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Targeting drug lords: Challenges to IHL between lege lata and lege ferenda

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2023

Chiara Redaelli  and
Carlos Arévalo
Chiara Redaelli*
Affiliation:
Research Fellow at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian and Law and Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland Adjunct Professor at the Catholic University of Lille, Lille, France
Carlos Arévalo*
Affiliation:
Professor and Dean of the Law and Political Sciences School of Universidad de La Sabana, Colombia
*
*Email: chiara.redaelli@graduateinstitute.ch
**Email: carlos.arevalo1@unisabana.edu.co
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Abstract

This article aims to clarify how international humanitarian law (IHL) rules on targeting apply when drug cartels are party to a non-international armed conflict. The question of distinguishing between a cartel's armed forces and the rest of the cartel members is a pertinent matter. It is crucial to avoid considering every drug dealer a legitimate target, just as we do not consider that everyone working for the government is a legitimate target. Nevertheless, it is unclear at what point a member of a cartel would change from being a criminal to being a member of the armed wing of the cartel, hence becoming a legitimate target. The present article will suggest a teleological approach to solving this conundrum.

Keywords

non-international armed conflictstargetingdrug cartelsarmed non-State actorsinternational humanitarian law
Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 105 , Issue 923: Organized Crime , August 2023 , pp. 652 - 673
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC.

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Footnotes

The advice, opinions and statements contained in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. The ICRC does not necessarily represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided in this article.

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53 Ibid., para. 182.

54 Acuerdo por el que se dispone de la Fuerza Armada permanente para llevar a cabo tareas de seguridad pública de manera extraordinaria, regulada, fiscalizada, subordinada y complementaria, 11 May 2020, Articulo Primero (authors’ translation).

55 Suprema Corte de Justiciade la Nación, Sentencia del Pleno, Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 1/96, 5 March 1996.

56 Ibid. (authors’ translation).

57 Ibid. (authors’ translation).

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60 A. G. Rojo Fierro, above note 22, p. 1424.

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85 ICG, Peña Nieto's Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of Law in Mexico, Latin America Report No. 48, 19 March 2013, p. 12.

86 Ibid.

87 At the time, the Gulf Cartel was party to a NIAC against the Mexican government. See C. Redaelli, above note 9.

88 Fen Osler Hampson, “Afghanistan 2001–2010”, in E. Wilmshurst (ed.), above note 18, p. 199.

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90 ICRC Interpretative Guidance, above note 2, p. 72.

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93 Carpenter, Ami C., “Beyond Drug Wars: Transforming Factional Conflict in Mexico”, Conflict Resolution Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2010, p. 404CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

94 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 11, Rule 1.

95 C. Kerr, above note 43, p. 218.

96 M. John-Hopkins, above note 74, p. 289.

97 Ibid., p. 290.

98 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 11, Rule 15.

99 M. John-Hopkins, above note 74, p. 280.

100 Ibid., p. 290.

101 At the time, the Sinaloa Cartel was party to a NIAC against the Mexican government. See Geneva Academy, above note 83.

102 C. Kerr, above note 43, p. 221.