During the period between the Great European War (1914–18) and the Pacific War (1941–45) the Japanese expansionist impulse in the South Seas expressed itself through emigration and economic enterprise abroad. There were Japanese settlements in almost every country in the region. The larger ones were in the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. On the eve of the Pacific War the estimated number of Japanese residents in the South Seas was 24,000, with investments totalling around ¥250 million. Compared to those of the Western colonial powers and the immigrant Chinese, the size of these investments was insignificant and their numbers meagre. But this only served to spur those interested in Japan's economic expansion in the South Seas to make greater efforts to achieve their aims. External events helped to realize these objectives. For a brief interregnum during the Japanese Occupation (1942–45) the Japanese became the politically dominant community in the region with control over its economic resources.

The rise and fall of Pertamina is a remarkable event in the recent economic history of Indonesia which has had wide-ranging economic and political ramifications. Formed in 1968, the state enterprise grew rapidly into one of the most important companies in Asia and Indonesia's most vigorous business organization. By 1974, this burgeoning oil conglomerate led by a dynamic President Director, Dr Ibnu Sutowo, known for his “can-do” philosophy and record of delivering the goods, had expanded its activities to a wide range of diverse business ventures both within and outside of Indonesia. But in late 1974, just as it seemed that the oil boom would surely strengthen Pertamina's already-dominant role in political and economic life in Indonesia, severe financial difficulties overtook the enterprise. In March 1975 the Indonesian Government was forced to step in to shore up Pertamina, and the subsequent investigations which continued on into 1976 revealed a series of remarkable business miscalculations which had led the company to accumulate debts officially put at over US$10 billion, much of it in foreign currency. Corruption in Indonesia has attracted much attention in recent years, so it is perhaps not surprising that it is this side of the remarkable Pertamina affair — and especially the role of Dr Ibnu Sutowo — that has received most comment. But the controversy surrounding the rise and fall of Ibnu Sutowo should not be allowed to obscure other significant issues. There are numerous semi-independent “states within a state” in Indonesia, and the role of particular individuals (whether honest or corrupt) within them should be kept in perspective. After discussing the background to the Pertamina crisis below, several issues will be taken up. It will be argued that while the economic consequences are bound to be farreaching, their impact on the economy should not be exaggerated. It will also be suggested that it is conflict between the need for autonomy and the desirability of public accountability which is at the heart of the debates about Pertamina's role, that many other official institutions (especially state enterprises) are faced with a similar conflict, and that we must look to the long-term development of institutional checks and balances to permanently improve the situation.

Studies of Indonesia in the twentieth century have properly concentrated on the history of the nationalist movement, but its external relations have been unduly neglected. It is indeed a commonplace that the Japanese invasion had a decisive impact on the fortunes of the nationalist movement and of its antagonists. But the invasion was the climax of a sequence of developments that brought the security of the Netherlands' tenure of Netherlands India into question. Apart from their intrinsic interest, those developments provide an additional context within which to appraise the nationalist movement and the Dutch reaction to it.

Butterworth in the state of Penang is becoming an important urban centre in Peninsular Malaysia. The rapid industrialization taking place within and just outside the city limits, the opening of its military airport to civilian traffic, and the extension of its harbour facilities for ocean-going vessels have all served to encourage further urban development. The considerably increased frequency of the car ferry service to Penang island (since 1975) is further evidence of the growing economic importance of the region and has led to a certain suburbanization of Butterworth in relation to Georgetown, where possibilities of areal extension are limited by lack of space on the mountainous island of Penang.

Once the premier port in colonial Southeast Asia and one of the foremost in the British Empire, Singapore now ranks as the world's fourth busiest port, tonnagewise, with the second highest per capita G.D.P. in Asia. Its post-war achievements rest on solid historical advantages. A broad historical survey of its commercial growth before World War II is therefore not amiss: the more so, as there has been no such panoramic presentation before. With no natural resources, Singapore's economic growth was almost synonymous with its foreign trade. In most historical works, especially those written before World War II, Singapore has been treated as an integral part of the Straits Settlements or British Malaya, for, until its emergence as a separate nation in August 1965, Singapore as the focal point of reference for researches was not part of the historical consciousness.

This paper derives from a larger study of the nature of Japan's relations with colonial South and Southeast Asia in the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War. By means of a detailed examination of a single facet of Japanese-Philippine relations, it is hoped that a greater insight may be gained into the often convolute processes of the interactions between, on the one hand, the dominant Asian power of the inter-war period, and on the other hand, colonial entities and personalities still beholden to Western European or North American rulers. However, two caveats need to be put forward about this essay: (1) the case of the Philippines was unique in colonial Asia since the United States had fully committed itself to a policy of withdrawal, thus facilitating contacts between the local ruling elite and Japanese diplomats; (2) despite pre-war and wartime propaganda to the contrary, the principal concern of Japan in all its dealings with colonial South and Southeast Asia before the Pacific War was economic. In the prior instance, therefore, the paragraphs that follow will demonstrate an apparently remarkable degree of freedom of action on the part of the Filipinos in authority under the Commonwealth Administration (1935–46) in spite of the continuing legal responsibility of the United States for Philippine foreign affairs under the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie (Independence) Act of 1934. The second caveat will be evidenced by the unstinting and continuous attention of Japanese diplomats to the development of ever closer economic ties between the Philippines and Japan.

During the Second World War, there was a momentous drive to build a new Thai society under the Government of Pibulsongkram, popularly known as Pibul. The wave of these changes lasted only about five years, but it had an enormous effect on all aspects of Thai life.

Given the great strides made over the past twenty years in our understanding of modern Southeast Asian history, it is surprising that many traditional and possibly outdated interpretations remain unchallenged. Despite the growing use of indigenous source materials, the willingness to take an Asian-centric (and occasionally nonelitist) perspective, and the increasing attention to social, economic, and cultural (rather than just political and diplomatic) history, a number of important themes need reinterpretation or reevaluation. Indeed, many modern historians continue to accept as valid traditional assessments of some nineteenth-century events. This is sometimes the case even when the original sources are compromised by a Western ethnocentric and colonialist bias, since European representatives of the imperialist imperative largely produced the documentary sources for the period. The colonial episode now seems a far less benevolent exercise than it did to an earlier generation of historians; yet, outmoded perspectives sometimes remain with us. Such a failure of reinterpretation characterizes the recent writings on one of the better-known episodes in Bornean history, the so-called “Chinese Rebellion” of 1857 in Sarawak. The time has come for a revisionist appraisal.

Military consideration had been given top priority by the Japanese policy-makers in formulating policy towards Burma immediately prior to and after the outbreak of the Pacific War. This was evident in their decision to establish military administration in Burma in March 1942, and in granting independence to the Burmese in August 1943. These decisions, however, had an adverse effect for Japan during the war years, since they were largely responsible for turning the Burmese against Japan.

There are only a few studies on the Indonesian youth movement in the pre-World War II period. Apart from those dealing with specific organizations and hence not concerned with the more general trend, most of the authors tend to emphasize the unity of the movement after the 1928 youth congress. The usual story told is that after that year, a clear concept of an Indonesian nation emerged and the movement was no longer divided. There is hardly any discussion about the division between secular and Islamic movements. Concerning Indonesian national symbols, the impression is created by these authors that they were adopted unanimously in 1928 although evidence shows that at that time only certain groups accepted them. The general acceptance of these national symbols took place only late in the thirties.

History may regard the summer of 1976 as a watershed of sorts in the evolution of Southeast Asia's place in world politics. Following the official reunification of the two Vietnams, there occurred in rapid succession the removal of the last American combat troops from the Southeast Asian mainland and the first positive stirrings by Vietnamese officials in response to ASEAN overtures for a normalization of relations. Although it is too early to determine the ultimate consequences of these events, their combined symbolic significance is unmistakable.

For the greater part of the period from 1940 to 1945, French Indochina occupied a peculiar place in the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Great East Asia. Following the capitulation of France before the German army in June 1940, the northern part of Indochina became the first area in Southeast Asia to admit Japanese troops — at that stage, as an extension of the Japanese campaign in southern China. In July 1941 the Japanese advance into southern Indochina marked the first step towards a full-scale attack on European and American possessions in the whole region, which materialized in December 1941. But this military advance into Indochina, precisely because it took place before the general assault on Southeast Asia and the Pacific, had to be achieved by means of agreements and treaties with an established government. These were possible only because the French in Indochina decided to recognize the pro-German government at Vichy, so that the Japanese were able to apply diplomatic pressure both in France and at Hanoi. Once the agreements had been made, the Japanese saw no need to change the basis of their occupation of Indochina even after December 1941; they were by then preoccupied with establishing their presence in other areas. Consequently they continued to recognize the French administration in Indochina and to maintain diplomatic relations with it, so long as diplomatic pressure was sufficient to ensure that Japanese military needs were fully met.