In contrast with the vast specialized literature on the application of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies in contemporary experiments on the international protection of human rights, comparatively very little has been written on the place of the local remedies rules in earlier international law experiments granting procedural status to individuals. It may in fact be asked to what extent was the application of the local redress rule in those earlier experiments taken into due account by the draftsmen of present-day human rights instruments and procedures. The present study purports to examine the multiplicity of solutions given to the problem of exhaustion of local remedies in international experiments in the first half of the twentieth century.

The scientific investigation of the ocean has only relatively recently become an area of concern to the international law of the sea. Until not very long ago, marine scientists had retained a freedom of movement within the natural environment they studied which their colleagues on land had already lost some time before. Ocean scientists had little difficulty in collecting their data and samples and making their observations when and where they wished. Maritime boundaries did not constitute a barrier to their mobility. The geographical extent of coastal State jurisdiction was generally very limited, and when investigations were to be conducted in the territorial sea or internal waters of a foreign State permission was readily obtained. It was even not unusual for the scientists involved only to notify the government having jurisdiction informally; the notification often being made through their scientific colleagues in the nation concerned. Beyond the narrow territorial sea oceanographic research could be carried out unimpeded under the principle of the freedom of the high seas.

The recent Tenerife aircrash of March 1977 involves a variety of multistate issues. The Dutch lawyer, if unable to obtain a satisfactory settlement for his client, may contemplate undertaking action in the U.S.A. He will then be confronted with such questions as against whom he can bring proceedings, under the jurisdiction of which court, what the procedure will be, and which state or national law will apply. He will also be required to know who may bring an action, who may ultimately benefit from it and what items may be included to determine the amount of damages.

1. It was over a year ago that the Editors of this periodical asked me for a contribution giving some account of Dutch international law regarding matrimonial property. What prompted that request was the forthcoming 13th Session of The Hague Conference on Private International Law, which was to be held in October 1976. There reigned great uncertainty in Dutch international law regarding the answer which should be given to the famosissima quaestio as to what law the joint matrimonial property regime will be subject when prospective spouses do not possess the same nationality. In the reports submitted to the Royal Fraternity of Notaries in 1969, Dubbink had defended the position that the national law of the husband still prevailed, whereas the other pre-adviseur, namely myself, expressed a preference for the law of the place of domicile of the future spouses or, in the event of their not living in the same country, the law of the first matrimonial domicile. As the Hoge Raad was expected shortly to deliver judgment in a case in which the spouses differed in nationality, I had suggested waiting for that ruling. This judgment was not given until 10 December 1976. Meanwhile, however, the 13th Session of The Hague Conference had taken place, so that the occasion for the writing of the article was no more. The Editors nevertheless considered that their request could be maintained. I am happy now to furnish my contribution, because both the judgment of the Hoge Raad and the Convention adopted in 1976 by the Hague Conference on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Régimes have evinced important new points of view, including more especially the premise of the future spouses' free choice of law. The Dutch international law of matrimonial property needs to be re-written, but that is far beyond the ambitions of the present article. After describing and analysing the caselaw of the Hoge Raad I will simply endeavour to give a succinct description of the present state of this law. In so doing I will also refer as appropriate to the recently adopted Hague Convention.

At the present time, the world commodity trade is primarily carried by ships. Merchant fleet and fishing vessels of 10,000 gross tonnage of more than thirty nations sail in and out of the port areas throughout the world carrying passengers and cargoes including inflammable gas and pollutant chemicals. The rapidly increasing intensity of traffic, the size of vessels, the speed of container and other ships, the growing danger of collision, loss of life and pollution underscores an important need for improved maritime communication.

The theme chosen by the T.M.C. Asser Institute for today's symposium reads “Legal aspects of a projected new international economic order”, In my opinion this is a courageous choice. As far as I know, the Institute has in the past always chosen topics that permitted unequivocal definition. It is not immediately obvious that such is the case with our present subject. In my view a more democratic and equitable international economic order than the present one would be highly desirable. But it is one thing to express such a preference. A different thing althogether is to assume that “a new international economic order” as a concept is already part of social reality and is, therefore, suitable for legal discussion. To me personally, this assumption would appear to be as yet premature. However, the particularization in our theme of the new international economic order as a “projected” one puts things in a different light, for this must mean that we have to envisage our new international economic order in terms of three important resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly taken in 1974.1 am referring to the Declaration and the Programme of Action concerning the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. All three resolutions having been adopted by “consensus” of the General Assembly, the question arises as to what legal significance can be attributed to them.

Outline:***

1. Some indications on the research project of the Universities of Utrecht and Leyden on international economic organisations and legal issues of a new international economic order

2. Some legal characteristics of the existing international economic order

3. What should be new in a new international economic order?

4. The impact of the principle of State sovereignty on a new international economic order

5. Three final remarks

The current discussions on establishing a so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) have their origin no doubt in both the poor performance of the first UN Development Decade and the profound changes — apparent since the early seventies — in world political and economic relations.

I was indeed intrigued by the previous speaker's comments and also by the excellent and very thorough and very provocative presentation this morning. As Prof. VerLoren van Themaat knows from previous discussions with me, there are many things in what he says that I do not agree with, and I suspect that one of the reasons for my being here relates to that. To a certain extent I'd like to follow up on the analogy that was made at the outset of this morning. It seems to me that we are dealing with the sextet that is playing a piece of music, which I would characterize perhaps as a concerto, because there is an interplay between two parts of this sextet, namely, the legal scholarship if you will and the economic principles or scholarship. I have not concluded in my own mind which plays the solo-part and which the background-part?

The present time might not seem to be a very propitious one to discuss international monetary relations with the object of obtaining new insights as to how to achieve a New International Economic Order. A stream of articles and pamphlets has been published or is forthcoming with titles such as: An International Monetary Nonsystem, Alternatives to Monetary Disorder. The Failure of Monetary Reform. This by itself is an indication that all is not well in the esoteric world of international finance.

I should like to express my gratitude to the T.M.C. Asser Institute for their invitation to the symposium. As a guest I had no intention of speaking today, and, consequently, I have no prepared text. But some theses and arguments used in the course of discussion lead me to the conclusion that it would perhaps be reasonable and useful to clarify certain important points. Before I endeavour to do so, may I be permitted to stress, since I have the honour to be a Judge of the International Court of Justice, that everything I intend to say must be considered only as my own private opinion.

Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult for me to speak as the last speaker after Excellency's brilliant intervention. I think if as lawyers we are here to speak about a new economic order of things in the world, then we are here for the prease purpose of trying to do away with economic tensions which have been the cause of war, and in this way, I feel, our efforts are devoted to the cause of peace.

The present survey is the first of a series that will cover Dutch judicial decisions rendered or published in 1974 to 1976 inclusive, concerning the new Hague private international law Conventions. The surveys are based on the p.i.l. card index of the T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, and prepared by dr. M. Sumampouw, senior research officer at that institute.

Whenever the use of comparative law is discussed, the question arises as to whether the phrase encompasses the use of foreign law. In this report comparative law will be taken in a broad sense, to include foreign law. For practical reasons subjects which are not confined to the boundaries of a single system – such as European law, international law and the law of international organisations – will not be covered in this report. For the same reasons no attention will be paid to those branches of legal science, which do not primarily deal with positive law, such as jurisprudence, legal methodology, sociology of the law and criminology.

The present article is intended to give a résumé of the international law questions arising in connection with Article 25 of the Constitution of the German Federal Republic of 23 May 1949, which reads as follows: “The general rules of public international law are an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory”. First of all it must be recalled that the Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919 included a similar provision. Article 4 provided: “The generally recognised rules of international law constitute a binding integral part of the legal system of the German Empire.”