It is the greatest honour for me to be invited to give the Wilberforce Lecture this year, on Lord Wilberforce's ninetieth birthday. In my generation, he has provided an inspiration for us all—an example which we may strive, but never succeed, to emulate. His brilliant intellect the modernity of his outlook, his capacity to look beyond the immediate problem to the more fundamental issues, his readiness to innovate—all coupled with a disarming informality of address—make him at the same time one of the most profound lawyers, and one of the most attractive men, of his generation. It is a privilege for me to have known him. I am his admiring, but still struggling, disciple.

On 21 July 1997 the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary announced the United Kingdom's decision to accede to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“the Convention”), a decision which was acted upon four days later in New York. The United Kingdom thus became the 119th State to establish its consent to be bound by the Convention and the 82nd party to the Agreement of July 1994 on the Implementation of its Part XI (“the Implementation Agreement”).

The law and legal system of Mauritius are an unusual hybrid and a remarkable instance of comparative law in action. As a consequence of its history, as an overseas possession of France from 1715 to 1810 and as a British colony from 1814 until it achieved independence within the Commonwealth in 1968, its law and legal system reflect the legal traditions of both its former colonial rulers. In general terms, Mauritian private law is based on the French Code Civil while public law and commercial law are based on English law: an example of what has recently been labelled a “bi-systemic legal system”. The Constitution, a version of the Westminster export model, was originally monarchical. It was amended in 1991 and Mauritius became a republic within the Commonwealth in 1992.

Of all the rights of indigenous people, none is more central to the survival of their culture than the claim to their ancestral lands. The resolution of their claims to ancestral lands is one of the fundamental issues of our time—indeed of all time. Often called a human rights issue—a description apt to reinforce the strong moral foundations of the claims of the indigenous peoples—it is an issue which we cannot ignore. Throughout the world people of all races and all colours have a powerful emotional attachment to their ancestral lands. That attachment is the very core of a people's culture and is vital to the survival of the culture. As the UN Human Rights Committee has recognised, in the context of the exercise of cultural rights protected by Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources”.

In looking at the role and influence of the International Court as it advances on towards and beyond the millenium, one is struck by the variety of perspectives from which one may view that institution. These include those adopted by the Court itself, academic theorists, practitioners both private and governmental, states more generally, international organisations and individuals. Each of these manifests its own methodology, needs and interests. Academics, for example, are keen to examine the intellectual basis and consistency of decisions and to infer, analyse and criticise the existence and nature of rules and institutions. Practitioners seek to equip themselves with the knowledge and tools necessary in order to enable their clients to win before the Court. States cautiously seek to uphold the dispute resolution role of the Court in general terms without losing any cases or putting themselves in a position where this is a possibility. International organisations and individuals look at the Court with keen and hopeful eyes.

In an economic climate plagued by the risk of insolvency, sellers will not wish to sell unless they can be sure of getting paid. At the same time most sellers would go out of business if they asked for cash on delivery and did not sell on credit. In Europe one way to combine these conflicting business realities is by selling goods subject to a reservation of title clause or a clause de réserve de propriété or an Eigentumsvorbehalt (hereafter RTC). An RTC may be defined as “merely an agreement between the parties as to the time when ownership is to pass”. By reserving title in the goods sold until they are paid for, it ensures that goods revert to the seller in case of the buyer's insolvency, and hence escape from the hands of the liquidator. The sale fails but the seller's losses are minimised. This is particularly important in the current context of insolvency practice where the legal order for the distribution of assets is very unfavourable to the supplier of goods who does not use an RTC. As an unsecured creditor he will receive any money owed only after the costs of the insolvency procedure and the shares of preferential and secured creditors are subtracted from the assets. He will, in the blunt words of Templemann LJ, ‘receive a raw deal’.

Historically, New Zealand has indicated an ambivalent attitude to the Privy Council. The appeal has existed for New Zealand since the Supreme Court was established in 1841 and the first case on appeal was heard in 1849. But, as early as 1903, the Bench and Bar protested against the judgment of the Privy Council in Wallis v. Solicitor-General as showing ignorance of New Zealand law and social conditions.

Recent English decisions have paved the way for English courts to apply foreign intellectual property law to the infringement of foreign intellectual property (‘IP’) rights in cases in which the court is seised of jurisdiction pursuant to the 1968 Brussels and 1989 Lugano Conventions. If one defendant can be sued pursuant to the Conventions' rules, the potential exists to consolidate in one English action claims against different defendants for the infringement of intellectual property rights from different jurisdictions. This ability to consolidate infringement actions is subject to Article 16(4) of the Conventions, the requirements of Article 6(1) and RSC Order 11, rule 1(1)(c), and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. However, it appears that in cases in which the court is seised of jurisdiction pursuant to the non-Convention rules, English courts will not be entitled to apply foreign intellectual property laws.

When the European Court of Justice gave judgment in Francovich it was hailed as a triumph, not necessarily for its erudite reasoning, but because it allowed an individual to claim damages from a member State for its failure to comply with Community law obligations, thus providing a method of redress where previously none existed. Although the scope of the remedy was unclear and appeared superficially limited to the facts of the case, it represents the final element necessary to establish a coherent doctrine for the effective protection of an individual's Community law rights.

In Francovich the European Court of Justice set out the conditions of liability of member States in the case of non-transposition of directives: first, the directive must confer rights on individuals; second, it must be possible to determine the content of those rights from the provisions of the directive; and third, there must be a causal link between the breach of the State's obligation and the damage suffered.

To assist effective legal co-operation in combating criminal activity, the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union has recently concluded two new conventions to simplify and improve extradition procedures between member States of the European Union. In doing so, the Council set in motion a process whereby existing arrangements for extradition were examined with a view to making them more flexible. In 1995 the Council recommended that the convention on simplified extradition be adopted in order to fulfil the aim of efficiency in the field of criminal justice. Its aim was to speed up extradition in cases where persons consented to be extradited. However, after further discussion concerning other aspects of extradition the Council eventually recommended that member States adopt far more radical procedures. The 1996 convention relating to “involuntary” extradition between member States appears to bypass several procedures designed to offer a degree of protection for the fugitive offender. Traditionally, extradition procedures have sought to offer a balance between judicial co-operation in the fight against crime and protecting the fundamental rights of the individual, and these concerns are acknowledged within the preambles to both the new EU conventions. However, the new conventions make several alterations to what can be regarded as established extradition procedures. In this article we examine these new procedures and consider whether the balance has shifted too far in favour of law enforcement at the expense of fundamental legal protections.

In November 1996 a special meeting of the contracting parties to the London Dumping Convention 1972 (LDC) adopted a new Protocol. The objective of the Protocol is to protect “the marine environment from all sources of pollution”.3 This is to be done by placing more restrictions on dumping and clarifying ambiguities in the law.