Islamization of Egypt

Christianity reached Egypt in the first century and the last pocket of paganism was Christianized by the sixth century. The Coptic Christian church, followed by the Egyptian masses, split from the Byzantine church in 451. Yet, Greeks and Hellenized Egyptians stayed loyal to the Byzantine church forming a parallel church, the Melkite church. Condemned as heretics, Copts were persecuted by the Byzantines until the Arab Conquest in 641. On the eve of the Conquest, Copts constituted the majority of Egyptians, with non-Coptic Christians and Jews forming two mostly urban minorities (see Footnote footnote 14).

Following the Conquest, non-Muslims shrank from 100 percent of Egypt’s population in 641 to 7 percent in 1897. Yet, in the absence of published statistics on Egypt’s religious composition before the 1897 population census report, determining the date at which non-Muslims shrank into a minority remains a matter of strong debate. Courbage and Fargues (Reference Courbage, Fargues and Mabro1997, pp. 27–28) used total poll and land tax revenues to estimate non-Muslims’ population share between 641 and 813, finding that non-Muslims shrank into a minority by 680.Footnote ⁶ Egypt’s Islamization was mostly driven by voluntary conversions to Islam, that were observed by the state (see the discussion of alternative theories).Footnote ⁷ Importantly, being Muslim was an “absorbing state” due to three Islamic laws: apostates are sentenced to death, the offspring of a Muslim male is Muslim, and Muslim females may only marry Muslim males.

Tax Wedge between Copts and Muslims in 641–1856

To provide incentives for non-Muslims to convert to Islam, the Arab tax system granted tax exemptions to converts. After a formation period between 632 and 750, the tax system evolved into its canonical form around 750 and remained unchanged in essence until 1856. Table 1 summarizes the taxes and benefits that were imposed on Copts (C) and Muslims (M). Every free adult Coptic male paid a poll tax (jizya), an annual per head cash tax; furthermore, Coptic landholders paid an annual land tax (kharaj) assessed at a lump-sum amount per unit of land that varied by crop and paid in cash or kind.Footnote ⁸ By contrast, Muslims were exempted from the poll tax, and Muslim landholders paid (until 750) a reduced land tax (variously called tithe, ushr, zakat, sadaqa) that was assessed at a percentage of yield that varied by land quality and paid in cash or kind, but they became subject to the higher kharaj tax rate starting from 750. Finally, Copts were subject to miscellaneous taxes that were later extended to Muslims starting from 750. Muslims, on their part, were subject to military conscription in return for a stipend in cash (‘ata’) and kind (rizq); an obligation that was abolished in 833 with the shift to recruiting slave soldiers.

Table 1 Difference in Net Taxes Between Copts and Muslims

Notes: Miscellaneous taxes changed over time. In 641–857, they were ad-hoc taxes collected for specific uses such as military expenses, lodging for officials, governor’s expenses, the village overhead expenses, and public projects. In 857–1171, their tax base expanded to include pasture, weir, and various crops and products. In 1171–1856, they included taxes on pasturage, industry, mines, fisheries, trade and transactions, property, maintenance of public services, war taxes, and taxes on vice.

Sources: Morimoto (Reference Morimoto1981, pp. 51, 140, 257–63), Rabie (Reference Rabie1972, pp. 73–132), and Ismail (Reference Ismail1998, pp. 153–208).

To sum up, the Coptic-Muslim difference in net taxes in 641–750 was equal to the sum of (1) poll tax, (2) (positive) difference between kharaj and ushr land tax rates, (3) miscellaneous taxes, and (4) difference between stipend and (non-pecuniary) cost of military conscription. Since 750, however, the net tax differential has equated the poll tax.

Regressivity of the Poll Tax Schedule

Figure 1 shows the long-term trend of the de jure nominal annual poll tax per person. From 641 to 750, the poll tax was one dinar on average, but starting from 750, it was imposed in three lump-sum amounts per person of one, two, and four dinars on the poor, middle, and rich respectively.Footnote ⁹ The nominal tax remained stable from 750 to 1100, increased slightly between 1101 and 1300, declined in 1301–1400, remained stable between 1401 and 1700, and then increased between 1701 and 1856, when it was finally abolished. Although the de facto poll tax varied more than the de jure tax, they were equal on average.Footnote ¹⁰

Sources: Muslim historians’ and jurists’ handbooks in 641–1100, government officials’ handbooks in 1101–1700, and Ottoman official tax tabulations in 1701–1856.

Figure 1 De Jure Nominal Annual Poll Tax Per Person in 641–1856

Notes: An Islamic dinar weighs 4.25 grams of gold.

Despite the three-bracket system, the poll tax rate per dinar of income was higher among low-income Copts. First, Figure 2 shows that the de jure poll tax per dinar was decreasing in wages. Second, examining the de facto poll tax reveals the same finding. A few tax registers in 703–733 contain information on both the poll tax and (cash) land tax per person. Since the cash land tax was a lump-sum amount per unit of land, it can be used as a proxy of the size of landholdings (wealth) of landholders. Table D.1 in the Online Appendix shows that the de facto poll tax rate per dinar of land tax was decreasing in land tax; smaller landholders faced, on average, a higher poll tax per dinar.

Source: I draw on Ashtor (Reference Ashtor1969, pp. 90–4, 223–29, 372–81) to construct a dataset on occupations and wages. I assigned to each occupation the de jure poll tax rate per person according to jurists’ criteria.

Figure 2 Wages and De Jure Poll Tax Per Dinar in 750–1517

Notes: The fitted lines estimate the following OLS regression in each period: t_i = α + β log (y_i) + u_i where t_i is the poll tax per dinar for individual i and log (y_i) is the natural logarithm of the annual wage. The estimates are as follows (robust standard errors are in parentheses): (1) In 750–969: t = 0.186 (0.012) - 0.028 (0.002) log (y) [N = 35; RFootnote ² = 0.83]; (2) In 969–1250: t = 0.229 (0.031) - 0.035 (0.005) log (y) [N = 77; RFootnote ² = 0.54]; (3) In 1250–1517: t = 0.053 (0.005) - 0.008 (0.001) log (y) [N = 60; RFootnote ² = 0.71].

Real Poll Tax Rate in 641–1517

The real poll tax decreased between 641 and 750, because the nominal tax did not increase (Figure 1), and because the dinar’s purchasing power declined (Ashtor Reference Ashtor1969, p. 465). Furthermore, the poll tax declined as a percentage of income due to the increase in nominal wages. The dataset on occupations and wages in Figure 2 reveals that the de jure poll tax in 750–969 was, on average, 8 and 10 percent of the annual wage for low- and middle-income brackets respectively, but it declined to 6 percent in 969–1250, and 1.4 percent in 1250–1517. The tax was negligible though for the high-income bracket throughout the whole period.

Copts’ Population Share in 641–1897

Courbage and Fargues (Reference Courbage, Fargues and Mabro1997)’s estimates of Copts’ population share in 641–813 from total tax revenues rely on strong assumptions on tax enforcement. Two novel data sources allow me to provide different and arguably more convincing estimates of non-Muslims’ population share between 641 and 1897. The first is a dataset on Christian churches and monasteries (both Coptic and non-Coptic) in 1200 and 1500 that I constructed from Abul-Makarim (Reference Abul-Makarim and Anba-Samuel1984 [1200]) and Al-Maqrizi (Reference Al-Maqrizi and Sayyid2002 [1500]) (see Section B in the Online Appendix for further details). Using this dataset, I estimate non-Muslims’ population share in 1200 and 1500 by the share of villages in all Egypt that had at least one Christian church or monastery. The second is the 1848 and 1868 population census samples that record the religious affiliation of each individual. My estimates, plotted in Figure 3, indicate that non-Muslims’ population share was 16 percent in 1200, 3 percent in 1500, and 7 percent in 1848–1868. These estimates are consistent with those of Courbage and Fargues (Reference Courbage, Fargues and Mabro1997) and indicate that non-Muslims fell into a minority by 1200 and declined slowly thereafter.Footnote ¹³ The composition of Egypt’s non-Muslims likely persisted from 641 through 1868.Footnote ¹⁴

Sources: Courbage and Fargues (Reference Courbage, Fargues and Mabro1997), Abul-Makarim (Reference Abul-Makarim and Anba-Samuel1984 [1200]), Al-Maqrizi (Reference Al-Maqrizi and Sayyid2002 [1500]), the 1848 and 1868 population census samples, and the 1897 population census report.

Figure 3 Non-Muslims’ Population Share in 641–1897

Coptic-Muslim SES Gap in 641–969 and 1848–1868

Documenting the trend of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap is challenging because it requires observing religion and occupations simultaneously. To this end, I collected all the available individual-level information on occupations and religion in 641–969 (N = 402) from the papyri in the Arabic Papyrology Database (henceforth, APD), where I inferred a worker’s religion from his name (converts adopted an Arabic name). I compare Copts’ and Muslims’ occupational distributions estimated from the APD sample in 641–969 to those estimated from the 1848–1868 census samples. For the purpose of this article, I pooled the two samples in 1848 and 1868 and restricted the analysis to Egyptian local free Coptic and Muslim employed men of a rural district of origin who are at least 15 years of age and with non-missing information on age, religion, occupation, and district of origin. I refer the reader to Section B in the Online Appendix for further details about the two data sources, and a discussion of the representativeness of the APD sample.

To measure SES in the APD sample and the 1848–1868 samples, I constructed three dummy variables that measure the incidence of working in a white-collar job. White-collar1 =1 if an individual is a professional, a high-level bureaucrat, or a mid-low bureaucrat; these are literate white-collar jobs that are non-political and non-religious (except high-level bureaucrats). White-collar2 =1 if white-collar1 =1 or if an individual belongs to the judiciary, the military, the police, the clergy, or the rural elites; these are literate political or religious white-collar jobs. White-collar3 =1 if white-collar2 =1 or if an individual is a merchant; a white-collar job that is not necessarily literate. I also created dummy variables for three other outcomes: artisans, farmers, and unskilled workers. By construction, the population shares of white-collar3, artisans, farmers, and unskilled workers sum up to 1, thus, exhausting the occupational distribution.

The findings are in Table 2. Copts (56 percent of the APD sample) are over-represented among white-collar workers in 641–969. About 22 percent of Copts in the sample worked in white-collar jobs compared to 15 percent among Muslims. This is mostly attributable to Copts’ over-representation in the mid-low bureaucracy (scribes, land tax collectors, accountants). In fact, Copts are seldom observed among the judiciary, the military, the police, and merchants, but the differences are not statistically significant and the population share of these jobs among Muslims (5 percent) is too small to offset Copts’ over-representation in the mid-low bureaucracy. The advantage of Copts is not limited to white-collar jobs, however, as they are over-represented among artisans (weavers, carpenters, tailors) at 19 percent versus 14 percent among Muslims (p = 0.13) and under-represented among farmers. The results in 1848–1868 are strikingly similar. Copts are more likely to be white-collar workers (as mid-low bureaucrats) or artisans, at 50 percent as opposed to 20 percent among Muslims. They are also less likely to be farmers or unskilled workers, at 50 percent versus 80 percent for Muslims. Even though Muslims are over-represented among professionals, high-level bureaucrats, the judiciary, the military, the police, the clergy, and the rural elites, the combined population share of these jobs (6 percent) is too small to offset Copts’ advantage. Comparing the figures in 641–969 and 1848–1868 indicates that the Coptic-Muslim gaps persisted with respect to most outcomes, although the gaps with respect to mid-low bureaucrats, artisans, and unskilled workers increased significantly.

Table 2 Coptic-Muslim Occupational Differences in 641–969 and 1848–1868

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

*** p < 0.01

** p < 0.05

* p < 0.10

Differences in columns (3), (6), (7), (8), and (9) are estimated from the regression: ${y_{it}} = \sum\nolimits_{l = 1}^2 {{\beta _{1l}}{d_l}} + \sum\nolimits_{l = 1}^2 {{\beta _{2l}}} \left( {cop{t_{it}} \times {d_l}} \right) + {\varepsilon _{it}}$, where y _it is a dummy variable indicating the occupational outcome of individual i in period t(= 641–969 or 1848–1868); d _l are period fixed effects; copt is an indicator variable for being Coptic Christian; ε_it is an error term.

Sources: The APD sample in 641–969 and the 1848–1868 census samples (see the text and Sections B.1 and B.3 in the Online Appendix for details).

A few important notes are in order. First, because of their political or religious nature, the judiciary, the military, the police, the (Muslim) clergy, and the high-level bureaucracy were (mostly) restricted to Muslims by law.Footnote ¹⁵ But since Egyptian Muslims (converts) were under-represented in these jobs vis-à-vis non-Egyptian Muslim elites (Arabs, and later on, Turks), the findings likely underestimate the true Coptic-Muslim SES gap. Second, Eliyahu Ashtor (Reference Ashtor1969) documents that bureaucrats were better paid than artisans and unskilled workers, and hence the occupational gap likely reflected an income gap. Third, Copts’ persistent over-representation in the mid-low bureaucracy and skilled artisanal jobs, and Muslims’ over-representation in trade, are both well documented in history. Circa 1000 ce, Al-Muqaddasi noted that, “scribes in the Levant and Egypt are Christians.” According to Jacques Tagher (Reference Tagher1951, p. 142), “the condition of the Copt did not change during the six centuries preceding [the nineteenth century]… His work, tax collecting, was the basis of his existence and his only hope to accumulate wealth.” Lord Cromer, the British Consul of Egypt in 1883–1908, observed that, “when the English took Egyptian affairs in hand, the accountants in the employment of the Egyptian government were almost exclusively Copts,” (Tagher Reference Tagher1951, p. 213). André Raymond (Reference Raymond1973, pp. 456–59) documents that Copts in eighteenth-century Cairo were over-represented among jewelers, carpenters, tailors, and weavers, which are almost the same set of occupations in which I observe Coptic artisans in both 641–969 and 1848–1868. Muslims, on their part, were over-represented in trade. Under the Mamluks, for example, all merchants of spices were Muslims.

To summarize, the long-term trends are broadly consistent with Propositions 1 and 2. The higher tax rate in 641–1250 triggered a decline in Copts’ population share and the emergence of a Coptic-Muslim SES gap as farmers and unskilled Copts were more likely to convert. Conversions subsided after 1250 with the tax decrease. Being at the country level though, the evidence from the long-term trends is only suggestive.

Empirical Strategy

Poll tax rates varied across districts. Tax papyri in 641–1100 reveal that among the four kuras for which I observe the poll tax, the average tax was lower in the kura of Qahqawa in the south than in the three northern kuras by 25 percent (Figure 4, panel A). I first treat the tax variation as exogenous, and examine its effects using two sets of OLS regressions. The first set examines the effect on Copts’ population share in 1200, 1500, and 1848–1868:

(1) $1200\,{\rm{ and\,1500:}}\,churc{h_{vd}} = {\beta _{10}} + {\beta _{11}}{\tau _d} + {X_d}{\beta _{12}} + {\varepsilon _{1vd}}$

(2) $1800 - 1868{\rm{: }}cop{y_{id}} = {\beta _{20}} + {\beta _{21}}{\tau _d} + {X_d}{\beta _{22}} + {\varepsilon _{2id}},$

while the second set of OLS regressions examines the impact of the poll tax in 641–1100 on the Coptic-Muslim occupational gap in 1848–1868:

(3) $1848 - 1868{\rm{: y}}_{id}^o = {\beta _d} + \beta _{31}^ocop{t_i} + \beta _{20}^o(cop{t_i} \times {\tau _d}) + (cop{t_i} \times {X_d})\beta _{33}^o + \varepsilon _{3id}^o;o = 1,2,3,4,$

where the dependent variable in equation (1), church =1 if village v in district d has at least one Coptic church or monastery in 1200 and 1500. The dependent variable in equation (2), copt =1 if individual i of district of origin d in the 1848–1868 population census samples is Coptic Christian. The dependent variable in equation (3), $y_{id}^o = 1$ if individual i of district d works in occupation o. I estimate equation (3) separately for four occupational outcomes that exhaust the full occupational distribution (defined as in Table 2): white-collar3, artisan, farmer, and unskilled occupations. The main regressor, τ_d =1 if the average poll tax payment in 641–1100 in district d is higher than the cross-district average. The parameters β ₁₀ and β ₂₀ are constant terms, while β_d is a full set of district of origin fixed effects.

Sources: Panel (A) is from poll tax registers and receipts in 641–1100. Panels (B) and (C) are from the 1848–1868 population census samples. See Section B in the Online Appendix for details.

Figure 4 The Spatial Distribution of the Poll Tax, Copts’ Population Share, and the Coptic-Muslim SES Gap

Notes: The Coptic-Muslim SES gap is the difference between Copts and Muslims in the population share of professionals, high-level bureaucrats, and mid-low bureaucrats (white-collar1 =1). The Nile Delta is the northern triangle on the map. The Nile Valley extends from the south of the Nile Delta to Egypt’s southern border with Sudan.

I include in X_d a set of pre-641 district-level controls to account for cross-district heterogeneity that may be correlated with poll tax rates, conversions, and the Coptic-Muslim SES gap. The controls are: (1) the natural logarithm of the urban population in district d circa 300, as a proxy for income; (2) a dummy variable that takes value 1 if district d is believed (according to a Coptic book written around 400 (Mingana Reference Mingana1931)) to have been visited by the Holy Family during its legendary flight to Egypt, as a proxy for religiosity or attachment to Coptic Christianity, but since the book’s date is uncertain it must be interpreted with caution;Footnote ¹⁶ (3) a dummy variable that takes value 1 if district d had at least one autopract estate circa 600, as a proxy for the resistance to Arabs of the Coptic elites; the autopragia was a privilege granted to large landholders in late Byzantine Egypt allowing them to pay taxes directly to the capital and collect taxes in their constituencies; (4) a dummy variable that takes value 1 if there was at least one Byzantine garrison in district d circa 600, as a proxy for Byzantines’ resistance to Arabs (Copts did not hold arms during the Conquest).

Standard errors are clustered at the district level, the level at which I observe the poll tax indicator variable, after mapping kuras in 641–1100 into districts in 1200, 1500, and 1848–1868. Technically, this is a justifiable level of clustering because it is the level at which the treatment (poll tax) is assigned (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, et al. Reference Abadie, Athey, Imbens and Wooldridge2017). However, since the number of districts (clusters) where the poll tax papyri survived is too small, this may bias the standard errors downwards (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller Reference Cameron, Gelbach and Miller2008; Cameron and Miller Reference Cameron and Miller2015). Unfortunately, I am not able to correct for this bias by the adjustments that are suggested in the literature, because the main regressor, the poll tax, does not vary within clusters (districts). But to mitigate this concern, I also report the White-Huber robust standard errors in the village-level regressions in 1200 and 1500 (equation (1)), and the robust standard errors clustered at the finer village level in the individual-level regressions in 1848–1868 (equations (2) and (3)). As predicted by the literature, these alternative standard errors are mostly larger than the ones clustered at the district level, but in most cases the coefficients retain their statistical significance. Furthermore, as a robustness check in Section C in the Online Appendix, I re-estimate all three equations using Arab settlement in 700–969, that is observed for all 42 kuras or 76 districts, as an alternative measure of the poll tax (see Online Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2).

Equations (1), (2), and (3) are direct tests of Propositions 1 and 2. They are equivalent to district-level regressions (weighted by a district’s population) with Copts’ population share being the dependent variable (in equations (1) and (2)), and the Coptic-Muslim difference in the population share of each occupational outcome being the dependent variable (in equation (3)). The thought experiment here is to vary the poll tax across districts and observe the two outcomes, while holding income, religiosity, and resistance to Arabs, constant across districts.

Propositions 1 and 2 make the following predictions. Proposition 1 predicts that β ₁₁ < 0 and β ₂₁ < 0; districts with a higher poll tax will have relatively fewer Copts. As all districts were almost 100 percent Copt in 641, and assuming away cross-district migration, Copts’ population share in 1200, 1500, and 1848–1868 is approximately equal to one minus the share of converts between 641 and each of 1200, 1500, and 1848–1868. The coefficient $\beta _{31}^o$ captures the Coptic-Muslim SES gap in low-tax districts. The model predicts that $\beta _{31}^o \gt 0$ for the white-collar and artisanal outcomes and < 0 for the farmer and unskilled outcomes. Due to the initial positive selection of non-convert Copts in every district, and assuming that the initial selection perpetuated through 1848–1868, Copts in low-tax districts are expected to be over-represented among white-collar workers and artisans and under-represented among farmers and unskilled workers. The coefficient on the interaction term (copt_i×τ_d), $\beta _{32}^o$, captures the impact of the tax on the Coptic-Muslim SES differential. Proposition 2 predicts that $\beta _{32}^o \gt 0$ for the white-collar and artisanal outcomes and < 0 for the farmer and unskilled outcomes. Assuming that the initial selection persisted through 1848–1868, I expect that, compared to Copts in low-tax districts, Copts in high-tax districts are differentially more likely than Muslims to be white-collar workers or artisans and differentially less likely to be farmers or unskilled workers.

Figure 4 maps the average poll tax in 641–1100, and Copts’ population share and the Coptic-Muslim SES gap, both observed in 1848–1868. First, within the 11 districts for which I observe the poll tax, the tax is higher in the north. Second, Copts are a minority in all districts in 1848–1868, but are relatively more concentrated in the Nile Valley. Finally, Copts are more likely than Muslims to be white-collar workers in 41 out of the 49 districts in which there are any Copts, but the gap is larger in districts with a relatively smaller Coptic minority.Footnote ¹⁷

However, it is unlikely that the poll tax was exogenous. The poll tax was assessed and collected by the local authorities of each district, and thus the variation in tax rates may reflect differences across tax administrators in their willingness to enforce the poll tax within their constituencies.Footnote ¹⁸ This introduces two potential sources of endogeneity: (1) reverse causality: tax authorities may have chosen tax rates in 641–1100 in response to conversions and the Coptic-Muslim SES gap within their constituencies, and (2) omitted variables: tax rates may have been impacted by unobserved district-level characteristics that are not captured by the current set of control variables and are correlated with conversions and the Coptic-Muslim SES gap.

To address the potential endogeneity of the poll tax, I employ an IV strategy. As an IV for the poll tax in equations (1) and (2), I use district’s distance to ‘Arish, a town close to Egypt’s northeastern borders that was the first to be captured by Arabs in 639 due to its proximity to the Arab peninsula. Similarly, I use “Copt × Distance to ‘Arish” as an IV for the interaction term in equation (3). The argument is that Arabs were more likely to settle in areas that were closer to ‘Arish. In these areas, the argument goes, Arabs were more likely to replace Coptic local elites as large landholders and headmen (Sijpesteijn Reference Sijpesteijn2009), and hence to impose a higher poll tax rate (or enforce the tax more strictly) on Coptic taxpayers. By contrast, in areas where Arabs did not settle, Coptic elites remained in power and were likely more lenient with their fellow Copts by allowing taxpayers to pay zero or reduced tax and to accumulate tax arrears (Morimoto Reference Morimoto1981). This argument is supported by quantitative and historical evidence. For one, Table D.2 in the Online Appendix reveals that poll tax payments in 641–1100 were, on average, higher in kuras where at least one Arab tribe settled in 700–969. The result holds when I use distance to ‘Arish as an IV for Arab settlement. And Arabs were less likely to settle in districts further away from ‘Arish. For another, tax papyri in 641–1100 indicate that the poll tax rate in the kura of Qahqawa, where Arabs did not settle, was, on average, lower, due to the higher share of its Coptic taxpayers who paid zero poll tax. Indeed, complaints from Egypt’s governor Qurra ibn Sharik (709–715) to Basileios, the (Coptic) headman of Qahqawa, that reached us in the extant papyri may have been motivated by Basileios’ lenient tax policy.

Does the distance to ‘Arish satisfy the exclusion restriction? The proximity to ‘Arish, a small border town, is (arguably) unlikely to be correlated with pre-641 characteristics of districts. Table D.3 shows that urbanization circa 300, religiosity, power of Coptic elites, and Byzantine resistance in a district are all uncorrelated with its distance to ‘Arish.

Findings

Table 3 shows the findings on the impact of the poll tax on conversions in equations (1) and (2). The OLS estimates in Panel 3a indicate that villages located in districts that faced a higher-than-average poll tax in 641–1100 were less likely to have at least one Coptic church or monastery in 1200 and 1500 by 15 and 38 percentage points; approximately, 0.5 and 1.5 standard deviations, respectively. This implies that these districts witnessed relatively more conversions to Islam between 641 and 1200 (and 1500). Similarly, in 1848–1868, individuals who originated in high-tax districts are less likely to be Coptic Christian by about 16 percentage points; approximately, one standard deviation. The IV estimates in Panel 3b confirm the OLS findings.

Table 3 The Poll Tax in 641–1100 and Copts’ Population Share in 1200, 1500, and 1848–1868

Dependent Variable: 1200 and 1500: = 1 if At Least One Coptic Church or Monastery in Village 1848–1868: =1 if Individual is Coptic Christian

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses, and at the village level in brackets. White-Huber robust standard errors are in curly brackets. KP Wald F-Stat in parentheses corresponds to clustering at the district level, in brackets to clustering at the village level, and in curly brackets to White-Huber standard errors.

*** p < 0.01

** p < 0.05

* p < 0.10

A constant is included in all regressions.

Source: 1200 and 1500: Dataset on Christian churches and monasteries in 1200 and 1500; 1848–1868: The population census samples. Data on regressors are from multiple data sources. See Section B in the Online Appendix for details.

Results on the Coptic-Muslim occupational differentials in equation (3) are in Table 4. The OLS estimates in Panel 4a show that, compared to their co-religionists in low-tax districts, Copts in high-tax districts are differentially more likely than Muslims to be white-collar workers and artisans and differentially less likely to be farmers and unskilled workers (the latter effect is statistically insignificant). For example, compared to low-tax districts, the Coptic-Muslim difference in the population share of white-collar workers in high-tax districts is greater by 10 percentage points; approximately, one standard deviation of the cross-district distribution of the Coptic-Muslim white-collar difference. Estimating separate regressions for each occupational category in White-Collar3 (results not shown) reveals that the effect stems from Copts’ higher over-representation among mid-low bureaucrats in high-tax districts. The IV estimates in Panel 4b confirm the OLS estimates.

Table 4 The Poll Tax in 641–1100 and The Coptic-Muslim Occupational Differences in 1848–1868

Dependent Variable Indicated on Top of Each Column

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses, and at the village level in brackets. KP Wald F-Stat in parentheses corresponds to clustering at the district level, and in brackets to clustering at the village level. Copt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual i is Coptic Christian. Poll tax is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the average poll tax payment in 641–1100 in district d is above average.

*** p < 0.01

** p < 0.05

* p < 0.10

Source: The 1848–1868 population census samples combined with multiple data sources. See Section B in the Online Appendix for details.

Overall, the results suggest that, compared to Copts in low-tax districts, Copts in high-tax districts were relatively fewer in 1200, 1500, and 1848–1868, but differentially better off in 1848–1868. Put differently, there was an initial positive selection of non-convert Copts on SES between 641 and 1200, the extent of which varied across districts due to the cross-district variation in the poll tax during this period. The initial selection persisted at the district level through 1500 and 1848–1868.

Theories of Decline in Copts’ Population Share

There are two sets of explanations for why Copts shrank into a minority between 641 and 1897: the first traces Egypt’s Islamization to demographic factors, whereas the second emphasizes Copts’ conversion to Islam. Strictly speaking, three demographic processes could have driven Islamization in the absence of conversions (Fargues Reference Fargues2001): population replacement via Muslims’ immigration or Copts’ emigration; Muslims’ higher birth and/or lower death rates; and intermarriage between Coptic females and Muslim males (opposite scenario is prohibited) without pre-marriage conversion, which results by law in a Muslim offspring.Footnote ²⁴ These processes, I argue, are not the main causes of Islamization. On the one hand, Arab immigration, the largest Muslim immigration wave in Egypt’s history, was small compared to Copts’ population. In 641, Egypt’s population (2.7 millions) was three times that of the Arab peninsula (1 million) (Russell Reference Russell1958, p. 89). Josiah Russell (Reference Russell1966) estimates the number of Arab immigrants in 650 at 100,000. Arab immigration subsided after 833 with the shift to slave armies and the stoppage of state stipends to Arabs. On the other hand, Copts rarely emigrated from Egypt because of their unique denomination that differed from Catholics and Greek Orthodox Christians. Next, I consider differences in fertility and mortality. As the 1848–1868 censuses predate the demographic transition, they provide a glimpse of the demographics of medieval Egypt. The samples suggest that within male household heads, Copts had, on average, more children than Muslims (1.48 versus 1.35, p = 0.003). In addition, Copts had higher mortality at younger ages (10–29 or 10–39), but lower mortality at older ages (30–79 or 40–79) (Table D.4).Footnote ²⁵ This implies that Muslims did not have higher fertility or lower mortality than Copts. Finally, cross-marriages (without pre-marriage conversion) were rare as suggested by the dearth of cross-marriage contracts in the papyri in 641–969. The 1848–1868 samples record only two cross-marriages.

But even if Egypt’s Islamization was mostly driven by Copts’ conversion to Islam, there are alternative explanations of the conversion process other than the tax system. To begin with, an old thesis traces Copts’ conversion to the violent suppression of Copts’ tax revolts in 726–866. This theory does not fully account for the findings, though. For one, it is not obvious why poor Copts were more likely to convert, since both rich and poor Copts revolted. For another, Online Appendix Table D.5 shows that almost all tax revolts were in the Nile Delta. Since the districts where I observe the poll tax are in the Nile Valley, where almost no revolts took place, it is unlikely that the cross-district variation in conversion is driven by the revolts. Another thesis traces Copts’ conversion to state persecution or anti-Coptic riots. Two early persecution waves took place in 847–861 and 996–1021, but the third wave in 1250–1517 was the largest and the most violent. Although persecution may indeed explain part of the decline in Copts’ population share (especially between 1200 and 1500), it does not fully explain the findings. Again, it is not clear why persecution or riots would target poor Copts. Furthermore, the list of churches and monasteries in Al-Maqrizi (Reference Al-Maqrizi and Sayyid2002 [1500]) allows me to calculate the number of Coptic churches that were burned in each province in the anti-Coptic riots of 1321, one of the most violent riots during that period. Out of the 35 churches that were burned, 17 were located in urban Egypt, 8 in the Nile Delta, and only 6 in the Nile Valley. None of the Nile Valley churches were located within the 11 districts for which I observe the poll tax. A third hypothesis traces conversions to Copts’ desire to access top state posts that were confined to Muslims. But this theory is insufficient because the population share of these posts was too small to shift the Coptic-Muslim SES gap in favor of Muslims (Table 2). And, if anything, this mechanism would have actually mitigated the Coptic-Muslim SES gap. Finally, conversions may have occurred due to a true belief in Islam, but again it is not obvious why poor Copts were more likely to convert since Coptic Christianity was, like Islam, attractive to the poor. After all, it was Coptic Christianity that attracted Egypt’s poor masses, and induced them to resist the Byzantines’ persecution to convert to the (elite) Melkite church between 451 and 641. Moreover, this theory does not explain why conversions among the poor were more widespread in high-tax districts.

Theories of Formation of the Coptic-Muslim SES Gap

One explanation for the emergence of Copts’ economic advantage over Muslims that differs from tax-induced self-selected conversions is that Egypt’s rulers may have preferred to recruit Copts in the bureaucracy. For one, Copts were more likely than Muslims to cooperate with rulers whose doctrine differed from that of Egypt’s Muslim (Sunni) population. A famous example here is the Fatimids (969–1171), who were Ismaili Shiites and preferred to recruit non-Muslims in top state posts. For another, Copts were perhaps better candidates to fill the local bureaucracies of districts with relatively larger Muslim populations, because as Copts lacked local support bases in these districts, they were less likely to rebel or support Muslim rebels. This mechanism is unlikely to fully explain the Coptic-Muslim SES gap, though. Copts’ SES advantage did not stem from top state posts, but from mid-low bureaucracy and artisanship where rulers’ preferences played less of a role. And even in local rural bureaucracies, Copts rarely reached top posts that would have allowed them to lead (or subdue) rebellions. Indeed, Online Appendix Table D.7 shows that the share of Copts in the bureaucracy was, if anything, increasing in Copts’ population share, controlling for the bureaucracy size; districts with larger Coptic populations filled their bureaucracies with more Copts. This suggests that rulers filled local bureaucracies with qualified personnel regardless of their religion.

Another set of explanations of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap emphasizes Western Europe’s influence in Egypt starting from 1800. Charles Issawi (Reference Issawi1981) and Timur Kuran (Reference Kuran2004a) postulated that the privilege of non-Muslim minorities emerged in the nineteenth century because Europeans favored non-Muslims or because non-Muslims adopted European legal structures. The role of the expansion of European schools in the rise of Egypt’s non-Muslim minorities has also been explored (Salama Reference Salama1963; Abecassis Reference Abecassis2000). But although these theories may indeed account for part of the SES advantage of non-Coptic Christians and Jews and for the (possibly) widening SES gap between Copts and Muslims after 1850, they do not fully account for the findings. They do not explain why the Coptic-Muslim SES gap emerged by 969, long before the rise of Europe. Furthermore, the 1848–1868 censuses record the “protégé” status that individuals purchased from European consulates in return for having access to European legal structures. Table D.6 reveals that the share of protégés was negligible (<1 percent) among Muslims and Copts in both 1848 and 1868. Protégés were only sizable among non-Coptic Christians (17–26 percent) and Jews (8–10 percent); the two groups constituted only 6 percent of non-Muslims in Egypt and were mostly urban. These differences are likely due to occupational specialization. While non-Coptic Christians and Jews excelled in commerce; a profession that involved transactions with Europeans where access to European laws mattered, Copts’ advantage stemmed from artisanship and bureaucracy where European laws had less of an influence.

Finally, as Jews’ economic advantage has often been explained by the ban on Jews from practicing certain jobs such as farming, one might extrapolate this explanation to Copts. Yet, Copts were not banned from farming; one third of adult employed male Copts in 1848–1868 were farmers. If anything, Copts were banned from high-level bureaucracy, military, police, judiciary, and clergy, which likely mitigated the gap.

Theories of Persistence of the Coptic-Muslim SES Gap

If SES and (genetic) ability are positively correlated, the positive selection on SES of non-convert Copts will imply selection on ability. The persistence of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap may thus be attributable to the persistence of ability differentials. Although I cannot rule out this explanation given that we lack genetic evidence on ability differences between Copts and Muslims, I argue that it is unlikely to account for persistence because it relies on assumptions that have limited support from history. First, historical evidence on group restrictions on apprenticeships suggests that SES in medieval Egypt was at most weakly correlated with ability. Furthermore, the fact that the SES gap declined in the late twentieth century with the expansion of mass modern education, that relaxed group control over access to (white-collar) skills, implies that ability differences, if any, were less influential. Second, even if there were initial ability differences, they are unlikely to persist for over a millennium unless we assume within-group selected marriages on ability. Strictly speaking, both endogamy and successive selected conversions on ability (due to, say, the continuous imposition of the poll tax until 1856 and idiosyncratic shocks to ability) are insufficient to generate persistence. This is because, unlike Jews and non-Coptic Christians who were homogeneously rich, mostly urban, elites, Copts were much more heterogeneous on SES (ability). This heterogeneity was possibly the result of cross-district differences in the poll tax, and the fact that the selection effect of the poll tax was conditional on religiosity. Consequently, even under endogamy and repeated selected conversions, since poor Copts likely had the same ability as poor converts, the possibility of marriages between rich and poor Copts would lead Copts’ ability to regress to the population mean. Third, even if we assume within-group selected marriages on ability, these do not explain why Copts did not disappear given that there were likely idiosyncratic shocks to ability leading to new conversions in every generation.Footnote ²⁶ Finally, ability differences do not explain why Copts and Muslims persisted in specific occupations (and not merely that Copts maintained a higher SES).

Apart from genetics, persistence of inter-group SES inequality can also be attributed to intergenerational transmission of cultural differences. Following Botticini and Eckstein (Reference Botticini and Eckstein2005), one can argue that Coptic Christianity, like Rabbinic Judaism, encouraged the accumulation of human capital which pushed Copts with a lower preference for education to convert. This theory is unlikely to hold though as there is no literacy requirement under Coptic Christianity and illiteracy among adult male Copts in 1986 was 34 percent. Furthermore, Coptic schools were purely religious in 641 when conversions started and their shift towards teaching secular subjects by 1700 was possibly a result of selected conversions on SES. Another cultural explanation is due to Weber (Reference Weber and Parsons1905), who explained Protestants’ SES advantage by their work ethic. Yet, Coptic Christianity shared with the Egyptian Muslim Sufi culture a mystic outlook on life that attributed materialistic success to metaphysical factors rather than to hard work. Moreover, the fact that Copts’ advantage stemmed from bureaucracy and artisanship, and not from commerce, indicates that Coptic Christianity was not more conducive to Capitalism than Islam.

Data Replication Notice

The data from the 1848 and 1868 population census samples are to be used for replication purposes only. Using the 1848 and 1868 census samples for research requires the consent of the author.