This study examines the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in two areas: the decision to initiate prosecution by indictment (in lieu of a preliminary hearing) and the decision to reinitiate prosecution by indictment after preliminary hearing discharge. To explore concerns about prosecutors’ use of the grand jury to pursue prosecution in cases with insufficient evidence to convict at trial, the author studied prosecutors’ practices in murder cases in Cook County, Illinois. To gather the information the author collected disposition data for prosecutions initiated by grand jury and by preliminary hearing, interviewed prosecutors, and examined prosecutors’ case documents indicating reasons for declining or pursuing prosecution of discharged cases. The data show similar conviction rates for prosecutions initiated by grand jury and those by preliminary hearing but a significantly lower rate for prosecutions reinitiated after discharge. Three reasons for the latter finding are discussed: special evidentiary characteristics of reinitiated cases, seriousness of the offense studied, and prosecutors’ special motivations and practices in serious cases. The author suggests that although prosecutors typically are constrained by practical, organizational, professional, and ethical concerns, they may in extraordinary situations reinitiate prosecution of weak cases. In light of the study's findings, the author assesses several proposals to eliminate or restrain prosecutors’ power to reinitiate.

Civil rights litigation undertaken by lawyers associated with interest groups, particularly the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF), is of ten described as planned” litigation. This article examines litigation by these organizations from the late 1960s through the early 1980s to explore the extent to which “planned litigation” is planned. The author interviewed both staff attorneys for organizations participating in race relations litigation and “cooperating attorneys” associated with such organizations.

Elements of planned litigation discussed are litigating organizations’ choices—of areas of law on which to focus, of cases, of federal or state courts, and of amicus curiae participation—and the dynamics of litigation—including relations between staff and cooperating attorneys, litigators’ control of cases, and the effect of Supreme Court decisions on litigation strategy.

The interviews reveal that much interest-group civil rights litigation is not selected deductively on the basis of previously developed criteria but instead develops inductively from cases that come to the organizations and is affected by pressure and circumstance. Counter to the view, stemming from Brown v. Board of Education, that civil rights litigation is undertaken as planned “campaigns” based on “blueprints,” it appears that much about “planned” litigation is problematic, with many constraints imposed by the actions of others and by resource problems, with the result that many deviations from litigation strategy occur. Thus much “planned” litigation is responsive and reflexive and beyond litigators’ control.

Tests of statistical significance have increasingly been used in employment discrimination cases since the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood. In that case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that “in a proper case” statistical evidence can suffice for a prima facie showing of employment discrimination. The Court also discussed the use of a binomial significance test to assess whether the difference between the proportion of black teachers employed by the Hazelwood School District and the proportion of black teachers in the relevant labor market was substantial enough to indicate discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has proposed a somewhat stricter standard for evaluating how substantial a difference must be to constitute evidence of discrimination. Under the so-called 80% rule promulgated by the EEOC, the difference must not only be statistically significant, but the hire rate for the allegedly discriminated group must also be less than 80% of the rate for the favored group. This article argues that a binomial statistical significance test standing alone is unsatisfactory for evaluating allegations of discrimination because many of the assumptions on which such tests are based are inapplicable to employment settings; the 80% rule is a more appropriate standard for evaluating whether a difference in hire rates should be treated as a prima facie showing of discrimination.