This article discusses the suggestion of having the notion of solidarity as the foundational value for welfare scheme reforms. Solidarity is an emerging concept in bioethical deliberations emphasizing the need for value-oriented discussion in revising healthcare structures, and the notion has been contrasted with liberal justice and rights. I suggest that this contrast is unnecessary, flawed, and potentially counterproductive. As necessary as the sense of solidarity is in a society, it is an insufficient concept to secure the goals related to social responsibility. The discussion on solidarity is also based on a questionable sense of nostalgia. Furthermore, solidarity and liberal justice share essential objectives concerning welfare schemes; therefore, the question arises whether the proper comparison should in the first place be within justice and solidarity.

This article analyzes the criteria for the distribution of healthcare services through different justice theories such as utilitarianism and liberalism, pointing out the problems that arise when providing services to a culturally diverse population. The international epidemiological setting is a favorable one for discussing personal responsibility and luck egalitarianism; however, some provisions have to be made so that healthcare institutions do not treat ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic minorities unfairly. The article concludes by proposing that accommodations and culturally sensible attention should be provided when possible, without affecting the equal opportunity of others to access these services.

Collating the concepts of vulnerability through five regional perspectives on bioethics from the United States, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, this article proposes a means of integration between the different approaches in order to seek a theoretical and normative basis for the field of global bioethics. It argues that only through opening continuous, critical, and self-critical dialogue within the international bioethical community will it be possible to achieve a sufficiently global understanding of vulnerability that is capable of identifying the means needed for addressing the conditions that leave certain groups and individuals more susceptible to “wounding” than others.

In this article, we discuss the ideas of Eric J. Cassell about the patient-professional relationship. We argue that his approach combines in an interesting way features from the literature on patient autonomy and paternalistic practices. We suggest that these seemingly paternalistic features of practicing medicine, which are widely either ignored or condemned in bioethical discussion, are of vital significance in medical practice. In the first sections of the article, we describe the main features of Cassell’s understanding of the sick person and his version of personalized medicine. We pay particular attention to his notion of information control and compare his ideas about conversation with patients to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s analysis of patient-professional dialogue. In the latter part of the article, we explore through a couple of examples the implications these ideas have for medical practice.

In bioethics, the concept of vulnerability is applied almost exclusively to research participants and patients. We turn the tables and apply the concept to nurses caring for anorexia nervosa (AN) sufferers. In doing so, and using results from a qualitative research study undertaken in the UK, we show that AN nurses face a significant probability of incurring identifiable harms (inauthentic relationships and nonreciprocal relationships). Some recommendations on how these harms can be avoided or mitigated are given, but further research is needed.

Something strange has happened to the concept of dignity in bioethics. After a long period in which U.S. pragmatist and U.K. consequentialist philosophers have argued that the concept is useless and vacuous, and in which they have been reasonably successful in expunging it from mainstream English-language academic bioethics, dignity has suddenly become popular again in debates about the legalization of physician-assisted dying (PAD). And, even stranger, it is deployed not by conservatives but by liberals. In the debates about PAD, liberal proponents of legalization seem to accept without question that there is such a state or process as “death with dignity,” which is juxtaposed to “undignified dying.” It also seems to be accepted that both of these states can be fairly easily identified and that they carry great moral weight. This article provides an analysis of the current resurgence of “undignified” arguments and argues on the basis of that analysis (1) that a proper understanding of the concept of dignity shows that the previous reductive arguments against dignity are partially incomplete and therefore partially misguided and (2) that, despite dignity having meaning, the idea of an undignified death cannot carry the moral weight it is given by proponents of the legalization of PAD.

One of the widely recognized facts about human dignity is its vastly divergent applicability—from highly controversial issues in bioethics to broader topics in political philosophy. A group of theories that this article subsumes under the header “natural good theories” appears to be especially fitted for normatively multifaceted notions like dignity. However, the heavy normative weight the concept of dignity has to bear due to the central position it occupies within these theories creates its own difficulties. As is shown in a discussion of Martha Nussbaum’s capability conception of dignity, dignity appears to be unable to mirror the special normative relevance people want to assign to it in cases of great moral misconduct. The article provides a suggestion on how to solve this problem by means of paradigmatic cases that work as material constraints regarding the exact boundaries of dignity violations.

It seems natural to think that the same prudential and ethical reasons for mutual respect and tolerance that one has vis-à-vis other human persons would hold toward newly encountered paradigmatic but nonhuman biological persons. One also tends to think that they would have similar reasons for treating we humans as creatures that count morally in our own right. This line of thought transcends biological boundaries—namely, with regard to artificially (super)intelligent persons—but is this a safe assumption? The issue concerns ultimate moral significance: the significance possessed by human persons, persons from other planets, and hypothetical nonorganic persons in the form of artificial intelligence (AI). This article investigates why our possible relations to AI persons could be more complicated than they first might appear, given that they might possess a radically different nature to us, to the point that civilized or peaceful coexistence in a determinate geographical space could be impossible to achieve.

This article explicates two approaches to the basis of moral worth and status: Eva Kittay’s relational view and Jeff McMahan’s psychological personhood view. It is argued that these theories alone do not provide adequate support for the conclusions Kittay and McMahan want to draw concerning individuals whose entitlement to fundamental protections can be challenged—infants with severe cognitive disabilities and infants without the support of their families and social environments. The real justification can in each case be found in deeply held convictions regarding entities that must and entities that must not be included in the core community of moral equals. Philosophical discussions about these convictions would be more useful for the advancement of our moral thinking than vain attempts to show that the absolute truth lies on either side of the ongoing debate.

In 1996, Sandra Jensen became the first person with Down syndrome to receive a heart-lung transplant. Although it took place almost 20 years ago, her experience continues to shed light on contemporary challenges that individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders face in securing access to transplantation. While overt discrimination has decreased, barriers persist in physician referrals, center-specific decisionmaking regarding wait-listing, and the provision of accommodations for optimizing the assessment and medical management of these individuals. These issues arise from the persistent biases and assumptions of individuals as well as those of a healthcare system that is inadequately positioned to optimally serve the medical needs of the growing number of individuals with functional impairments. More data and greater transparency are needed to understand the nature and extent of ongoing access problems; however, long-term solutions will require changes at the healthcare professional, regional transplant center, and national levels.

Although recent literature on professionalism in healthcare abounds in recommended character traits, attitudes, or behaviors, with a few exceptions, the recommendations are untethered to any serious consideration of the contours and ethical demands of the healing relationship. This article offers an approach based on the professional’s commitment to trustworthiness in response to the vulnerability of those seeking professional help. Because our willingness and ability to trust health professionals or healthcare institutions are affected by our personality, culture, race, age, prior experiences with illness and healthcare, and socioeconomic and political circumstances—“the social determinants of trust”—the attitudes and behaviors that actually do gain trust are patient and context specific. Therefore, in addition to the commitment to cultivating attitudes and behaviors that embody trustworthiness, professionalism also includes the commitment to actually gaining a patient’s or family’s trust by learning, through individualized dialogue, which conditions would win their justified trust, given their particular history and social situation.

Educators in bioethics have struggled to find valid and reliable assessments that transcend the “reproduction of knowledge” to target more important skill sets. This manuscript reports on the process of developing and grading a minimal-competence comprehensive examination in a bioethics master’s degree program. We describe educational theory and practice for the creation and deployment of scoring rubrics for high-stakes performance assessments that reduce scoring inconsistencies. The rubric development process can also benefit the program by building consensus among stakeholders regarding program goals and student outcomes.

We describe the Structure of the Observed Learning Outcome taxonomy as a mechanism for rubric design and provide an example of how we applied that taxonomy to define pass/fail cut scores. Details about domains of assessment and writing descriptors of performance are also presented. Despite the laborious work required to create a scoring rubric, we found the effort to be worthwhile for our program.

Electronic health records, data sharing, big data, data mining, and secondary use are enabling exciting opportunities for improving health and healthcare while also exacerbating privacy concerns. Two court cases about selling prescription data, the Sorrell case in the U.S. and the Source case in the U.K., raise questions of what constitutes “privacy” and “public interest”; they present an opportunity for ethical analysis of data privacy, commodifying data for sale and ownership, combining public and private data, data for research, and transparency and consent. These interwoven issues involve discussion of big data benefits and harms and touch on common dualities of the individual versus the aggregate or the public interest, research (or, more broadly, innovation) versus privacy, individual versus institutional power, identification versus identity and authentication, and virtual versus real individuals and contextualized information. Transparency, flexibility, and accountability are needed for assessing appropriate, judicious, and ethical data uses and users, as some are more compatible with societal norms and values than others.

KS is a 76-year-old Burmese woman who presented to the hospital with right-sided weakness that had begun two days prior. Although KS had been diagnosed earlier with dementia and had a medical history of stroke, she was living at a nursing home and was able to walk on her own and use her right arm to feed herself. Since her last stroke three years ago, she had also developed aphasia, and her speech has been minimal. During her current hospitalization, KS was found to have a cerebral hemorrhage, but after consultation with neurosurgery, the team determined that no medical interventions were available, and a higher level of care was not required. She also presented with other medical conditions, including severe hypertension, chronic kidney disease, and depression. The patient’s blood pressure has remained high. She has now failed a swallow evaluation and is refusing the insertion of a nasogastric feeding tube. The patient has a younger sister who believes, from a cultural perspective, that only the patient should make her medical decisions. As a result, she feels helpless in assisting the team. The medical team has asked for an ethics consultation to direct the patient’s care and to guide decisionmaking.

An individual’s hesitance or outright refusal to function as a substitute decisionmaker creates a number of challenges for treating teams, as is highlighted by the case of KS. It is not uncommon for individuals who suddenly find themselves in the role of substitute decisionmaker (SDM) to experience feelings of inadequacy or of being overwhelmed. The natural apprehension that comes with realizing, or being informed, that you are now responsible for providing or refusing consent on behalf of a loved one is often exacerbated by the accompanying circumstances. Even though there are movements afoot to encourage and support advance care planning and the inclusion of those who will become SDMs in conversations about values and wishes, there is still much work to be done. Although the case as presented does not provide information regarding what, if any, processes have taken place prior to the current hospital admission with regard to including the patient’s sister in discussions about future circumstances, it is clear that the sister feels unprepared to assume the role being thrust upon her. What, then, does a clinical ethics consultation have to offer in such situations? The following discussion highlights three ways in which ethics consultation can be of value to both the treating team and the identified SDM: ethics consultation (1) helps the care team and SDM navigate the regulatory landscape, (2) supports the treating team, and (3) supports the SDM.

This case illustrates the dilemma that occurs when a patient refuses treatment. When a patient refuses recommended interventions, it can cause much distress among the medical team and family. On the surface, the ethical issue appears to be in regard to treatment refusal. However, when we look deeper, it becomes evident that the question is truly about whether the patient has the ability to make this treatment decision, given her worsening dementia, recent hemorrhage, and depression. In this case, an essential component of an ethics consultation would be to assess this patient’s decisionmaking capacity to determine if her refusals are informed. This case has another level of complexity. If the patient does not have decisionmaking capacity, then who would be willing to serve in the role of surrogate decisionmaker? The case raises several ethical questions and thus makes directing a patient’s care and decisionmaking challenging.