This introductory note to the Special Issue ‘Autocracy Strikes Back: Authoritarian Resurgence in the Early 21st Century’ situates this collection of articles in the burgeoning literature on authoritarian resurgence, and illustrates the conceptual terrain on which these articles make their contribution. In this regard, we discuss autocratization, authoritarian resilience, democratic transition failure, and autocracy-to-autocracy transition as processes of regime change representing different ways in which authoritarian resurgence may advance. Relatedly, we clarify how these processes of regime change differ from each other and provide a few basic coordinates to frame their comparative analysis.

Over the last decades, Western European party systems have experienced growing levels of electoral volatility and the recurring emergence of successful new parties. This evidence calls into question the issue of party system institutionalization (PSI), a topic taken for granted so far in Western Europe, following the conventional wisdom that party systems are highly institutionalized in this region. This article tackles this issue and provides some contributions: it offers a theoretical clarification of PSI and develops an index allowing for cross-country and cross-time comparability; it looks for an explanation, by testing the impact of various potential determinants and their changes over time. Covering 324 elections in 19 countries since 1945, the analysis shows that, since the 1970s, a process of de-institutionalization is going on and that PSI is mainly a function of the cleavage structure and the number of parties, with economic performance becoming relevant only in the last period.

This research contributes to the expanding literature on the determinants of government transparency. It uncovers the dynamics of transparency in the Italian case, which shows an interesting reform trajectory: until the late 1980s no transparency provisions existed; since then, provisions have dramatically increased under the impulse of changing patterns of political competition. The analysis of the Italian case highlights that electoral uncertainty for incumbents is a double-edged sword for institutional reform: on the one hand, it incentivizes the adoption of ever-growing transparency provisions; on the other, it jeopardizes the implementation capacity of public agencies by leading to severe administrative burdens.

The so-called third wave of democratization is over and scholars are increasingly alert to the apparently growing number of regime changes in the opposite direction. However, there is little agreement concerning how many distinct forms these processes can take, and even less systematic cross-regional analysis of the phenomenon, which diminishes our ability to seize its actual import. Accordingly, this article pursues a twofold goal. First, we present a framework for the analysis of the processes opposite to democratization. Specifically, we build on the notion of ‘autocratization’, identify similarities and differences between the various forms it can take, and catalogue how it can happen. Second, we provide new data on post-Cold War cases across the world and use these data to map the prevailing trends. The analysis confirms the increasing empirical relevance of the phenomenon, and reveals the existence of a few geographical and historical patterns in the forms and modes of contemporary autocratization.

The Five Star Movement (M5S) formed the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group when it first elected its members in the European Parliament (EP) in 2014. Two and a half years later, the M5S sought, without success, to leave the Eurosceptics and join the Liberal group. This attempted a change of transnational affiliation is puzzling: why has the M5S tried to leave the Eurosceptic group to ally with the most Europhile group in the EP? How could this U-turn be explained? Relying on several different data – the EUANDI party data set, official EP data, and original interviews with members of the EP – this article provides a systematic answer to these questions. We test three general hypotheses on group membership in the EP, using the M5S as a case study. We show that neither policy congruence nor the pursuit of office fully explains the M5S’s observed or attempted alliances. We suggest, instead, that ‘domestic politics’ is the key driver of the M5S’s behaviour in the EP. Political group membership is functional to the Movement’s strategic objectives at home. This article shows that national-level explanations of transnational affiliation need to be given more consideration, and highlights the ‘second-order’ importance of the EU arena with respect to ‘first-order’ national strategic objectives.

What is the effect of the economy on political trust among Latin American countries? The few studies that have examined the causal link between the economy and trust in institutions have observed the phenomenon in a synchronic way, adopting information collected at the individual or at the aggregate level. The results shown by these works reveal a citizenry that is dissatisfied, less tolerant towards the political class, and oriented to de-legitimize the political system. In this work, which analyses the political attitudes of citizens in 18 Latin American countries from a longitudinal perspective (1996–2013), the conjoint effect that economic perceptions and the real economy have on political trust is estimated. In particular, by using data from the Latinobarómetro, we show that in contexts where the political regime continues to alternate between democracy and authoritarianism, citizens’ sociotropic understanding of the economy contributes to strengthening the relationship between citizens and political institutions.

The literature on populist parties has tended to look at this new phenomenon as distinct from traditional party models. While there are a number of studies focusing on specific dimensions, there have been few attempts to systematically examine the features of these new players through the eyes of distinct party types. This work uses the case of Podemos to highlight what distinguished this new party from mainstream parties. We consider the following dimensions: the genetic model, ideological and programmatic stances, its organization, and the profile of its electoral base. It is shown that Podemos presents hybrid characteristics, combining those of traditional party models with the characteristics transposed from the digital culture. The findings also show that populist parties evolve similarly to mainstream parties and this evolution depends not only on electoral and strategic pressures, but also on the process of institutionalization. The lessons of Podemos will allow us to discuss comparable cases from contemporary democracies, thus strengthening our findings and generating more robust evidence about the (alleged) novelty of populist parties with regard to party models.

This paper focuses on the reasons that Italian interest groups decide to lobby together with like-minded groups (‘friends’), or engage in networking activity with groups that have conflicting interests (‘foes’), in order to influence public policy. How often do Italian interest groups recur to these lobbying strategies? What favours the construction of a coalition of more or less different interest groups lobbying on a particular issue? What, on the contrary, influences the decision to lobby individually? In order to answer these questions, original data coming from a national survey conducted on 1277 Italian interest groups are provided. Empirical results are interesting: from a descriptive point of view, business groups are more likely to engage in joint lobbying than other group types, whereas the same holds true for unions with respect to networking with rival organizations. From an explanatory point of view, groups that perceive themselves to be threatened by rivals’ influence in policymaking, or by environmental challenges, are more likely to work in coalitions and to engage in networking: resources do not matter in ‘absolute’ and ‘objective’ terms, but in ‘relative’ and ‘subjective’ ones.

Whilst much of the contemporary debate on regime change remains concentrated on transitions to and from democracy, this paper focuses on autocracy-to-autocracy transitions, a relatively understudied but particularly relevant phenomenon. Building on an updated typology of non-democratic regimes and through a qualitative case-by-case assessment, the present paper identifies 21 transitions from one dictatorship to another, out of 32 cases of autocratic breakdown during the 2000–15 period. Hence, after the fall of a dictatorship, the installation of a new authoritarian regime was almost twice as likely as democratization. Accordingly, the paper focuses on the 21 recorded autocracy-to-autocracy transitions and examines in which non-democratic regimes a transition from an autocracy to another is more likely to occur, which peculiar forms of authoritarian rule tend to be installed, and the specific ways in which the dismantling of the previous existing authoritarian rule is achieved.

The purpose of the article is try to assess whether inclusive procedures of selection are more likely to appoint a candidate who can be competitive in the general elections compared with less inclusive ones. Accordingly, I took into account nomination processes (NPs) to select/appoint the prime ministerial/presidential candidate for general elections held in four Western European countries (France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom) over approximately the last two decades. Using an original data source and innovative indicators, I assessed the inclusiveness of each NP and the party/candidate’s performance in the following general election in order to look for a possible relation. The outcome shows a very weak negative correlation between the two variables. Thus, while it does not appear that inclusive systems of selection have a clear positive impact at the electoral level, it is likewise hard to maintain that systems such as primary elections cause electoral failure.

Two main elements characterize a country as federal and the development of its federal system. The first one is directly connected to competences and how regions may or may not have powers over public policies. The second one focuses on the fiscal arena, and how regions generate their own income and share it with the central government. This paper describes from a historical point of view the different phases that the Spanish federal process has followed since its beginning in 1978 up to the last reform in 2016. These phases are related to the composition of both the regional and the national governments. It is therefore is important to investigate the connection between changes in these compositions and how they may have affected the phases of decentralization. Employing the new institutionalism paradigm and seeking for critical junctures in the different moments, we show how national governments are more important in shaping this process than regional ones.

Although the failed democratic transition in Egypt following the Arab Spring is unanimously held as a poster child for the stubbornness of authoritarianism in the MENA region, its determinants remain disputed. Contributing to this debate, this article focuses on the noxious effects of past electoral authoritarianism on the transitional party system. More specifically, through quantitative text analysis, the article demonstrates that transitional parties’ agency is largely the by-product of the way in which political competition was structured under the previous electoral autocracy. On the one hand, the uneven structure of opportunity upholding previous rule is central to the lack of pluralism. On the other hand, the previous regime's practice of playing opposition actors against each other through identity politics is at the root of the absence of common ground among the aforementioned parties during the transition.

Despite recurring elections and the transition to multiparty systems, authoritarianism has re-emerged in the Post-Soviet Space. Along with domestic factors, the external dimension should also be considered to fully understand this regional trend. Scholars depict Russia as a typical ‘black knight’ for democracy. While most of the literature deals with the Kremlin's policies in the ‘new’ Eastern Europe, this article pays attention to Russia's actions in the relatively understudied Southern Caucasus. Specifically, it investigates why and how Moscow tried to thwart democratization in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The diachronic analysis addresses three periods, namely, Yeltsin's presidency, the first Putin presidency and the Putin–Medvedev diarchy. Findings suggest that the Kremlin implemented an increasingly nuanced and intentional black knight strategy in Southern Caucasus, aimed at gaining primacy in the Post-Soviet Space and recognition of its great power status.

After the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the UN launched the peacekeeping operation UNIFIL II. Italy embarked on the demanding task of taking responsibility for leading the mission. We present a model of military intervention in multilateral operations that aims at highlighting the mechanisms at stake. In so doing, we argue that an analytical eclectic approach offers a novel explanation of Italy’s behaviour. We explain the drivers of Italy’s intervention in Lebanon in two ways. First, we analyse Italy’s actions at the outset of the crisis. Second, we provide an account of the parliamentary debate that took place in both chambers of the Italian Parliament between July and October 2006.

This paper introduces a dynamic perspective on how (personal) political ideology shapes reactions to immigration policies at the mass level. Greater ethnic diversity and growing calls for multiculturalism represent a disproportionately greater challenge to rightists because they value conformity, tradition, and stability more than leftists. Consequently, we hypothesize that the impact of political ideology on opposition to immigration has become stronger over time. Analyses show that: (a) leftists were less opposed to immigration than rightists in both 2002 and 2014, and (b) rightists have become more opposed to immigration in the time between 2002 and 2014, whereas leftists’ reactions remained stable across this period. We tested our motivated reasoning hypothesis in a repeated cross-sectional (fixed effects regression) analysis of individual-level data from 18 countries (N = 55,367). The individual-level data on political ideology and immigration policy preferences is from the European Social Survey data sets fielded in 2002 and 2014.

Within the context of the economic downturn in southern Eurozone countries and the imposition of new constraints on national policy-making, this article examines the congruence between party issue prioritization, during and after the electoral phase. This is done through a longitudinal analysis of four countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and use of party manifesto and parliamentary question data. We found that between the electoral and parliamentary arenas, parties tend to emphasize different issues. However, this occurs in different ways across time, countries, and parties. We propose a measurement of issue congruence in agenda framing between the pre- and post-electoral phases to assess to what extent elections provide a guide for public policies. Moreover, we propose arguments to explain different results in the analyzed countries and across parties. We show that the crisis magnified the capacity of the opposition to maintain programmatic coherence – a helping hand for opposition parties (including the radical ones) that succeeded in boosting the relevance of their signature issues.

The article aims at disentangling the existing relation between job precariousness and political participation at the individual level illustrating that the former can be considered an emerging political cleavage. The authors apply an interpretive framework typical of political participation studies to an original data set composed of two groups of young workers (with precarious and open-ended contracts) in a big Italian post-industrial city, Turin. First, applying a confirmatory factor analysis, a typology of three ‘modes’ of political participation – voting, collective action, and political consumerism – is used to reduce data complexity. Second, logistic regressions are deployed to analyze the role played by occupational status, political positioning, and the interaction between the two, on the different modes of political participation. Precarious youth show a higher level of political participation in representational behaviours (voting). Left-wing youth are generally more active than non-left-wing ones in non-representational behaviours (collective actions and consumerism), the impact is more pronounced for precarious young people. Thus, results demonstrate the relevance of occupational status in explaining patterns of participation and invite scholars to promote a dialogue between industrial relations and political participation studies.

Starting from the imperfect nature of Myanmar's democracy, this paper aims to answer two questions. First, can Myanmar's transition be defined as a case of democratization, or is it, rather, a case of authoritarian resilience? To state this differently: is the progress enjoyed by Myanmar's polity the outcome of an ongoing process that is supposed to lead to a fully fledged democracy, or, rather, an attempt to enshrine elements of authoritarian governance under a democratic guise? Second, if the balance leans towards the latter instead of the former, how did authoritarian resilience work in Myanmar? The transition is analysed from a long-term perspective, moving from the 1988 pro-democracy uprising up to the most recent events. Data were collected from available published sources and from three fieldworks conducted by the authors in Myanmar. The paper concludes that Myanmar's transition is better understood as a case of authoritarian resilience than as democratization and highlights three core traits of Myanmar's authoritarian resilience: first, the very top-down nature of the political transformation; second, the incumbents’ ability to set the pace of political reform through the use of repression and political engineering; and third, the divide-and-rule strategy used as a means to keep contestations separated and local.