In July 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to Annex VII of the Law of the Sea Convention issued an award on the merits in the South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China. Among other issues to be decided was the status of several insular features under the law of the sea regime of islands codified in Article 121 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). Article 121, paragraph 1, defines an island as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” Like all coastal land territory, islands, with one important exception, generate a full suite of maritime zones: territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf (Article 121(2)). The important exception is found in the third paragraph of Article 121: “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”

As a teacher of international law for more years than I care to admit, I have to declare at the start of my comments that I admire the South China Sea Arbitration Award greatly. It presents an interpretation of the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on islands and rocks in a comprehensive, carefully considered and intellectually satisfying way. As my colleagues will doubtless point out, it does present problems relating to current existing state practice, but it does to my mind capture what the UNCLOS III drafters had in mind when the 1982 Convention text was put together.

In my remarks I would like to draw attention to the role of history in the Tribunal's reasoning concerning the regime of islands, both as regards its approach to historical uses of maritime features and in particular its approach to determining what it was the drafters of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) intended. My contention in these remarks is that the Tribunal took an unashamedly developing-state oriented view in its conception of the object and purpose of the regime of islands, thus foregrounding perspectives that were present at the time of the negotiation of UNCLOS but which are not necessarily given much attention in the contemporary English-language literature. Before turning to this perspective, one must closely scrutinize the Tribunal's reading of UNCLOS Article 121.

When the Tribunal issued its July 2016 Award in the Philippines-China arbitration, the United States announced that the decision is an important contribution to the shared goal of a peaceful resolution to disputes in the South China Sea. The United States strongly supports the rule of law and efforts to resolve disputes in the South China Sea peacefully, including through arbitration. As provided in Article 296 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the decision is “final and shall be complied with” by both parties to the dispute.

The Tribunal's conclusion that Itu Aba and other features in the South China Sea are rocks that are incapable of generating exclusive economic zones came as a surprise to some scholars and government officials who have never interpreted Article 121(3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the strict way adopted in this case. In the absence of any previous judicial interpretation of the article, a range of interpretations of Article 121(3) have been seen in the academic literature, and in state practice. Although much of the decision is extremely well argued, I must disagree with the Tribunal's approach to Article 121(3).

This lecture is not styled as a tribute to Professor David Caron, but I shall invoke his scholarship today, not only because this Annual Meeting is dedicated to his memory, but also because of his many insights into dispute settlement.

Assurances of victim participation in proceedings before the International Criminal Court and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have been seen as a welcome corrective to the flawed model of earlier tribunals. The first such tribunal created since the postwar period, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), was established by the UN Security Council in May 1993 without even consulting those who survived the atrocities that gave rise to its creation, the majority of which took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nor were victims formally incorporated into the ICTY's work except for those who provided testimony and other evidence. (The same holds true for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by the UN Security Council in 1994; in the interests of brevity, my remarks will focus on the ICTY.)

Good morning, everybody, and welcome to this extraordinary panel on the operationalization of international law, beyond the state, so it is a very ambitious title and it is a very ambitious question, and we are trying to discuss a bit more about the private actors and the role and the place of the private actors in international society, but not only private actors as such but private actors in their relationship with other classical subjects of international law of states across an international organization.

Okay. Thank you very much, Hélène, and thank you to the organizers for putting together this panel and for the invitation to be here.

Thank you. I would also like to add my thanks to the conference organizers for the invitation. This is my first time attending ASIL and it is a real privilege to be here.

Thank you very much, and I am actually really excited about the table arrangement here because I am wearing blue jeans, but right now I look very formal, so this is perfect.

Well, thank you, and thank you for the invitation to be here. Good morning, everyone.

One of the near casualties of the global financial crisis (Crisis) was the march toward a more principles-based global regulatory structure that simultaneously encouraged cross-border transactions and recognized sovereign authorities over them without the necessity of a one-size-fits-all regulatory framework. The implementation of the G20 reforms for over-the-counter derivatives was far more prescriptive than principled. Post-crisis implementation of the G20 reforms, embodied in the United States in Title 7 of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, yielded a costly, and in some markets, persistent loss of liquidity and fragmentation as market participants have attempted to sort out complex and sometimes competing regulatory requirements for reporting, trading, clearing, margin, and capital in practice.

This is the panel on the use of defensive force against non-state actors. We thought we would use the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS, to take stock on where we are on the question of when, if ever, states may use defensive force against non-state actors in other states.

Thank you very much, Monica, and thank you very much for the invitation to speak on the panel. I was a senior legal advisor in Australia from 2013 to 2017, so, in fact, during this time. I think it is a terrifically conceived panel because it is one of the most pressing and problematic issues with which we have to deal, I think, as international legal advisors.

Thank you, and thanks again from me, also, for the invitation today. This is a topic which is extremely topical and extremely important.

Well, two previous speakers already laid out everything so maybe I will just pass now. No, I will continue here.