No major Allied Power contributed more men and more money td the defeat of the Ottoman Empire than Great Britain. No major Allied Power championed more zealously the cause of Greek ambitions in Asia Minor than Great Britain. No major Allied Power witnessed the despoliation of its peace objectives for non-Arabic Turkey with greater frustration than Great Britain. Between the drafting of the Armistice of Mudros in October, 1918, and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the catastrophic drift of events was discernible to a number of British statesmen. Tragically, their observations were ignored or rejected by the key British statesman, Lloyd George.

The purpose of this study is to examine the socioeconomic role played by the local foreign minorities in modern Egypt. Who were these local foreign minorities? And what do we mean by their socioeconomic role?

Local foreign minorities were those foreigners like the Greeks, the Armenians, the Italians, and other Europeans, who emigrated to Egypt during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and who kept their language and culture and did not get assimilated into Egyptian society. Other local foreign minorities included the Syrians and the Jews. The former were originally Arabic speaking but a large proportion of them tended later to acquire foreign nationalities and a Levantine outlook. A great number of Jews in Egypt were foreign emigrants who settled during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century in Egypt, whereas a section of the indigenous Jewish population acquired foreign protection and foreign nationalities during the same periods.

Because the Seljuk throne managed to survive for sixty years after the establishment of the Mongol Protectorate in Seljuk Anatolia in 1243, there seems to have been no sudden upheaval in Anatolian society and its formal institutions. Nevertheless, a gradual, and at first rather inconspicuous, transformation took place which resulted in the shifting of centres of both power and the arts to western Anatolia in the centuries that followed. This paper addresses itself to the resulting alterations and innovations in architecture, especially with respect to the directions they gave to subsequent periods in Anatolian—Turkish architecture.

The transformations that created the classical period in Ottoman architecture began between approximately 1250 and 1450. As a result of these changes, Anatolia came to derive its models and inspiration no longer from Iran, but from the eastern Mediterranean whose traditions now gave the major direction to the following centuries in Anatolia.2 This shift in orientation was by no means sudden or radical, but rather it was the long-term result of a particular political situation. Nevertheless, a critical date in this evolutionary process seems to be around 1250, the time of the coming of the Mongols.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the cities on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, Tunis, Alexandria, Beirut, Smyrna, and Istanbul among them, experienced an influx of foreign communities which, combined with an increase in the indigenous populations and new urban policies on the part of certain rulers, tended to disrupt customary patterns of urban relationships. Although the scholarship of recent years has provided a new awareness of the network of interrelationships which held together the segments of medieval Islamic urban society, studies on the nineteenth-century changes in those relationships as represented by the policies of Muhammad ῾Alī, Aḥmad Bey, and the Ottoman Tanzimat reformers, have tended to focus more on aspects of state and government than on cities as such. Yet cities, especially capital cities, reflect most intensely periods of social and institutional transition.

The process of modernization in Morocco is dramatically symptomized by the decline of traditional authority. Postindependence politics have been in a state of permanent crisis, and the monarchy could only survive as any other political alternative promised imminent chaos. The abortive military coup of Skhirat in July 1971 was only another link in the chain of events that have perpetuated internal crisis. The army's massive interference in national politics was, however, a novelty. It had the effect of greatly accelerating the latent process of disintegration of traditional society and politics.

Our perception of the world around us, both as to what it is and what it ought to be, is influenced by a variety of factors. Among such factors are the nature of training we have received and the philosophical outlook we have been exposed to in the course of our lives. To most of us, the manifestations and the impact, if any, of the ideas that we have thus formulated do not go beyond a small circle—our mates, children, friends, and associates. For a few, it can extend to a larger circle and at times to more than one generation. In one instance, however, the impact has encompassed a nation. The Shah's reform measures have not only affected the social, economic, and political life of Iran in this generation and generations to come, but it may have altered the destiny of the country in the community of nations.

Twenty-five years ago, when anthropologist Paul Stirling did the fieldwork for his book Turkish Village, he tried to find out what the villagers of Sakaltutan knew about the origin and history of their village. The villagers apparently had very little sense of their past, and the longest genealogies covered only six generations. On the basis of their information and other observations and opinions, Stirling estimated the age of the village at about two hundred years and suggested that the village ‘was probably founded by people from villages nearer Kayseri, who had made a temporary summer camp there for pasture, and later decided to settle permanently and plough’.

A substantial number of social-psychological studies dealing with the Arab world purport to explain the ‘Arab basic personality’, or ‘the Arab mind’. The alleged purpose of these studies is to understand the ‘psychology of the Arabs’ the underlying motivations of their behavior, and the reasons for their underdevelopment. Most of these studies emphasize the use of projective analyses of the Arab personality on the basis of supposedly dominant childrearing practices. The personality pattern which emerges from this research includes characteristics such as free-floating hostility, rigidity, the lack of reality testing, and suspiciousness6 which are said to explain the nature of Arab political behavior.