Environmental law has long been an area of concern in terms of correct implementation and enforcement. In this context, the Commission’s enforcement focus has been on “systemic” breaches of environmental law (that is, breaches that form part of a pattern of individual breaches that, taken together, because of their repeated or widespread nature, have a significant effect on the environment). Proving the existence of such breaches in environmental law presents a number of peculiar features, because of the scientifically–loaded questions which underlie environmental legislation. The aim of this article is to relate the established approach of the CJEU towards scientific uncertainty to the specific situation in which the Commission asserts that a breach of EU environmental law has a systemic nature. It will show that, while the CJEU has been sensitive to the systemic nature of the claims brought forward by the Commission by using some of the procedural tools at its disposal, its general reticence to engage with the substantive claims at stake might have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the infringement proceedings as a tool to adequately pursue systemic breaches of EU environmental legislation.

The article discusses the role for systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law. It does so by analyzing in depth that law as regards the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), but also across measures of EU criminal law that have not yet been explored under this light. While the attention of the literature has been mainly on the EAW and the way those deficiencies can led to refusing the execution of the warrant, a wider assessment reveals the existence of a latent law of the systemic and the particular in this field. The conclusions reveal that the understanding and application of systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law have significant implications in terms of the principle of mutual trust and the complex interaction between different EU values.

The concept of a systemic fundamental rights violation refers to a particular set of violations that are both widespread and embedded, so their reoccurrence may be assumed to be likely. It takes on at least two distinctive roles in EU asylum law and policy. One role is linked with the functioning of the principle of mutual trust, a principle that obliges Member States to recognise each others’ systems and decisions, presuming them to be legal, apart from exceptional cases. In this context, the principle sets the standard from when the presumption of legality is rebutted. In its conceptualisation and application, it is in tension with European human rights law, and, for a period, set up frictions between the CJEU (in NS/ME and Opinion 2/13) and the ECtHR (in MSS and Tarakhel). This tale of judicial frictions is not merely of historical interest. Its legacy is, we conclude, a thin concept of systemic breach, characterised by an over-individualized approach to assessing the human rights risks. The second role for the concept of systemic violations relates to embedded violations, including at the EU’s external borders. We demonstrate the utility of this other invocation, in particular as systemic breaches often signal deeper rule of law issues both within particular national systems and embedded within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). We illustrate that the CEAS itself brings about systemic human rights violations. Identifying and responding to the “systemic” in asylum increasingly relates to the credibility of the EU as a Union based on the respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law.

This article explores the use of the systemic criterion in the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law on judicial independence under Article 19(1)(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU). It starts from the observation that ever since the Portuguese Judges judgment, the case law has moved towards a more abstract and general assessment of issues of judicial independence. Yet, despite that evolution, the Court—perhaps surprisingly—only rarely uses the systemic criterion in its judgments. There are only two strands of case law to be found, neither of which tell us much about how the Court understands the notion of “systemic” in this field. This article argues that this criterion nevertheless has an important role to play in the case law on judicial independence and that the Court should explicitly limit the finding of a violation of Article 19(1)(2) TEU to those issues that have a systemic impact on the functioning of the domestic judiciary. By limiting the effects of Article 19(1)(2) TEU in such a way, the Court would strike a balance between the protection of the independence of the domestic judiciary, which is crucial for the proper functioning of the European Union (EU), and respect for the autonomy of the Member States as to the organization of their judiciary.

The aim of the present contribution is to assess how infringement proceedings under Articles 258 to 260 TFEU have dealt with ‘systemic’ breaches of EU law by the Member States’ authorities. It will be argue that two, or possibly three, strands of case-law appear to specifically concern systemic breaches of EU law.

The article looks at how “systemic” irregularities or breaches of law imputable to EU Member States are defined in key legal documents relating to the protection of the EU budget – notably with regards to Agricultural, Structural and Recovery funds, and with regards to the Conditionality Regulation. It is argued that “system deficiencies” arise where the financial interests of the European Union are damaged or put at risk because the systems meant to protect these interests in a Member State are considered deficient themselves. The scope of these systems varies with documents: some systems are defined in sectoral legislation and only have relevance for specific funding programmes; other systems have a more constitutional character and are linked to the protection of the rule of law in EU member states. Moreover, the severity of system deficiencies can be graded on a scale. This has implications regarding the extent of the financial consequences which can be imposed on Member States for the protection of the EU budget – how much EU funding should be withheld from them. It is also argued that the rationales underlying the imposition of financial consequences – putting the EU budget out of harm’s way or incentivizing change to reduce risk? – have implications pertaining to the legal and constitutional relationship established between the EU and its Member States.

In analyzing the mission of the European Court of Human Rights, it is common to distinguish between what is akin to “individual justice” and what is more akin to “constitutional justice.” The way in which the Court combines the two depends on its “judicial policy.” In this contribution, we will examine how the “systemic” nature of the violations complained of affects the “judicial policy.”

The systemic equivalence test constitutes an important tool in European Human Rights Law: It is used in order to structure the different systems of protection that apply in a common space and to common addressees. More precisely, where there is “systemic” equivalence between different legal orders protecting fundamental rights, a presumption of compatibility of concrete legal acts is applied. While this technique is very useful in the context of a multi-layered legal landscape, this systemic approach currently seems to be very poorly conceptualized by the various judicial instances calling upon it. This may entail risks for the protection of fundamental rights in Europe, as certain acts may benefit from a presumption of conformity even though they are adopted by legal systems that do not have the qualities required to benefit from it. This article critically assesses this technique, and provides avenues for improvement of its use.