Two threats arose in China after land reform that imperilled the transition from the anti-feudal, new democratic revolution of land reform to the socialist revolution of collectivisation. One threat came from “below,” from the village environment; the other from “above,” from the hierarchy of party and government. Both threats centred on the basic-level leadership and activists who had been recruited into political roles during the guerrilla years and especially during land reform. One threat arose as the interests of the peasants in the maintenance of the small-producer economy affected the attitudes and behaviour of village leaders, leading them to such responses as wanting to withdraw from political involvement. The other threat arose as the rural administrative system became increasingly burdened by numerous tasks and assignments. As pressure to produce results increased, rural leaders tended to become administrators and command mobilisers, orientated towards getting each job done quickly, using coercion. This approach caused a variety of problems; for example, it jeopardised a central goal of the socialist transformation of agriculture of securing peasant support and cooperation with this change.

Early in 1928 the Chinese Communist Party was in crisis. It might have disintegrated and disappeared. Yet in fact it persisted, constantly refashioned itself, and ultimately became the political system of the country. The broad questions we may ask about this historical fact are: What was the nature of the Party in 1928? What had been the experience of the leadership? And what was the relationship between the Party, with its distinctive ideology, and the Chinese social environment?

In January 1935 the harassed, decimated main forces of the Chinese Communist movement paused in the course of their epic Long March from Kiangsi to rest and regroup at Tsunyi in the hills of northern Kweichow. During their brief occupation of this remote, provincial town the top political and military leaders present held a conference which has come to be regarded as the major turning point in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the time, however, no such significance was attached to the stop-over in Tsunyi and, indeed, the very fact that an important political meeting was convened there was not revealed for some years after.

By the mid 1960s, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had structured the opportunities and career choices available to the Chinese people. In their individual decisions, the Chinese people had to confront the questions Mao wanted them to face, such as whether to join the Party, to serve the people, and to become heavily involved in political life. Mao and his associates had helped to shape the determinants of social mobility and delineate the skills needed to get ahead and along in China. By 1965, the violence, uncertainty, and turmoil which affected lives during the revolutionary era had given way to a period of more stable, predictable, and structured career patterns.

Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideology in theory postulate objectives (both long and short term) and dictate both the organisational means and action programmes necessary to achieve them. Theory and practice should therefore be integrated into a coherent dynamic whole. Or, in other terms, the aspirational and operational aspects of policy should pursue the same ends. The object of this article is to examine the inter-relationship of the aspirational and operational aspects of Maoist foreign policy. The first is concerned with the future development of world revolution and China's relationship to it. But it is also related to the realisation of China's long-term goals. The second deals with the shrinking scope currently allocated in Peking to normalised interstate relations. But it is also concerned with China's active promotion and support of guerrilla movements in many of the states on her periphery.

A significant aspect of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been to reveal the least stable areas of China geographically and politically. One of these is Inner Mongolia. Also, the events of the upheaval— in direct contradiction to the Maoist dictum that “the Party must always control the gun, the gun must never be allowed to control the Party”— have caused a breakdown in Party and Government authority and a shift to military control in many parts of China: administrative organs at provincial, municipal and local levels have been replaced by People's Liberation Army (PLA) directed “Revolutionary Committees.” In most areas of China, the political upheaval can be ascribed to a power struggle between the Party, Red Guards and other semi-organised groups. However, the Cultural Revolution in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region takes on added significance in that “local nationalism” among the Mongol national minority played an important role in the conflict between the established political structure and the efforts of the Maoists to “seize power.”

The intent of this short article is to introduce scholars who have not recently worked in Hong Kong or Taiwan to the kinds of research materials relating to the Cultural Revolution which are now available there. Most of the sources discussed, however, are at least equally valuable for studying problems of earlier years as well. Treatment is generally limited to sources not included in Berton and Wu's recently published bibliography, although additional information can be found in that volume about the Union Research Institute and about some of the Taiwan organisations mentioned.