Emotions play an important role in cognition and have a significant and all too often neglected influence on (international) law-making processes. Fear, in particular, can be a driver of reasoning and decision-making. Fear of terrorism / immigrants / health threats / food contamination / environmental hazards – to give a few notable examples – influences the perception of risks associated with these issues and consequently impacts international policy- and law-making. International law rules and doctrines are often adopted – if not overtly justified – on the basis of fear and other emotions. This article aims to explore how fear – as both an individual and collective emotion – may affect decision-making processes, be determinative of normative outcomes, and shape security policies at the domestic and international levels. This approach deviates from traditional rationalist understandings of law and emphasizes the role of emotions in apprehending the nature and functioning of legal processes. Hopefully, this exploration will open up interesting avenues for further research on the role of emotions in international legal processes.

This article uses the metaphor of the hall of mirrors to produce three distinct images of the international lawyer. The hall of mirrors refers here to the extent to which international legal discourses are built on self-referential mechanisms tantamount to mutually reflecting mirrors, by virtue of which movements and postures are reproduced ad infinitum without disclosing the origin thereof. According to the first image produced by virtue of the metaphor, the international lawyer feels invincible and fully makes use of the hall of mirrors to allow international legal discourses to obscure their origins and thrive in foundationlessness. The second image depicts a vulnerable international lawyer who is deprived of self-referential mechanisms for the production of international legal discourses because the mirrors have been shattered or the light turned off or simply because she has closed her eyes. The third image is that of a self-reflective international lawyer who is neither invincible nor vulnerable but consciously standing between the mutually reflecting mirrors wearing fissured spectacles and with no intention to smash the mirror, turn off the light or close her eyes. By developing these three distinct images, this article sheds light on how the contingency of legal doctrines, modes of legal reasoning and legal categories is experienced by international lawyers.

This article discusses the law and practice of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a little-known but important international organization. The article aims to illuminate what it is the IOM does; how it influences its member state practices while simultaneously working on member state assignments; and how this affects the dominant theory underpinning the law of international organizations, i.e., the theory of functionalism. The article concludes that the IOM takes functionalist thought to extremes, and in doing so makes visible the latter’s ideological nature.

The quest for universality in international economic law has met many obstacles. This article begins from the proposition that there are various ways to conceive of universality in international law, for example whether the rules are accepted widely among states (omnipresence) or whether they are broadly coherent (generality). Homing in on trade and investment law, the article assesses how each of these areas has functioned as a testing ground for these different conceptions. An in-built quasi-universality characterizes international trade law with the WTO as a seemingly centralized universal institution. Such universality, however, has often been achieved through differentiation of rights and obligations (e.g., the Enabling Clause and regional trade agreements). In investment law, attempts at universalization through the construction of centralized institutions have failed. Nevertheless, certain common standards have emerged in this fragmented regime. There is also a debate around the use of the MFN clause as a universalizing tool and renewed efforts to universalize investment law are afoot. More generally, it is clear that there is little appetite for codification of international economic law, and that states wish to control its content through the conclusion of treaties. In the final analysis, this article asks whether it is time to conceive of universality differently, and particularly whether equity and collective preferences should be a more central part of the quest.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) governed Iraq from 2003 following Resolution 1483 of the UN Security Council. This Resolution affirmed that Iraq was in a state of occupation and that there were occupying powers. The Resolution referred to the United States of America and the United Kingdom as ‘occupying powers under the unified command of the “Authority”’, the ‘Authority’ being the CPA. However, the legal status of the CPA and its relationship to the US (the focus of this article) is not entirely clear, both under US domestic law and international law. This lack of clarity could have significant implications for the US’s responsibility for the CPA’s conduct. As with private military companies, a CPA-style administration of territory could become a tool for states to quarantine their risk under the law of occupation. This article contends that the theory of occupation by proxy may help clarify the legal status of the CPA and its relationship to the US and could assist in closing the identified gap in responsibility. To support this argument, this article establishes a legal framework for the theory of occupation by proxy which is then applied to the CPA and US.

This article illustrates the power of discourse in free trade agreement (FTA) negotiation, elucidating the concept from the perspective of a country’s abilities of rule control, rule assimilation and rule contestation. To enhance rule control, the G2 (the US and EU) have chosen their FTA partners, designed the FTA rules, and offered offensive-defensive exchange strategically. They have approached weak or trade-dependent parties first in FTA negotiation, innovated new rules to accelerate FTA negotiation, skillfully constructed intentional ambiguity and exemptions to remove rule discrepancies and made offensive-defensive exchange with their negotiating parties. Some of these strategies have been copied by China although in a different way. Further, a template approach for negotiating an FTA and exporting domestic laws and normative values to others contributes to the G2’s rule assimilation. A de facto FTA template has also been established by China recently, but its legal culture and political stance have led it to sign incomplete contracts and tolerate rule differences with its negotiating parties instead of transposition of domestic law. In facing the rival rules adopted by their competitors, the G2 have incorporated counteractive rules in their FTAs with their competitors’ close trading nations. China has also contested rules treating China as a non-market economy in its FTAs, but its stance toward state-owned enterprises (SOE) disciplines and rules forbidding forced technology transfer is milder due to its lack of experience in dealing with unfavourable rules.

The sheer amount of non-state participation in the creation of the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) is surely noteworthy. The aim of the Bank’s consultation was to get ‘global’ input and feedback, and with over 8,000 stakeholders from over 63 countries taking part, it is laudable. The extent of the participation challenges the positivist approach to international law-making, which views only states as having the power to make law and raises questions about how to legitimize such international soft-law making. Legitimacy is entangled with democracy, as scholars debate whether democracy is the required benchmark for decision-making processes at international organizations. This article uses deliberative democracy to analyse the ESF consultation process. Whilst, democratic legitimacy has been interpreted to mean inclusivity and participation, deliberative democracy raises a series of hard questions about equality and power that scholarship on global governance needs to grapple with. Although this participatory process at the World Bank challenges traditional narratives in international law, analysing it through a lens of deliberative democracy exposes the work that still needs to be done to discuss democracy in international decision-making.

While civil society groups have been urging the World Bank to integrate human rights concepts into its policies, borrower countries have increasingly made the case for flexibility and deference to domestic standards in the implementation of bank-funded projects. This article analyses how the World Bank has navigated these conflicting legitimacy demands in the context of its 2016 Environmental and Social Framework (ESF). Drawing on insights from organizational sociology, we focus on practices of decoupling, which allow organizations to correspond to legitimacy demands by different audiences while not having to substantially adjust their core activities. The labour and indigenous peoples’ safeguards serve as cases in point. Specifically, the article argues that the Bank has decoupled its discourse concerning the ESF from the framework’s actual content by making statements about the ESF’s coherence with key human rights concepts which, upon closer scrutiny, do not fully correspond to its actual requirements. The article also shows how the design of the ESF furthers a decoupling of relevant requirements from its actual implementation. In particular, the confined scope ratione personae of the relevant safeguards and the discretion granted to the Bank’s staff and the borrower to add meaning to undefined key concepts may render their human rights-related requirements in a number of cases inconsequential. By and large, the decoupling practices identified regarding the Bank’s ESF entail problematic effects for the normativity of relevant human rights concepts and may, in the long run, undermine the Bank’s legitimacy as a whole.

The World Bank has reviewed its environmental and social policies at a moment of intense production of international instruments dealing with land tenure, all of which take the form of soft law. This endeavour is motivated by the progressive acknowledgement of the importance of secure and equitable access to land for the realization of human rights and food security. The latest contribution of the World Bank to this debate is of great significance. This article aims to unveil the effects that the new Environmental and Social Framework is likely to generate in this context. It analyses the protection of access to land and security of tenure contained in the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Standards in light of the developments occurring at the international level. To this end, the article reviews the changes to the standards in the context of the social impacts when a lending project affects land holders or users directly or indirectly; addresses the mechanisms for protecting, compensating and improving livelihood opportunities for those affected by the projects; and comments on the safeguarding of indigenous peoples’ lands. The article finds that the World Bank, by incorporating some of these emerging standards, has confirmed the relevance of emerging principles and guidelines on land, even if they are contained in non-binding instruments. On a critical note, the article recognizes the refusal of the World Bank to adopt the underlying discourse and fully embrace human rights achievements in the context of land issues.

This is a study of three authoritative instruments that promote a common idea: economic activities and development should be conducted with respect for human rights. The World Bank Framework, the International Financial Corporation Performance Standards and the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights are examined to get clarity on how human rights risk management differs from more conventional management approaches. The focus here is on prevention of human rights impacts. Do the three instruments employ approaches adequate for handling human rights risks? To understand prevention, one needs to reflect on what makes human rights a particular type of impact and account for the regulatory context of protecting human rights transnationally. The analysis identifies four ‘offsets’ through which economic decision-makers can distort their human rights performance and place causal observers at a disadvantage. Prevention becomes an issue of how to relate to ‘residual impacts’ on human rights. This article finds that the ‘hierarchy or mitigation’ and even ‘human rights due diligence’ under illuminate the challenge. The proposal here is to add ‘reduction at source’ as a parameter of human rights risk management. The sources for this analysis are the three instruments, and the practice of implementing organizations, particularly IFC projects, CAO cases, impact assessments, and CSR reports. In conclusion, the potential for cross-fertilization among instruments is genuine. Increased clarity on prevention of human rights impacts should assist economic decision-makers in their risk management task and casual observers in assessing their performance.

This article analyses the World Bank’s environmental and social Safeguards against the backdrop of changing paradigms of global legal order. In January 2017, a new ‘Environmental and Social Framework’ (ESF) entered into force and replaced older ‘Safeguard Policies’ that had incrementally emerged since the 1980s in response to harmful impacts of investment projects financed by the Bank. The Safeguards reform epitomizes the changing structures and geopolitical shifts that shape international law in the twenty-first century and provides a fascinating looking glass on the evolution of global order since the end of the cold war. In this perspective, we see the first generation of Safeguards, introduced since the late 1980s, as an element of incremental legalization in the emerging global governance regime, a regime characterized by unipolar multilateralism and geopolitical dominance of ‘the West’. The 2016 reform not only reflects the increased politicization of global governance by civil society but also the emergence of a more competitive multilateralism, characterized by counter-institutionalization on the part of emerging powers like China. A comparison of the old and new Safeguards thus allows us to analyse different forms of contestation and resulting normative evolution in the key area of global governance of development and finance.

Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice attributes limited legal authority to judicial and arbitral decisions. They are not formal sources of law and are described as only subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. However, the continuing validity of this characterization is challenged not only by the Court’s practice of referring to its own jurisprudence, a phenomenon that has been empirically and theoretically analysed elsewhere, but also its relatively new practice of relying on external case law. This article seeks to draw attention to one aspect of this new practice, namely the marked increase in the Court’s citation of inter-state arbitral awards since the 1990s. It is argued that the Court refers to inter-state arbitral awards in its decisions for three principal reasons – (i) to determine the existence of a given rule, (ii) to supplement its legal reasoning or its own case law on a particular issue, and (iii) to distinguish an arbitral award from the case before it. More ambitiously, the article argues that the way the Court relies on inter-state arbitral awards shows that the Court attributes legal authority to these awards that goes beyond that of a subsidiary means for determining a given rule of law, bringing it closer to what might be qualified as persuasive but non-binding precedent.

The International Criminal Court is empowered by its constituent instrument to request its states parties to identify, trace, freeze, and seize assets ‘after a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued … having due regard to the strength of the evidence and the rights of the parties concerned’. This article critically examines the approach adopted by the Court to requesting such protective measures at the pre-trial phase, reflecting on how the rights and interests of the primary stakeholders implicated by this process: (i) accused persons, (ii) the Prosecutor, (iii) victims, and (iv) bona fide third parties, are safeguarded and balanced.