The United States public and government, initially unrealistic in their visions of UN potentialities, have recently been turning toward the extreme of skepticism. There are various reasons for the change: the squabbles over Chinese representation and Rhodesian sanctions, the ever–increasing budgets voted by small powers who apparently pay a disproportionately low share of UN expenses, United States disillusionment at being out–voted by the Afro–Asian bloc, and the latter's insistence that the only really important function of the UN is to end colonialism and racism. Although some of these frictions have been adjusted, others are in danger of flaring into major disagreements, and, in any case, the old easy assumption of permanent US–UN friendship has gone by the board.

The imposition of limited sanctions against Italy was given fair prospect of success by members of the League. Sanctions were to have a twofold purpose. One was to uphold the Covenant and encourage collective security. The other was to end the war by putting pressure on the Italian government so as to make it amenable to a negotiated settlement. It was expected that economic and financial measures (as opposed to military means) would be sufficient, over a period of time, to achieve this. The timetable was upset by unexpected political events and by the collapse of Ethiopian military resistance. Policies are explained, events discussed, and to illuminate some dilemmas a distinction (not then well perceived) is made between politically important “consumatory” assumptions and diplomatically operative “instrumentalist” and reconciliationist practices.

The Andean Common Market, the most recent attempt at regional integration in Latin America, differs from the other Latin American efforts both in the factors that prompted its formation and in the support it had when it was established. More importantly, it differs in its terms and provisions, providing for a higher level of integration than any other Latin American effort. Several of its features—a common policy on foreign investment, regional planning and coordination in such fields as industry and agriculture, a quasi–supranational secretariat — make it an innovative approach to integration in Latin America. Numerous factors enhance the integrative potential of Andean integration. Among these are relatively favorable ratings on several of the neo–functional variables of regional integration. These indicators suggest that the effort may attain its objectives and perhaps even set an example to be followed by other economic groupings among Latin American countries. Still, projections about the future of the Andean Common Market must remain mixed. Some negative factors exist within the movement that could, if they triumph over the positive factors, lead to the same stagnation that now characterizes LAFTA and the CACM.