Public agencies and public employees are increasingly berated as inept and inefficient. We argue that the public bureaucracy in the United States is more valuable and effective than generally recognized. Where public agencies do perform badly, the problem is often due to external factors. We discuss the oversimplified calls for more businesslike efficiency in government, the value complexity which complicates evaluation of the public bureaucracy, and the higher standards imposed on the public sector. We also discuss the challenges imposed on public agencies by special interest politics, an overload of highly complex assignments, and adverse public stereotypes. The danger of overlooking these issues is that we will continue to have a huge, active public sector, and decisions about its role and management must not be determined by oversimplification and stereotype.

At each stage of program implementation – strategic planning, systems design, development of the management control infrastructure, and project execution – different types of expertise are most critical to success. The civil service system, which is oriented toward the hiring of permanent employees, and personnel ceilings, which are often arbitrarily set in the budgeting process, interact to impede the transition from one implementation stage to the next. Cost overruns and long-run schedule slippage may result from attempts to expedite programs by beginning implementation stages in parallel, particularly if compensatory resources are not provided. These problems are illustrated with the history of the implementation of the strategic petroleum reserve program, a key element of US policy for reducing vulnerability to disruptions of the world oil market.

Important and controversial changes have recently taken place in industrial training in the United Kingdom. Training is a complex policy area – industrial, economic, educational and social objectives may be pursued through it. For the most part it has been policy formation which has been dominated by professionals and thus there has been a ‘closed system’ into which outsiders rarely intrude. But outside influences have become more powerful; consequently the professionals are careful about which issues they place on the agenda for discussion. However, the most striking impression made by the training system is its lack of coherence and this may undermine its effectiveness.

This study of flood control policy before and after the Chinese floods of 1980–2 reveals the interactive effects of bureaucratic politics, the goals and careers of national leaders, and natural disasters in a communist regime. Policy is shown to be more reactive and influenced by longstanding bureaucratic rivalries than most previous research has found.