms, although these mechanisms were not specifically designed nor envisioned to protect the rule of law, namely the European Semester, the European and Structural Investment Funds (“the ESIF”), the Multiannual Financial Framework (“the MFF”) and the protection of the EU’s financial interests. These mechanisms mainly pertain to the Economic and Monetary Union, cohesion policy and European fiscal policy, and rely on techno-managerial mechanisms (indicators and scoreboards, benchmarking, peer reviews, national reform programmes, etc.). Their use to indirectly protect the rule of law in Member States was first urged by the Commission; indeed, in April and July 2019, the Commission published two communications on the rule of law (COM(2019) 163 final; COM(2019) 343 final) where it notably stressed the role that the European Semester could play, as well as that of the ESIF. The Juncker Commission also put forward the concept of a Rule of Law Mechanism which would eventually lead to the adoption of an annual Rule of Law Report – published for the first time on 30 September 2020 (COM(2020) 580 final) – along with the necessity to create, as a part of the MFF, a mechanism to protect the EU’s budget when generalised deficiencies regarding the rule of law in Member States affect or risk affecting that budget. The Commission’s approach has more recently been approved by the European Council following the COVID-19 pandemic, and was subsequently fully integrated into the 2021–2027 MFF and European recovery plan – also known as Next Generation EU.

The analysis of these new techno-managerial instruments is important, and involves devices which, given their non-legal nature, were in danger of slipping under the legal radar.Footnote 3 In our view however, this instrument-based analysisFootnote 4 remains incomplete because it does not take sufficient account of the role assigned to the compliance of these instruments (especially the techno-managerial ones).

With this in mind, this article seeks to refine the instrument-based analysis by taking into account the compliance dimension.Footnote 5 This analysis seems all the more relevant given that the EU’s new strategy for the indirect protection of the rule of law relies on instruments that combine characteristics from both enforcement and management approaches. Classifying the instruments for the indirect protection of the rule of law through the lens of management and enforcement is not an easy task but nevertheless must take into consideration the different manifestations of the rule of law.

This article is divided into three main parts. Following the introduction (I), the first section will involve mapping and classifying the instruments of indirect protection through the lens of enforcement/management (II). Then, on this basis, an analysis of the effects will be undertaken, taking into account not only the instruments individually but additionally what has been the cumulative effect of the new strategy (III). Finally, an analysis of the advantages and potential for reconceptualising European responses to the crisis of the rule of law will be undertaken, as well as an identification of the risks of conflating these notions (IV) before the concluding remarks (V).

II. Mapping and classification

The new EU strategy to combat rule of law backsliding in some Member States involves a mix and match of instruments intended to combine enforcement and management methods to ensure compliance. This section aims to offer a thorough mapping of the aforementioned instruments in order to provide a concise classification of their nature. When it comes to rule of law backsliding, some legal scholars emphasise the questionable nature of the production of soft lawFootnote 6 that tends to replace and compete with the traditional enforcement method of infringement proceedings. Be that as it may, there is a disagreement among the actors involved as to how to break the current deadlock. In spite of the rich literature and legal scholarship on the nature and reform of the enforcement mechanismsFootnote 7 – and for some, the reform of the Union as suchFootnote 8 – the new EU strategy combines elements of enforcement and management theories in order to ensure compliance. Indeed, the rule of law crisis highlights the controversial progress in integration linked to efforts to establish the internal market by the end of 1992, which involved addressing theoretical disagreements concerning the specific forms of compliance with EU law. Compliance according to political scientists is evaluated according to the transposition of EU directives into national law, or the extent to which transposition is achieved by looking into infringement proceedings that challenge the adequacy of domestic measures.Footnote 9 Nevertheless, when it comes to the rule of law, measuring compliance is much more difficult and heterogeneous as the multiplication of infringement proceedings combined with a proved lack of national judiciaries paves the way for complementary mechanisms for the protection of the rule of law, and therefore compliance with the value of Article 2 TEU.

The launch of the new EU strategy for the indirect protection of the rule of law is the result of the new NGEU financial package, that for the first time has embedded several other instruments in the European semester through the monitoring of Member States. These instruments for the indirect protection of the rule of law are: the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the Common Provisions regulation (CPR) and the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation. This interlocking of the above mechanisms calls for a thorough understanding of the theories of management and enforcement,Footnote 10 as these two approaches can be helpful in shedding light on the systemic deficiencies of the monitoring of rule of law protection in several Member States. Moreover, the traditional road to compliance can be the result of the above two alternatives, or alternatively cumulative perspectives for compliance. It is a fact that the role of national courts in ensuring compliance with European law has been undermined as a consequence of the lack of judicial independence in Hungary and Poland. This has led the EU institutions to look elsewhere for ensuring the behavioral conformity of such states with the EU’s legal rules. However, the concept of compliance does not necessarily imply a cause-and-effect relationship between a rule and behaviour:Footnote 11 it remains agnostic about causalityFootnote 12 and focuses only on whether a behaviour aligns with a given rule.Footnote 13

The concept of compliance – while related – is dissimilar to the concept of enforcement as the latter refers to mechanism-based processes “by which the law is made effectiveFootnote 14 ” and by which actors are compelled to comply with the law. Within this article, enforcement refers to mechanisms which foresee legal sanctions and can be applied to the violator with a view to ensuring compliance, whereas management pertains to inducing rule conformity through monitoring and dialogue. Therefore, the mapping of the above mechanisms will be apprehended through the lens of the theoretical framework of enforcement and management strategies as competing, cooperative, or rather “coopetitive” tools (II.1) These instruments do share common characteristics such as monitoring and sanctions and work as part of a more tactical strategy for compliance (II.2). However, the overlapping mechanisms for compliance have led to several mismatches questioning the extensive use of the “carrot” and the rare use of the “stick” for the protection of the rule of law (II.3).

II.1. EU enforcement and management tools: From competing strategies for achieving compliance to allies for ensuring the rule of law

The techno-managerial strategy developed by the EU for the indirect protection of the rule of law relies on instruments that combine characteristics from both the enforcement and management approaches. The two perspectives of these approaches are considered to be the most effective means of addressing non-compliance, but are traditionally perceived as competing theories both in theory and in practice.Footnote 15 Nevertheless, J. Tallberg challenges the conception of enforcement and management as competing strategies for achieving compliance and suggests that the combination of the two is most effective.Footnote 16 He contends that the two strategies are complementary and mutually reinforcing, rather than discrete alternatives. Compliance systems that offer both forms of instruments tend to be particularly effective in ensuring rule conformance, whereas systems that rely on only one of the strategies often suffer are hampered in identifiable ways. Interestingly, the EU strategy for the indirect protection of the rule of law seems to fall under the above observation. Be that as it may, the mapping and classification of those instruments will contribute to the analysis by demonstrating this twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a “management-enforcement ladder”.Footnote 17

While J. Tallberg considers the two approaches to be two sides of the same coin when it comes to ensuring compliance, S. Priebus disputes this notion by transposing it to the strategy for addressing the rule of law crisis. She argues that the multiplication of instruments – the Justice Scoreboard, the Rule of Law Framework and the Rule of Law Mechanism Rule of Law conditionality – for the protection of the rule of law has not restored compliance.Footnote 18 More specifically, drawing on the two alternatives in compliance studies – the management and enforcement approaches – she pleads that, with the exception of Rule of Law conditionality, the Commission’s tools are characterised by a mismatch between the causes of the identified problems and the chosen solutions. Instead of sanctioning voluntary noncompliance, they rely on soft measures which are recommendedFootnote 19 in cases of involuntary noncompliance, but which are not suitable in cases of deliberate noncompliance.Footnote 20 It is worth mentioning that while J. Tallberg identifies several different reasons for noncompliance when defending the combination of the enforcement-management ladder,Footnote 21 S. Priebus advances the concept of deliberate noncompliance, emphasising enforcement instruments as the sole and singular effective means. In order to better understand these different visions, we will classify here the instruments of the EU strategy.

II.2. Classification of the instruments for the indirect protection of the rule of law

The design and operation of the EU’s system for inducing compliance with the rule of law focuses on a method combining both mechanisms. At the same time, this method challenges the antithetical positioning of enforcement and management strategies in contemporary discourse: monitoring, sanctions, capacity building, rule interpretation, and social pressure coexist as a means for ensuring states comply. The EU’s new strategy for the protection of the rule of law is a notable example of the symbiotic existence of the above elements, such as preventive capacity building, forms of monitoring, a legal system that permits cases to be brought against non-compliant states and deterrent sanctions as a final measure if states refuse to accept the rulings of the legal system.Footnote 22 As mentioned previously, for the classification of the above instruments, two analytical dimensions – namely, prevention and dialogue – will describe the management dimension, whereas the sanctions will describe the logic underlying the enforcement.

a. European semester

At the level of violation prevention, the EU institutions seek to compensate for capacity deficiencies and provide positive inducements through a range of management measures. In this respect, the European Semester, established in 2011, constitutes an annual cycle of economic policy coordination within the European Union that incorporates several dimensions of the rule of law. Its initiation was triggered by the 2007 economic crisis which demonstrated that the states had not made the best decisions vis-à-vis the economic sector. Its role consisted of improving economic policy coordination within the Union and ensuring the implementation of the EU’s economic rules at the supranational level, and has now evolved to take into consideration several rule of law dimensions included within the national reform plans and country-specific recommendations. The Council discusses these recommendations, amends them if deemed appropriate, and adopts them. The European Semester was conceived as an instrument for the coordination of policies to ensure sound public finances, to prevent excessive macro-economic imbalances and to support structural reforms,Footnote 23 and it has now become not only the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy guidance and surveillance,Footnote 24 but also an instrument of rule of law monitoring and surveillance. These elements provide enough material to qualify the European Semester as an instrument for inducing and ensuring rule-conforming behavior. Therefore, it falls under the management approach which embraces a problem-solving pathway based on capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency through the country-specific recommendations.

The classification of the European Semester among the management instruments relies not only on the recommendations that create an incentive-based logic for the Member States to comply but also on the use of specific tools such as the EU Justice Scoreboard and the Structural Reform Support Programme – which became the technical Support Instrument – in order to monitor structural reforms in the states. More specifically, the EU Justice Scoreboard,Footnote 25 introduced in 2013, provides information on the Member States’ judicial systems states, including the assessment of the reforms and efficiency of each justice system.Footnote 26 The annual EU Justice Scoreboard looks at a range of indicators to assess the independence, quality and efficiency of national justice systems and is complemented by country specific assessments, presented in the Country Reports, which enable to make a deeper analysis based on the national legal and institutional context.Footnote 27 This tool serves the specific aim of monitoring compliance with the rule of law and guiding investment as the European Semester is complemented by the EU Justice Scoreboard, and has proven to be a good framework to develop country-knowledge relating to rule of law.Footnote 28 Furthermore, the Structural Reform Support Programme launched in 2017 assisted the Member States with reforms based on their demands in all sectors, including those related to the rule of law, such as public administration, the judicial system, and the fight against corruption and supporting them in designing and implementing institutional, administrative and growth-enhancing reforms.Footnote 29 The mere fact that the use of this tool is dependent on requests from the Member States confirms the management approach to capacity building and incentives related directly to the EU’s strategic priorities.

Akin to the European Semester, the current long-term EU budget (also known as the Multiannual Financial Framework, or MFF) running from 2021 to 2027 and the Next Generation EU instrument supporting the recovery plan for Europe include the new EU budget structure, funding programmes, per-Member State allocations, and data on spending and revenue.Footnote 30 Based on the link between the rule of law and sound management of EU funds, the 2021–2027 MFF drives the dialogue surrounding the protection of rule of law in the EU’s funding programming decisions. The strategic use of EU funds in strengthening the rule of law is supported by the recommendations for structural reforms within the European Semester;Footnote 31 therefore, two funding instruments, namely the RRF and the CPR have been embedded in the European Semester.

The European Semester marked a turning point in the indirect protection of the rule of law. While it has played a role in promoting the rule of law since its inception, this role was accentuated by the implementation of the European recovery plan, Next Generation EU, following the Covid-19 pandemic.Footnote 32 Therefore, the Commission presented the European Semester as “an important early warning and preventive framework” for “dealing with problems of the rule of law in the Member States before it is necessary to resort to Article 7”.Footnote 33 In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the importance of the European Semester has grown, as the main instrument for implementing the recovery plan, the RRF, is closely linked to the European Semester in several respects. As an economic and budgetary instrument, the European Semester focuses on aspects of the rule of law that impact the business environment, particularly issues related to efficient and high-quality judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks, fraud, and conflicts of interest.Footnote 34 Many country-specific recommendations addressing rule of law issues were included in the RRF assessment plans.

For example, the European Semester’s 2022 country-specific recommendation addressed to Poland focused on enhancing the investment climate, particularly by safeguarding judicial independence. It also emphasised the need for effective public consultations and the involvement of social partners in the policy-making process.Footnote 35 The Council’s implementation decision approving Poland’s recovery and resilience plan reiterates the 2022 and earlier country-specific recommendations, highlighting challenges related to the investment climate, particularly concerning the Polish judicial system, decision-making, law-making processes, and the strengthening of the independence and impartiality of courts. According to the Council’s implementation decision, these reforms address all or a significant subset of the challenges identified in the country-specific recommendations.Footnote 36

The commitments of the Member States reveal the European Semester’s impact on the protection of the rule of law, despite its soft law nature. This nature, relying on monitoring and dialogue, is crucial for Member States when drawing up their national policies. Indeed, Member States must take these recommendations into account, especially those relating to the rule of law.Footnote 37 Even though the European Semester’s country-specific recommendations were strengthened with the RRF, it is still classified as a management instrument that becomes de facto binding through the RRF. From coordinating and monitoring national policies, it has evolved into an instrument for allocating European funds.Footnote 38

b. Common provisions regulation

Managing EU resources and the ESIF in particular can be quite interesting in identifying and addressing rule of law deficiencies. Specifically, the Commission possesses implementing powers that bear some resemblance to actual enforcement powers. However, the logic underlying the procedural arrangements of the ESIF includes compliance assessments which can entail genuine consequences, such as the loss of privileges. Under ESIF management, the Commission may make Member State entitlement to resources conditional. However, strictly speaking, conditionality does not serve an enforcement purposeFootnote 39 but rather applies the system which is within the Commission’s powers of implementation.Footnote 40 According to S. Andersen “Conditionality appears to substantiate some of the assumptions behind coercion and incentive-based enforcement theories. The funds are however established with a view to tackle structural problems and essentially constitute managerial instruments.Footnote 41 ” Indeed, the CPR includes a monitoring and evaluation period wherein technical assistance actions are deemed necessary at the initiative of the Commission.Footnote 42 Conversely, according to Articles 96 and 97 of the same regulation, interruption of the payment deadline and suspension of payment is foreseen if inter alia the Member State has failed to take the necessary action to remedy the situation giving rise to an interruption under Article 96 or there is a serious deficiency.Footnote 43 Be that as it may, the reduction and suspension of payments are management measuresFootnote 44 and are intended to remedy situations where EU funds have been distributed without the conditions for receiving them having been fulfilled. There is the view however that corrections possess a penal natureFootnote 45 where conditionality may indirectly bring about an incremental normalisation of sanction-type powers on the part of the Commission.Footnote 46 In this regard, the Commission’s operational role in defining the substantive conditions for structural funds may effectively turn conditionality into a new means of enforcement.Footnote 47

Under the 2021–2027 CPR, Member States must fulfil so-called horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in the implementation of cohesion policy programmes;Footnote 48 one of the enabling conditions requires compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. When preparing their programmes, the Member States have to assess whether the enabling conditions are fulfilled, and if the Commission does not agree with their assessment, it cannot reimburse expenditures related to the parts of the programme concerned until the conditions are fulfilled. Member States must thus ensure that these conditions remain fulfilled throughout the entire programming period.Footnote 49 If the Commission identifies a serious deficiency in the effective functioning of this system or the irregular spending of these funds in a Member State, it is authorised under the CPR to suspend the payments of these funds to said Member State or to recover it from them via the imposition of financial corrections, thereby leading to the possibility of a definitive loss of the EU funds by this Member State. It is claimed that systemic violations of the rule of law by a Member State that, for example, that undermine its judicial independence, could be classified as a serious deficiency in the effective functioning of the management and control system.Footnote 50

c. RFF

Regarding the RFF – the new funding possibility created following the COVID crisis and which is intended to address various structural deficiencies – rule of law issues can halt the disbursement of the monies and therefore hamper the post-COVID recovery.Footnote 51 The “interlocking” of the RRF with the European Semester stems from the country-specific recommendations and reform plans that make the Commission negotiate transitional arrangements with Member States to adjust or to reform behavioral requirements. Within the framework of the RRF, it was also decided to introduce a “dialogue for recovery and resilience” that may cover Member States’ recovery and resilience plans and their assessment, the state of the Union’s recovery, resilience and adjustment capacity, or the payment, suspension and termination procedures pursued under the RRF.Footnote 52 The dialogue must, however, be conducted on the basis of the table for recovery and resilience, the indicators of which do not include rule of law issues. While the RRF incorporates a dialogue and monitoring process connected to the country-specific recommendations, it also entails sanctions in the form of the suspension of funding according to Article 22 of the RRF regulation.Footnote 53 Considering that the RRF uses an ensemble of different features and tools for ensuring compliance with the rule of law, its nature has been much debated and falls under both the enforcement and management strategies.

More specifically, the monitoring and sanction mechanisms within the RRF have surprisingly been incorporated within a unique instrument. Considering that the RRF has a strong performance-based monitoring system,Footnote 54 it is providing important financial support for the implementation of key reforms and investments, entailing a fiscal and reform impulse financed by the Union.Footnote 55 However, the sanctions contained within the RRF regulation follow a different logic compared to the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation.

d. Rule of law conditionality regulation

More unambiguously, the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation is conceived as an enforcement instrument imposing sanctions when violations of the rule of law with an impact on EU financial interests are detected. The Rule of Law Conditionality regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the EU budget entails the possible suspension or reduction of EU funding in a situation where breaches of the principles of the rule of law in a Member State affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the EU in a sufficiently direct manner.Footnote 56 The decision relies upon the Commission on a case-by-case basis, with the Council’s agreement by a qualified majority. The Rule of Law Conditionality regulation clearly represents a purely enforcement instrument stressing a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctions. The rationale behind the design of this instrument can be traced back to the revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework, when the Commission issued a proposal in 2018 regarding using the EU budget as a tool “in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States.Footnote 57 ” According to the proposal, once such deficiencies are detected, the Commission has the right to initiate the procedure, with this mechanism having two functions. Firstly, it would constitute a punishment for the government implementing reforms not in line with the EU values. Secondly, at the same time it would serve as a measure of security for the EU itself, protecting its financial interests.

The enforcement approach underpinning the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation is anchored in the idea that states are rational actors who will perform a cost-benefit analysis regarding alternative behavioral choices when making compliance decisions.Footnote 58 Expressly, they may opt for flouting the rule when confronted with an incentive structure in which the benefits of non-compliance exceed the costs of detection.Footnote 59 Therefore, the compliance issues are better remedied by increasing the likelihood of detection and associated penalties through monitoring and the threat of sanctions. Footnote 60,Footnote 61 The former because it increases transparency and exposes possible defectors, the latter because sanctions raise the costs of flouting the law and make non-compliance a less attractive option.

In summary, we find different instruments for ensuring compliance, such as the European Semester, the CPR, the RRF and the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation. As well, the European Semester allows for dialogue and monitoring where the Commission defines its priorities, establishes the relevant indicators, produces the country reports and is the recipient of the Member States’ national reform programmes. The European Semester’s country-specific recommendations were only strengthened with the RRF, and while these two instruments could be considered together, the above classification order follows a typology based on a continuum from “pure management” to “pure enforcement.”

The RRF integrates both indicators, dialogue, and monitoring, encompassing a reform plan approved by both the Commission and the Council, along with sanction measures. The management and incentive perspective are much more obvious here as the RRF could be interpreted as an example of “coercive Europeanization” by other means,Footnote 62 “which uses the strictness of the performance monitoring mechanisms associated with the performance-based conditionality to enforced change into member states.Footnote 63 ” Put differently, if the traditional means of enforcement to induce compliance – once violations have occurred – is the infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU, it has now been strengthened and completed with the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation. Indeed, the proliferation and relative ineffectiveness of infringement proceedings regarding rule of law violations, coupled with the impasse of the Article 7 TEU procedure reinforce the convergent integration of the originally competing “foes” of management and enforcement theories.

The conceptualisation of the above instruments through the lens of management and enforcement theories does not, however, encompass the entire argument presented in this analysis. Specifically, regarding the indirect protection of the rule of law, the management and enforcement definition incorporates two additional aspects that require further emphasis. On the one hand, Member States can influence the measures to various degrees. In the case of the European Semester, the recommended measures are based on the country’s suggestions and are therefore more managerial compared to the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation, where only the Commission and the Council can decide on the measures.Footnote 64 On the other hand, the primary aim of the European Semester, the RRF, and the CPR is not the protection of the rule of law, contrary to the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation.

II.3. Synergies and mismatches of the mechanisms for compliance: carrot or stick?

It is drawn from the above that the conditionalities – as sanctions – relate to the rule of law under the CPR, the RRF and the Conditionality regulation. Nevertheless, only the latter is a purely enforcement mechanism that has recently been triggered against Hungary as a solution of last resort. Political scientists provide different explanations for why states fail to comply with their international and EU obligations which has led to different remedies for the problem.Footnote 65 If we focus on the managerialist approach which argues that non-compliance is typically non-volitional and often the outcome of administrative or financial incapacities, whereas sanctioning mechanisms may not always be effective,Footnote 66 there is a debate on whether rule of law violations should be addressed as non-volitional.Footnote 67

The use of different forms of conditionality in the above instruments can ensure compliance with certain norms which had been left unenforced. However, only the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation can go further as an enforcement mechanism. Until now, the EU has preferably made use of the prospect of benefits (“carrot”) rather than the threat of sanctions (“stick”), which is why the debate surrounding whether there is a gap between the objectives to be attained and the strategy adopted for the attainment of these objectives is admissible. The combined use of the above mechanisms and the controversially limited use of sanctions can be explained by the fact that most treaties in operation today require only modest changes in state behavior, hence why country-specific recommendations tend to codify existing behavior, rather than impose far-reaching adjustment requirements, and therefore confront states with few incentives to defect. However, if states were to negotiate agreements that require more profound behavioral changes, then enforcement would be imperative for ensuring compliance.

According to the management approach, non-compliance, when it occurs, is not the result of deliberate decisions to violate treaties, but rather an effect of capacity limitations and rule ambiguity. By consequence, non-compliance is best addressed through a problem-solving strategy of capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency, rather than through coercive enforcement. Managerial theorists further suggest that non-compliance may be inadvertent.Footnote 68

For several reasons, treaty language is often unclear and imprecise, which leads to their misinterpretation by states. Inadvertent non-compliance may also result from the uncertainty involved in selecting the policy strategies required to meet a certain treaty target, for instance. According to Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes: “If we are correct that the principal source of noncompliance is not willful disobedience but the lack of capability or clarity or priority, then coercive enforcement is as misguided as it is costly.Footnote 69 ” It is accordingly relevant to assert that the effectiveness of these instruments depends substantially on their actual use, while their design and underlying ideas concerning how best to address rule of law problems set limits on what they can achieve.

The deepening of the rule of law crisis followed by an expansion of said crisisFootnote 70 has made it all the more obvious why these efforts fail. According to S. Priebus, the actual problem is not that the EU lacks the adequate tools to address this situation, but rather that the EU institutions lack the will to use the instruments available more forcefully.Footnote 71 If this is the case, and noncompliance is as deliberate as suggested in the literature, then the enforcement mechanism may be the most effective instrument by far. According to S. Priebus, while the Commission acknowledges that the dismantling of the rule of law in some states is “the result of deliberate policy choices,Footnote 72 ” it has mainly not reacted with instruments involving sanctions, as suggested by the enforcement approach. Instead, the new tools predominantly rely on prevention and dialogue, mechanisms recommended by management theorists who assume that noncompliance is involuntary. Put differently, although the Commission has correctly identified the origins of noncompliance, it has not drawn the correct conclusions concerning the remedies to such breaches of the rule of law.Footnote 73

III. Analysis of the effects

The classification of the above instruments through the lens of the management and enforcement theories provides a suitable basis for assessing the effects of the EU’s rule of law strategy. While both approaches can be seen as allies for ensuring compliance with the rule of law,Footnote 74 these instruments share the characteristic of a cumulative effect and have various implication on the EU constitutional system. Their use relies on a suite of tools such as monitoring, dialogue, rule of law reports, annual data gathering exercises, (rarely) combined with a logical and clearly complementary enforcement mechanism (the triggering of Conditionality regulation) for a more thorough protection of the rule of law. Be that as it may, the interlocking of these mechanisms can be puzzling as to whether, which and when each instrument is followed by sanctions.

The democratisation of the monitoring and dialogue processes regarding the rule of law have not been accompanied by clear-cut criteria as to whether the enforcement mechanisms should follow. However, the one and only instance in which the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation was triggered against Hungary on 27 April 2022 is the logical continuity of several years of monitoring and dialogue vis-à-vis rule of law concerns that eventually evolved into serious or systemic rule of law violations. In terms of a last resort enforcement logic, pursuant to Article 6 of the 2020/2092 regulation, the Commission set out the factual elements and specific grounds for adopting measures to protect the EU’s financial interests due to rule-of-law violations in Hungary.Footnote 75 Specifically, on 18 September 2022 the European Commission recommended withholding 65% of the funding allocated to Hungary for three operational cohesion policy programmes (€7.5 billion in total) in order to “ensure the protection of the financial interests of the EU against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary” as part of the conditionality mechanism procedure initiated in April.Footnote 76 The proportion of frozen funds was ultimately lowered to 6.3 billion euros (55%).Footnote 77 Nevertheless, while recommending the freezing of EU funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality mechanism, the European Commission gave a formal green light to Hungary’s recovery plan. However, the disbursement of the recovery money was linked to 27 “super milestones” aimed at strengthening the independence of the judiciary, auditing rules and control over how EU funds are used.Footnote 78 This triggering of the Conditionality regulation can be seen as the ultimate enforcement solution that completes and reinforces the years of monitoring and dialogue to ensure compliance by imposing economic sanctions. Furthermore, the frozen funds following the CPR (Hungary) and the funds in grants which have not yet paid out (Hungary and Poland) following the RFF create a cumulative effect of this new EU strategy (III.1).

III.1. The cumulative effect of the new EU rule of law strategy

The sanctions form integral part of one characteristic of the new EU strategy, namely the cumulative effect, as a result of the interlocking of the different instruments. More specifically, and before the triggering of the above enforcement mechanism, the embedment of the RRF in the European Semester, the RRF’s referencesFootnote 79 to the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation and CPR lead to a bewildering array of legal sources for the protection of the rule of law. Furthermore, the conditionalities contained in three instruments – the RRF, Rule of Law Conditionality regulation and CPR – build a robust management network that can lead to sanctions based on the European Semester cycle.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the importance of the European Semester has become even greater with the RRF to which it is closely linked. While the purpose of the RRF is to provide financial support for reforms and investments undertaken by Member States to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, Member States are held accountable for their progress in implementing these plans within the framework of the European Semester. The macroeconomic conditionality contained in the RFF confirms the interconnected nature of the European Semester and RFF. In order to benefit from its financing, Member States must comply with the specific recommendations addressed to them as part of the European Semester; therefore, the national plans for recovery and resilience presented by the Member States detailing their reform and investment programme have to be “consistent with the country-specific challenges and priorities identified as part of the European Semester,Footnote 80 ” in particular with the recommendations made during the recent cycles. Subsequently, there is an assessment performed by the European Commission, before approval by a Council implementing decision. In this assessment, the Commission verifies that the plans contribute “effectively to addressing all or a significant part of the challenges identified in the relevant country recommendations.Footnote 81 ” Therefore, under the RRF, payments will be linked to performance, with the Commission authorising disbursements based on the satisfactory fulfilment of a group of milestones and targets reflecting progress on several reforms and investments of the plan. For each payment request, Member States will provide a “management declaration” that the funds were used for their intended purpose.Footnote 82

The embedment of the RFF in the European Semester is only one part of the cumulative effect for the indirect protection of the rule of law. What is more, the European Semester and the RFF are connected to the Conditionality regulation and the CPRFootnote 83 as well. The EU Budget and access to funds is linked to the European Semester (involving the achievement of reforms in key areas like employment, health, the environment, etc.) and respect for the rule of law (possibility to suspend, reduce or restrict access to funding in case of fraud or deficiencies in the judicial system).Footnote 84

IV. Analysis of the advantages and potential for reconceptualising European responses to the rule of law crisis: a complex apparatus for compliance

Legal scholars make the assumption that the Commission’s tools are characterised by a mismatch between the causes of the identified problems and the chosen solutions.Footnote 85 They suggest that the deployment of the above instruments has not restored compliance and that the EU strategy toes between inducing rule conformity on the one hand and deterring rule of law violations on the other. There is the notion that management tools are ill-equipped to reverse or at least halt instances of backsliding, with this mismatch serving to explain why the Justice Scoreboard,Footnote 86 the Framework, and the Review Cycle with its Annual Report have not made any difference, and more generally, why management strategies are unfit to deal with deliberate backsliding.Footnote 87 It is thus argued, from a theoretical perspective, that the Commission’s new rule of law instruments are ill-equipped to deal with serious noncompliance precisely because of this inherent mismatch between the causes of the problems identified and the solutions chosen, as mentioned previously.Footnote 88 While the Commission acknowledges that the dismantling of the rule of law in some states is “the result of deliberate policy choices,Footnote 89 ” it has mainly not reacted with instruments entailing sanctions, as suggested by the enforcement approach – with the only exception of the triggering of the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation against Hungary. Thus, involuntary noncompliance can be addressed through soft measures of sanctioning, yet deliberate noncompliance, such as the rule of law violations, is not suitable for the management approach. S. Priebus insists on the fact that the new tools predominantly rely on prevention and dialogue, mechanisms which are recommended by management theorists who assume that noncompliance is involuntary.Footnote 90

Be that as it may, the launch of the new EU strategy for the indirect protection of the rule of law has been proven to be the most powerful means of ensuring compliance. Moreover, while compliance is typically associated with coercion-based means of enforcement,Footnote 91 the Commission has developed its own combined strategy wherein the sanctions are the ultimate and rarest solution. The proliferation of management instruments however has involved the possibility of imposing sanctions, yet nevertheless the sanctions resulting from the triggering of the Conditionality regulation have addressed only rule of law violations in Hungary and not in Poland. Furthermore, the triggering of the regulation as well the increased number of infringement proceedings relies on the discretion of the Commission. The management instruments such as the European Semester and the RFF confirm the idea that compliance by the addressees of EU law and policies cannot be confined within the strict boundaries of coercive means of enforcement.Footnote 92 On the contrary, compliance increasingly involves steering and governing instruments, which seek to accommodate the behaviours of national public powers and private parties with existing EU law and policy targets.Footnote 93 The EU strategy further makes use of a more complex and articulated set of instruments, combining a variety of traditional techniques based upon coercion and authority, with non-coercive, non-authoritative instruments (such as incentives or non-binding measures).

While the management and enforcement approaches can theoretically be perceived as foes concerning the road to compliance – in this case non-binding incentive methods vs. coercive means of enforcement –, and while they are qualitatively different, methodologically they can be considered as allies in the maximisation of compliance. As E. Chiti puts it, “in this context, the notion of compliance is used to denote not only an outcome, but also a process – and in particular the whole of ongoing negotiations, political and legal processes, and institutional change that are involved in the execution of EU law and policies and are functionally orientated to give EU law and policies full effectiveness.Footnote 94 ” Accordingly, compliance does not refer to the simple result of obedience, but to the overall process through which obedience is gradually developed.Footnote 95 Having said that, the alternative management and enforcement approaches do not automatically nullify themselves, but compete within the specific process of re-establishing the rule of law. This does not necessarily lead to a conflation of the two approaches; inversely, they provide a solid nexus for the maximisation of compliance.

The assumption of a potential mismatch between the causes of the identified problems and the chosen solutions lies more clearly within the Commission’s communication on European Semester’s Spring package which contains one singular mention of the rule of law.Footnote 96 While the Communication of the Commission insists on the need for ambitious reforms at improving the business environment, administrative capacities and institutional resilience for additional investments, the rule of law issues and/or violations are seemingly addressed through the need for “continued efforts to strengthen the Rule of Law, in particular independent, quality and efficient justice systems and well-functioning anti-corruption frameworks (…), for the soundness of Member States’ institutional resilience and a good business environment.Footnote 97 ” From this perspective, strengthening the rule of law is one objective among numerous others within the economic governance coordination framework. Despite the incremental influence of the European Semester and its transformation into a de facto binding instrument, rule of law is negotiated through the lens of economic policy goals.Footnote 98

The criticisms previously addressed at the European Semester have focused on its nature as “a legally and politically unconstrained expert regimeFootnote 99 ” accompanied by the empowerment of the executive branch at the expense of national parliaments, and at the European level with a similar side-lining of the European Parliament regarding economic governance.Footnote 100 Considering that rule of law dimensions have been incorporated into the Semester’s cycle, there is a difficulty in assessing concisely how and to which extent the ex ante guidance resolves a problem, and more particularly a flagrant rule of law violation, already present within a considerable period of time. Therefore, the mismatch in this case scrutinises the appropriateness of a management instrument such as the European Semester for the objective pursued, namely the re-establishment of the rule of law. In this perspective, Member States are gradually internalising the new procedure. The management approach related to incentives has shifted towards designing country-specific recommendations focusing on what national policies should aim to achieve rather than prescribing what exact policies should be pursued.

V. Conclusion

The potential for reconceiving of and reconsidering the above European management and enforcement responses to the crisis surrounding the rule of law lies on a specific characteristic of the above instruments. More specifically, the management approach through the European Semester tends to equally present rule of law breaches of a different nature, and is an approach that risks trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law. Instead, the Commission can seek “to differentiate its reporting by distinguishing between systemic breaches of the rule of law and individual, isolated breaches,Footnote 101 ” and such a differentiation could be the fundamental element of a concrete and precise triggering of enforcement mechanisms when all previous management tools had not worked effectively.Footnote 102

Moreover, the absence of continuity and precise follow-ups over the years could not furnish an adequate, complete and effective rule of law monitoring.Footnote 103 The pitfall of the country-specific recommendations consists of a sole identification of rule of law concerns with no identification of specific deadlines for implementation. Should the Commission fail to follow the procedures it has foreseen, beyond the deadline given to a Member State for implementing such recommendations, it should justify its failure to act. In the current state of affairs, no assessment can be made regarding improvement in compliance with the rule of law, as well as implementation at a national level. Be that as it may, there are still differences in the use of management and enforcement mechanisms, and the euphemistic language and similar treatment of Member States facing serious rule of law violations with those who are only facing sporadic instances of rule of law violations is an inherent part of the management approach. However, when the quantitative differences are getting larger and more persistent over time, and at some point becoming qualitative differences,Footnote 104 in this respect justify the enforcement mechanisms.

D. Kochenov and P. Bard argue for shifting the focus of the discussion from the enforcement of the rule of law to the reform of the Union as such as a long-term solution.Footnote 105 The purported powerlessness of the EU is a consequence of a combination of the actual difficulties – both conceptual and practical – related to the enforcement of EU values.Footnote 106 Additionally, and equally importantly, it is related to the systematic misrepresentation of the Union’s capacity by the Member States and those institutions unwilling to act, as a clear consensus on any forceful means for dealing with backsliding in the rule of law is apparently lacking. The reimagining of other tools in place such as the broader appeal in the backsliding under Articles 258 TFEU or 259 TFEU,Footnote 107 as evidenced by the infringement proceedings pursued against Poland in the context of its destruction of the Supreme Court, which build on the newly found effet utile and EU law scope-shaping significance of Article 19(1) TEU,Footnote 108 are explanatory of the new configurations. While scholars anticipated this developmentFootnote 109 which infuses Article 258 TFEU with clear new potential, it is important to exercise due caution in interpreting it too broadly.

In a way, the alternative theories of compliance reshape the new frontiers of EU funding. They illustrate the relationship between budget and rule of law while guiding how this relationship should be governed, dismissing the idea of being seen as a set of clear-cut legal obligations that must be routinely enforced.Footnote 110 As Claire Kilpatrick and Joanne Scott put it “While the Commission could enforce obligations, it rarely does so as this could disrupt long-term repeat player relations between the Commission and the Member States.”Footnote 111 In this sense, the new EU strategy for the indirect protection of the rule of law through the management and enforcement theories draws the line between the new frontiers of EU funding while at the same time being perceived as both legally ingenious or legally inappropriate.Footnote 112 The bewildering array of rule of law instruments, both in genesis and implementation, questions whether the EU has over-stepped a normative frontier, or whether it has made an imaginative use of available legal pathways in creating new EU funding streams while negotiating rule of law deficiencies.

Acknowledgments

I would like to extend my gratitude to Arnaud van Waeyenberge for his invaluable guidance and support throughout this research endeavor. His insightful feedback was instrumental in shaping the directions of this paper. This research is part of the MEDROI project (ANR-21-CE41-0004-01) funded by the National Research Agency of France (ANR – Agence nationale de la recherche).

Competing interests

All authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

References

1 For this distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate non-compliance, see S Priebus, “The Commission’s Approach to Rule of Law Backsliding: Managing Instead of Enforcing Democratic Values” (2022) 60(6) Journal of Common Market Studies 1684–1700.

2 See Case C-286/12 European Commission v Hungary [2012] CJEU, Case C-808/18 Commission v Hungary [2020] CJEU, Case C-78/18 Commission v Hungary [2020] CJEU, Case C-66/18 Commission v Hungary [2020] CJEU and Case C-192/18 Commission v Republic of Poland [2019] CJEU.

3 L Fromont and A Van Waeyenberge, “Trading Rule of Law for Recovery? The New EU Strategy in the Post-Covid Era” (2022) European Law Journal 132–147. See also R Mavrouli and A Van Waeyenberge, “EU Responses to the Democratic Deficit and the Rule of Law Crisis: Is It Time for a (New) European Exceptionalism?” (2023) 15 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 405–439.

4 The instrument-based approach makes the instrument of public action the variable of analysis. In this approach, the instrument is understood as “a device that is both technical and social and that organises specific social relations between public power and its recipients according to the representations and meanings it carries.” P Lascoumès and P Le Galès, “L’action publique saisie par ses instruments” in Gouverner par les instruments (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po 2004) 12.

5 J Tallberg, “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union” (2002) 56(3) International Organization 609–643. S Priebus, supra n 1.

6 D Kochenov and P Bárd, “Against Overemphasizing Enforcement in the Current Crisis: EU Law and the Rule of Law in the (New) Member States” in M Matlak, F Schimmelfennig and T P Woźniakowski (eds), Europeanization Revisited: Central and Easter Europe in the European Union (European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 2018) 72–89.

7 A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford, OUP 2017; Online edn, Oxford Academic 2017).

8 D Kochenov and P Bárd supra n 6.

9 For further information, see L Conant, “Compliance and What EU Member States Make of It” in M Cremona (ed.), Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Oxford, 2012, online edn, Oxford Academic 2012).

10 The “enforcement” and “management” approaches have led to different expectations regarding the sources of compliance and non-compliance that are derived from the rationalist factors highlighted by political economists. Applications of these approaches to the EU setting produce hybrid accounts that combine features from the enforcement and management schools, L Conant supra n 9.

11 A Nollkaemper, “The Role of National Courts in Inducing Compliance with International and European Law – A Comparison” in M Cremona (ed.) n 9.

12 K Raustiala and AM Slaughter, “International Law and Compliance” in W Carlsnaes, T Risse and B Simmons, Handbook of International Relations (London Sage 2002) 543. But see Ho, “Compliance and international Soft Law: Why do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?” (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law at 649 (defining “compliance as state behavior that conforms to and arises out of an obligation of international law”). See also Koh, “Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599, discusses compliance in terms of obedience, suggesting some form of causation.

13 Compliance must be distinguished from implementation and effectiveness, which will not be assessed in this article. For these concepts, see A Nollkaemper supra n 11.

14 Smiley, “Taking the Force out of Enforcement: Giving Effect to International Human Rights Law Using Domestic Immigration Law”, (1998) 28 California Western International Law Journal 339, at 341–2 quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 528 (1990, 6th edn). For a narrower definition, see Hayashi, “Soviet Policy on International Regulation of High Seas Fisheries”, (1972) 5 Cornell International Law Journal 131, at 133 (referring to “the process of putting rules of law into execution through actual use or threat of legitimate physical force”).

15 K Raustiala and D G. Victor, “Conclusions” in DG Victor, K Raustiala, and EB Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press1998) at 681 (659–707).

16 J Tallberg supra n 5.

17 Ibid. Nevertheless, while Tallberg insists this twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a “management-enforcement ladder” makes the EU exceedingly effective in combating detected violations – and thereby reducing non-compliance to a temporal phenomenon – this may not be the case for rule of law violations in Hungary and Poland where some talk of deliberate noncompliance. This is to be discussed in another paper.

18 S Priebus supra n 1.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid. KL Scheppele, “Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions” in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press 2016) 105–32. KL Scheppele, D Kochenov and B Grabowska-Moroz, “EU Values Are Law, after All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union” (2021) 39(1) Yearbook of European Law 3–121.

21 For the various reasons for noncompliance such as administrative incapacity, preference, etc. see J Tallberg supra n 5.

22 Before this, and for the rule of law violations that occurred between 2010 and 2012, the European Commission had only two Treaty-based instruments at its disposal: the preventive and sanctioning mechanisms established by Art 7 TEU and the 258 TFEU infringement proceedings.

23 R Coman, “The legitimacy gaps of the European Semester: who decides, what and how?” (2017) 2–3(383–384) L’Europe en Formation 47–60.

24 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Next steps for a sustainable European future European action for sustainability, Strasbourg, 22.11.2016, COM(2016) 739 final.

25 L Conant, supra n 9; The Scoreboard is prepared in the form of a comparison between the states which highlights the best practices and sets the standards for other states through demonstrating that their success is feasible. Before the creation of the Justice Scoreboard, the Commission was only primarily involved in case of non-compliance of a state with the EU standards on the judicial system. When the Scoreboard was created, albeit based solely on peer pressure and the information voluntarily provided by the states, it became an influential tool for the EU rooted in positive precedents.

26 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union, State of play and possible next steps, Brussels, 3.4.2019, COM(2019) 163 final, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/rule_of_law_communication_en.pdf

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 The support is provided on the request of Member States and is tailor-made to address needs reflecting defined reform priorities. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 11.10.2021 COM(2021) 622 final Annual Monitoring Report on the implementation of the 2019 Structural Reform Support Programme {SWD(2021) 283 final}, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/srsp_amr_2019_adopted_6.pdf

30 Following the European Parliament’s consent, on 17 December 2020 the Council adopted the regulation laying down the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027.

31 See Communication from the Commission n 26; M Kölling, “The role of (rule of law) conditionality in MFF 2021–2027 and Next Generation EU, or the stressed budget”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 31 March 2022; See M Schinina, “Rule of law as an “integral part” of the next MFF: to what extent and why?”, Jean Monnet Module “Rule of Law and Mutual Trust in Global and European Governance (RoLETTE),”coordinated by R Coman at the IEE-ULB, available at: https://www.iee-ulb.eu/content/uploads/2021/08/Rule-of-law-as-integral-part-of-the-next-MFF-to-what-extent-and-why.pdf

32 See L Fromont and A Van Waeyenberge, « Le Semestre européen sauvera-t-il l’État de droit? (2022) 3 RRJ Cahiers de méthodologie juridique 1738–1749.

33 Communication from the European Commission n 26.

34 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Council, the European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, 2022, 2022 European Semester – Spring Package 2022, COM/2022/600 final, 23 May 2022.

35 Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2022 National Reform Programme of Poland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2022 Convergence Programme of Poland, Brussels, 14 June 2022, Brussels, 23.5.2022, COM(2022) 622 final.

36 Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Poland Brussels, 14 June 2022 (OR. en), 9728/22, Interinstitutional File 2022/0181 (NLE).

37 The importance of the European Semester in the rule of law crisis has been further stated in the Commission’s communication entitled “Further strengthening the rule of law in the European Union”, where the European Semester was meant to be “an important early warning and preventive framework” for “tackling problems of the rule of law in the Member States before it is necessary to resort to Article 7”. See also European Semester Spring Package, “Linking the European Semester, the RFF and RepowerEU. Key objectives for the 2022 country specific recommendations, p. 3.

38 See L Fromont and A Van Waeyenberge n 32.

39 S Andersen, “5 The Functional Overlap of Enforcement and Implementation Tools”, The Enforcement of EU Law: The Role of the European Commission (Oxford, 2012; online edn, Oxford Academic 2013).

40 In the general sense of implementation, i.e., not necessarily according to Art 291 TFEU.

41 S Andersen, supra n 39.

42 See Art 35 of the Common Provisions Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down Common Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund (…).

43 See the other conditions laid out in Arts 96 and 97 of the Common Provisions regulation.

44 S Andersen, Stine, supra n 39.

45 C-332/01 Greece v Commission [2004] ECR I-7699.

46 S Andersen, supra n 39.

47 For this view see ibid. This is the case when funds are linked to compliance with otherwise materially unconnected EU policies.

48 See also, Art 9 of the Common Provisions regulation relative to the Horizontal Principles, including respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of the Funds.

49 See “EU Cohesion Policy: Commission adopts €76.5 billion Partnership Agreement with Poland for 2021–2027”, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2022/06/30-06-2022-eu-cohesion-policy-commission-adopts-eur76-5-billion-partnership-agreement-with-poland-for-2021-2027

50 Suspension of EU funds for breaching the rule of law – a dose of tough love needed? Armin von Bogdandy and Justyna Łacny, European policy analysis, June 2020, 7epa, https://www.sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2020/2020_7epa.pdf

51 The institutional resilience is only a small part of the RRF regulation. The RRF focuses mostly on the green transition and digitalisation. Institutional resilience is another name for the rule of law since the exact term “rule of law” is not a part of the RRF regulation.”

52 L Fromont, “Une conditionnalité qui ne dit pas son nom: l’État de droit dans la Facilité pour la reprise et la résilience” (2022) 2(3) Cahiers droit européen 523–557.

53 See Art 22 of the Regulation establishing the RRF.

54 This monitoring is carried out mainly through the obligation imposed on Member States to report on their progress twice a year and through the establishment of common indicators. These indicators, of which there are fourteen, have been incorporated into a scoreboard for recovery and resilience. None of them relate to the rule of law, in particular the independence of the judiciary and the fight against fraud and corruption. However, this does not mean that there is no monitoring in this area. Other indicators included in the European Semester already cover these areas, such as the EU Justice Scoreboard, and other mechanisms, such as the Rule of Law Report, enable the monitoring of the situations in the Member States in terms of the rule of law on an annual basis. See L Fromont and A Van Waeyenberge n 33; see also Resilience dashboards for the social and economic, green digital, and geopolitical dimensions, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/dashboard_report_20211129_en.pdf

55 L Fromont, supra n 52.

56 For the measures, sanctions and scope of the Rule of Law Conditionality regulation, see Art 3 and 5 of said regulation. The scope of the sanctions is broader than Art 22 of the RRF regulation. See also R Mavrouli, “The Dark Relationship Between the Rule of Law and Liberalism. The New ECJ Decision on the Conditionality Regulation” (2022) 7(1) European Papers 275–286.

57 European Parliament, 2019.

58 J Tallberg, supra n p 611.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press 1965); Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions” in Kenneth A. Oye (eds), Cooperation Under Anarchy 226–54 (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press 1986); George W Downs, David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” (1996) International Organization 50(3) 379–406; Walter A Dorn and Andrew Fulton, “Securing Compliance with Disarmament Treaties: Carrots, Sticks, and the Case of North Korea” (1997) Global Governance 3(1) 17–40; Arild Underdal, “Explaining Compliance and Defection: Three Models” (1998) European Journal of International Relations 4(1) 5–30.

62 V Leontitsis and S Ladi, “The Changing Nature of European Governance and the Dynamics of Europeanization” in E Ongaro and S. Van Thiel (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe (London, Palgrave, Macmillan 2018) 765–81.

63 Ibid.

64 P Thinus “The EU’s Transactional Approach to Rule of Law Spending Conditionality in the 2020s” (2024) Journal of Common Market Studies, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13620

65 See the rationalists, non-driven theorists and managerialists. On the different approaches, see K Raustiala, “Compliance and Effectiveness in Regulatory Cooperation” (2000) 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 387–99. M Ioannidis, “Weak Members and the Enforcement of EU Law” in A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds) supra n 7.

66 J Tallberg, supra n 5.

67 S Priebus, supra n 1.

68 See RB Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance (Cambridge Mass. MIT Press 1994); A Chayes and A Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1995); A Chayes, A Handler Chayes and R B. Mitchell, “Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective” in E Brown Weiss and H K Jacobson (eds), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press 1998) 39–62.

69 A Chayes and A Handler Chayes supra n 68.

70 As similar tendencies have spread to other eastern EU Member States, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia. See S Hanley and MA Vachudova, ”Understanding the Illiberal Turn: Democratic Backsliding in the Czech Republic” (2018) 34(3) East European Politics 276–96; A Brezar, “Will Janez Janša Take Slovenia Down the Same Populist Road as Hungary?” (2020) Euronews, 28 October. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/28/will-janez-jansatake-slovenia-down-the-same-populist-road-as-hungary

71 B Bugarič, “Protecting Democracy Inside the EU: On Art 7 TEU and the Hungarian Turn to Authoritarianism” in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union 82–102 supra n 21; L Pech and KL Scheppele, “Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU” (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3–47.

72 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union, COM (2019) 343 final.

73 S Priebus, supra n 1.

74 J Tallberg, supra n 5.

75 Allegations include shortcomings in the control of the use of EU money, in audit and transparency obligations, and in public tender procedures. Furthermore, the Commission criticised the widespread corruption and lack of independence of the judiciary.

76 Proposal for a Council implementing decision on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary.

77 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary; Rule of law conditionality mechanism: Council decides to suspend €6.3 billion given only partial remedial action by Hungary, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/rule-of-law-conditionality-mechanism/

78 The 27 milestones also include the 17 commitments to redress the rule of law situation. Hungary’s RFF plan for €5.8 billion was the last EU country plan to be approved by the European Commission in November 2022. Commission recommends EU funds for Hungary remain frozen, Silvia Ellena, EURACTIV.com, 30 Nov. 2022, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/commission-recommends-eu-funds-for-hungary-remain-frozen/

79 According to Art 8 of the regulation RFF, “The Facility shall be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Art 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial regulation and the regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council”.

80 EU Commission updates Q&A on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF), Insight EU monitoring, 22 April 2021, available at: https://portal.ieu-monitoring.com/editorial/eu-commission-updates-qa-on-the-recovery-and-resilience-facility-rff/7257?utm_source=ieu-portal

81 L Fromont and A Van Waeyenberge n 32; see also D Bokhorst and F Corti, “Governing Europe’s Recovery and Resilience Facility: Between Discipline and Discretion” (2023) Government and Opposition 1–17.

82 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Brussels, 1.3.2022 COM(2022) 75 final p. 37.

83 Improved and increased operational links with the European Semester – focus on investment-related CSRs, esp. at the beginning of the programming (2019 CSRs) and during the mid-term review (2024 CSRs), Cohesion Policy 2021–2027, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/2021_2027/#8

84 The Recital 17 of the Common Provisions regulation states that “Rules adopted on the basis of Article 322 TFEU also include a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget.” See also Recital 49.

85 S Priebus, supra n 1.

86 For example, as part of an annual data gathering exercise, the Commission’s EU Justice Scoreboard is connected to the “European Semester,” focusing on the EU’s process of economic policy coordination, with the Justice Scoreboard primarily justified on business/economic grounds. The EU Justice Scoreboard, as it currently stands, does not provide an assessment or present quantitative data on the effectiveness of the national safeguards regarding judicial independence.

87 Some authors refer to the distinction between deliberate backsliding or deliberate non-compliance and involuntary non-compliance.

88 S Priebus, supra n 1.

89 European Commission COM (2019) 343 final. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union.

90 S Priebus, supra n 1.

91 E Chiti, “The Governance of Compliance” in M Cremona (ed.) supra n 9.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European central Bank, the European Economic and Social committee, the Committee of the regions and the European Investment Bank 2022 European Semester – Spring Package, Brussels, 23.5.2022 COM(2022) 600 final, p. 7.

97 Ibid.

98 See also M Dawson, “The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of ‘Post-crisis’ EU Economic Governance” (2015) 53(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 976–93.

99 F W Scharpf, “Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area” (2013) 13(15) MPIfG Discussion Paper 12.

100 C Fasone, “European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What Place for the European Parliament?” (2014) 20(2) European Law Journal 164–185; B Rittberger, “Integration without Representation? The European Parliament and the Reform of Economic Governance in the EU” (2014) 52(6) Journal of Common Market Studies 1174–83.

101 European Parliament resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report, para. 4.

102 There are a number of factors underlying the low impact of the country-specific recommendations of the European Semester. See C Alcidi and D Gros, “How to further strengthen the European Semester?” In-depth analysis at the request of the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, PE 602.114, November 2017.

103 See also a similar reasoning regarding the rule of law reports. While assuming that there are rule of law related issues in all member states, the four pillars contextualise the specific national legislation and practices. However, there is still no clear statement of what forms a simple concern, threat or serious violation creating a possible displacement effect on enforcement. See L Pech and P Bard, “The Commission’s Rule of Law Report and the EU Monitoring and Enforcement of Article 2 TEU Values,” study requested by the LIBE and AFCO committees, 2022; L Pech, P Wachowiec and D Mazur, “Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action” (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law.

104 L Pech and P Bárd, The Commission’s Rule of Law Report and the EU Monitoring and Enforcement of Article 2 TEU Values, supra n 103.

105 D Kochenov and P Bárd supra n 6.

106 G Itzcovich, “On the Legal Enforcement of Values. The Importance of the Institutional Context” in A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds) supra n 7; M Avbelj, “Pluralism and Systemic Defiance in the EU” in A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds) supra n 7.

107 KL Scheppele, “The Case for Systemic Infringement Actions,” in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds) supra n 20; D Kochenov, “Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make it a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool” (2015) 7 The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 153.

108 Case C–64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses [2018] CJUE; M Krajewski, “Associação sindical dos juízes portugueses: The Court of Justice and Athena’s Dilemma” (2018) 3 European Papers 295.

109 C Hillion, “Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means” in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), supra n 20.

110 C Kilpatrick and J Scott, “New Frontiers of EU Funding Forthcoming” in C Kilpatrick and J Scott (eds), New Frontiers of EU Funding: Law, Policy and Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2024).

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.