The main hypothesis of this article is that transgovernmental interaction among central banks and finance ministries of industrialized countries was as significant in economic policy formation as intergovernmental interaction. Elite interview data indicate, however, that the international consultative process among deputy central bank governors and deputy finance ministers conformed more closely to the intergovernmental image of international politics than had been expected. Both interaction patterns within the deputies’ consultative group and the impact of international consultations upon national economic policies could be explained moderately well in terms of a unified rational actor model. Examination of the transgovernmental interaction does suggest ways to systematically modify and improve interpretations based upon the rational actor model. In addition, the degree of politicization of issues may prove to be a reliable guide when deciding whether the transgovernmental dimension of an issue requires detailed study.

It is argued that the study of regional international politics is important (1) for empirical reasons having to do with the real world saliency of the region as a factor in international politics; (2) for theoretical reasons having to do with the subordinate system as being relatively neglected in scholarship with the exception of the integrationist approach; and (3) for policy reasons having to do with the importance of accurately understanding the dynamics of the region as part of the objective of stabilizing the international system. The dominant approach to regional international politics of the integrationists (neo–functionalists and transactionalists) is then discussed and criticized in terms of the two approaches' normative concerns, the nature of the model utilized, and the theoretical issues that are raised. A major conclusion is that the integrative model used is inappropriate as a vestige of the level of analysis problem, and such theoretical issues as the nature of the dependent variable remain unspecified. It is then argued that the authors' formulation of an empirical systems approach begins to meet these criticisms.

Relations between official agencies and private business concerning international coffee policy suggest that the power of the state dominates the international economic arena. The International Coffee Agreement did not benefit the United States coffee industry. Despite this, some large coffee roasting companies supported the Agreement. Without their support it would not have received Congressional approval. The action of the roasters can be explained by the behavioral theory of the firm, which emphasizes managerial discretion and risk avoidance. Large oligopolistic companies, potentially the most powerful of business enterprises, are also the ones least likely to oppose the state. However, the ability of one company to determine American policy toward the import of soluble coffee from Brazil shows that when the economic interests of an oligopolistic firm are unambiguously threatened, it can severely constrain official actors.