At first glance Reflexivization in Italian seems to obey the same restrictions we find in English. Thus, if we consider the proposal that reflexive pronouns and their antecedents must be clausemates in English, we find in Italian that the same clausemate condition holds and that for any two coreferential pronouns within the same clause, the second of them is a reflexive pronoun. If, on the other hand, we consider the proposal that a reflexive pronoun and its antecedent may be indefinitely far apart provided that certain circumstances are not present, such as an intervening specified subject or the reflexive's being in a tensed S to which the antecedent does not belong (as in Chomsky (1973)), again the same conditions hold for Italian Reflexivization; as illustrated in (I)–(3).

The expression is part of can be used in a number of different senses. One might cite as examples:A sheep is part of a flock. A priest is part of the clergy. Changing nappies is part of being a mother.A petal is part of a flower. But one does not ask What are the parts of the clergy? or What are the parts of being a mother? as one might ask What are the parts of a flower? or What are the parts of the human body? I shall refer to the latter as ‘structural parts’, to distinguish them from the rest; it is with the relation between structural parts and their wholes that the present paper will be concerned. This relation can also be expressed by sentences of the form A flower has petals, The human body has arms, etc. (The verb have can, of course, also be used in senses irrelevant to the present discussion.) The part-whole relation, thus conceived, is generally recognized as being one of the fundamental sense-relations structuring the vocabulary of a language.

Many contemporary linguists hold that an adequate description of a natural language must represent many of its vocabulary items as syntactically and/or semantically complex. A sentence containing the word kill, for instance, will on this view be assigned a ‘deep syntactic structure’ or ‘semantic representation’ in which kill is represented by a portion or portions of tree-structure, the lowest nodes of which are labelled with ‘semantic primitives’ such as CAUSE and DIE, or CAUSE, BECOME, NOT and ALIVE. In the case of words such as cats or walked, which are formed in accordance with productive rules of ‘inflexional’ rather than ‘derivational’ morphology, there is little dispute that their composite status will be reflected at most or all levels of linguistic representation. (That is why I refer, above, to ‘vocabulary items’: cat and cats may be called different ‘words’, but not different elements of the English vocbulary.) When morphologically simple words such as kill are treated as composite at a ‘deeper’ level, I, for one, find my credulity strained to breaking point. (The case of words formed in accordance with productive or non-productive rules of derivational morphology, such as killer or kingly, is an intermediate one and I shall briefly return to it below.)

In 1971–72 a lengthy discussion took place in Language concerning sentence stress (alias nuclear stress, alias intonation nucleus placement) and its relationship to syntactic structure (Bresnan, 1971, 1972; Lakoff, 1972; Berman & Szamosi, 1972; Bolinger, 1972). Bolinger had the last word in stating that placement of the nuclear accent ‘is not explainable by syntax or morphology’ but ‘is a matter of information, not of structure’ (Bolinger, 1972: 633). According to this view words with low informational content (i.e. highly predictable) in a particular context or situation are unlikely to receive a nuclear stress, whereas words with high information content (i.e. highly unpredictable) are likely to receive a nuclear stress. In addition, ‘the speaker will put the main accent as far to the right as he dares, when assertive pressure is high’ (Bolinger, 1972: 644).

One of the more welcome developments in generative phonology has been the acceptance of the long-established and well-known concept that the morphophonemic structure of a language may be reorganized in an attempt to establish ‘paradigmatic coherence’, that is to say, a major rôle of analogy is to eliminate or minimize allomorphic variation within a paradigm. Of course it would be wrong to suppose that analogical change is restricted to the elimination of allomorphy; indeed, it is even possible to find examples of analogical change which increase allomorphy, as in the development of the plural imperative form onto:n of Greek einai ‘to be’ in place of the more regular esto:n.1 But, since analogical elimination of allomorphy plays such a crucial rôle in linguistic change, we may safely concentrate on that aspect of analogy in this paper without denying the many other types of change in which analogy plays a part.

In Comrie (1976: 108) we read: ‘Several languages have special inferential verb forms, to indicate that the speaker is reporting some event that he has not himself witnessed, but about whose occurrence he has learnt at second hand (though without, incidentally, necessarily casting doubt on the reliability of the information)’. Two pages later Comrie writes follows:

Serebrennikov (1960: 66) lists the following languages known to him where there is a close formal relation, down to identity, between the expression of perfect and inferential meaning: Turkic languages: the Uralic languages Nenets (Yurak-Samoyed), Finnish, Estonian, Man (Cheremis), Komi (Zyryan), Udmurt (Votyak), Mańśi (Vogul); Georgian; and the Indo-European languages Latvian, Bulgarian, and Albanian.

In a recent article published in this journal (Faarlund, 1977), an attempt was made to account for the problem raised by the well-known fact that Scandinavian languages often use the neuter form of the predicative adjective in cases where the non-neuter form would seem to be called for by the ordinary rules of gender agreement.

Although there has been extensive research into the usage and interpretation of the modal auxiliary WILL (Leech, 1971: 52—54; Palmer, 1974: 104—115) sentences of the type (1) John will fight for justice. (2) Men will fight for justice. (3) John will be here. may still present problems of analysis.

Utilizing Palmer's system, we can interpret sentence (I) as implying the following: (i) simple futurity (ii) volition (iii) insistence (closely related to (ii) (Palmer, 1974: III)) (iv) characteristic activity.