The processes of democratisation and liberalisation initiated during the course of the Indonesian Reformasi era (1998-) generated a stronger porosity in the State's frontiers and led to the formation of certain semi-institutionalised organisations. The approaching 2019 presidential elections have enabled these organisations to position themselves as political and moral brokers. The Islamic Defenders Front militia (FPI) appears to be one of the main actors in this process. It has succeeded in imposing itself in the public sphere, channelling political support and utilising extensive media coverage.

While avoiding providing direct opposition to the ruling government and the Constitution, this organisation promotes the social morals followed by a large part of the population and encourages radicalism and violent actions in the name of Islam. The organisation collaborates with a section of the regional and national political elites, some sections of the army and police, several groups that are—more or less—criminal in nature, a number of local communities in different areas, and a variety of violent Islamist groups. Thus, it is at the crossroads of multiple political, economic, social, and religious interests.

At the same time, the organisation's leaders maintain their own political objectives. They manipulate the dynamics of the electoral decentralised system to their advantage by obtaining political concessions that serve their personal goals. The capacity of the organisation to impose its discourse on the public stage has led to an urgent need to interrogate both the institutional and ideological transformations initiated by the Indonesian decentralisation since 1999.

In 1881, the southern Philippine archipelago of Sulu was plunged into an extended contest for the succession to its sultanate. With only a tentative peace established by 1894, tensions remained volatile between the districts of Patikul, Parang, Luuk, and Maimbung on the main island of Jolo. These tensions straddled coincided with the transition of the colonial regimes from the Spanish to the US regime in 1899. Therefore, the events of the early years of American rule, most often understood in the context of the American arrival and Spanish departure, were in fact intertwined with the prevailing conflict and rivalry between local candidates vying for the sultanate

This paper discusses the year 1905 as an educational watershed in colonial Vietnam. It focuses on the development of student mobility that transcended colonial and imperial boundaries and gave new momentum to educational training on a transnational scale. In the mid-1900s, the anti-colonial mandarin Phan Bội Châu launched a new nationalist movement called Đông Du, meaning ‘Going East.’ It centred on sending young men to Japan via Hong Kong to train them as effective anti-French activists. These students came from Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina and enrolled in a variety of curricula. Although this initiative collapsed in the late 1900s, it remained a watershed. Regional mobility did not disappear afterwards but mostly redirected itself towards China. This paper brings a great diversity of material face-to-face, including governmental archives and biographies, and challenges the colonial-based vision of Vietnamese education by highlighting its regional dimension, from the early twentieth century to the outset of the Second World War.

The role of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council) in influencing the construction of democracy through its fatwas has fluctuated since its establishment in 1975. During the Suharto regime, which was characterised by authoritarian national leadership, MUI fatwas tended to serve the interests of the regime. Since the reform era, they have stimulated undemocratic circumstances in Indonesian Islam. This article examines MUI fatwas and their influence on democracy in the context of Indonesian Islam. The main argument of this article is that fatwas in themselves can improve or worsen the implementation of democracy. Fatwas may impede democracy if their contents are not aligned with democratic principles, while they may support the development of democracy if their contents promote democracy. Rising conservatism in Indonesia has been influenced by the issuance of fatwas that do not promote democratic values. In addition to examining the roles of fatwa givers and the methodology of fatwa issuance, this article analyses the social and political circumstances driving their issuance. This article presents examples of MUI fatwas that have democratic and undemocratic characteristics. It concludes that democratic circumstances can be achieved through opening spaces for fatwa issuance among additional fatwa institutions in Indonesia, as the monopolisation of fatwa issuance has created undemocratic tendencies in Indonesian Islam.

In 1913, a new generation of Indonesians asserted their agency by publicly demanding equality in colonial society. Through four case studies—the prohibition of traditional forms of deference, the sudden popularity of Western dress, the adoption of new legal assimilation guidelines for Indonesians, and the discussion of employee rights at a railway company—we argue that this new assertiveness reflected a broad change in mentality that we consider a turning point in Indonesian history. By focusing on Indonesian agency, we challenge the Eurocentric periodization of the Indonesian past that emphasized WWI as a trigger of change.

The successful ‘Defending Islam’ rallies of 2016–2017 provide clear evidence that Islamism is on the rise in contemporary Indonesia. Mainstream Islamic authorities, including groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, are increasingly losing their authority to newer, more conservative Islamic preachers and groups. What explains this phenomenon – and what does it mean for the moderate perspectives that many predicted would dominate Islam in Indonesia in the post-Reformasi era?

This article argues that three main mechanisms can explain the rise of Islamism in Indonesia: 1) the creation of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ in post-Reformasi Indonesia and the way in which this marketplace has contributed to the rise of Islamism and the breakdown of Islamic authority; 2) the ascent of new Islamic authority figures, who propagate their views using new methods, ranging from social media to campus da'wa organisations and community-based activities (majelis taklim); and 3) the growing influence of new Islamic groups and preachers, who are building alliances with established religious elites and politicians. Such alliances strengthen the influence of new Islamic authorities, while further marginalising religious minorities, such as Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims.

An increasing number of reports and studies on offenses against religious minorities has been published in Indonesia since the country's democratic transition in 1998. While the literature on intolerance unveils the young democracy's institutional problems which have undermined and eroded minority rights, such as direct elections and the lack of judicial independence, it leaves many critical questions to address. Although the number of victims of religious intolerance increased, in the same institutional settings, a large number of religious minorities has managed to prevent escalating violence and avoid being targeted by intolerant groups. Under what circumstances and how do minorities deter attacks in a time of heightened tension against them under a democratic system that has afforded them little protection? This article sheds light on the case of the Shi'a who suffered a series of attacks in Sampang, Madura in the East Java province, but have since gradually developed resilience. A series of attacks in Sampang in 2011–12 was one of the most destructive events against religious minorities in Indonesia. Examining the Sampang incidents, this article argues that if the religious minority can develop a cohesive network with elements of the majority capable of mobilising state power, it would build a safety net preventing attacks by intolerant groups. Thus, this article aims to develop our understanding of how religious minorities address violence caused by hostile socio-political forces and adapt to Indonesia's democracy.

In 2013, a group of British aviation archaeologists began excavating in Myanmar in search of some 140 mint-condition crated Royal Air Force (RAF) Spitfire Mk XIV aircraft. According to their story, at the end of the Second World War, Allied forces in Burma were left with these unassembled aircraft. Without the funds to send them home, but unwilling to let the planes fall into enemy hands, they buried the crated planes in Mingaladon, Meiktila and Myitkyina. Like legends of pirate treasure, the story of these buried Spitfires carries with it fantastic aura and intrigue. For aviation fans, the pirate's gold is an iconic aircraft, meaningful in patriotic narratives for its role in the Battle of Britain. This paper will discuss this story as a form of military history folklore which is stoked by the orientalist perception that Burma/Myanmar's decades of military regimes and purported isolation indirectly ‘“preserved” the crated aircraft in time. As this paper will demonstrate, Burmese and others in Southeast Asia have their own legends of buried war materiel and treasure. This point, though largely lost on British aviation enthusiasts in their quest for their Spitfire ‘holy grail’, nevertheless crucially enabled their quest to manifest itself.

In Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia, being Malay usually means being a practitioner of Islam and a speaker of standard Bahasa. However, such understandings no longer comprehend other members of the so-called brown-skinned race who were once united with the Malay aggrupation: numerous Filipinos (and East Timorese), who inhabit the same broad geopolitical region. Challenging the recent narrowly defined conceptions of who is, or was Malay, this study recalls an inclusive borderless understanding acquired in antiquity by the Filipino nation, whose peoples were considered by Spanish and American colonisers and educated by their government to consider themselves as part of a pre-modern “Malay” world. Geohistorical evidence shows how such auto-consciousness evolved and preceded the entry of the term into the nearby British colonisers’ lexicon, before its social-reconstruction for the perpetuation of post-colonial polities as well. The author interweaves his textual survey with the problematisation of the location of ethnicity, and points out the seemingly neglected corpus of Iberian works that demonstrate how the knowledge of Malayness could only have been approached by Europeans from a geographic periphery, of which the Philippine archipelago was very much a part, especially the Mindanao area. The author builds on and constructively critiques work by one scholar who had initiated the claims of the Filipino to Malayness. It is shown how sociocultural and geopolitical priorities can help or hinder the relaxation of definitions of who is Malay and where Malays are properly situated, if only because these counter perceptual rigidities, and allow the creation of hybrid third spaces that admit new possibilities of coexistence.

Indonesian women were at the forefront of activism during the turbulent period prior to reformasi and were a part of the leadership that demanded democratic change. Two decades after Indonesia embarked on democratic reforms, the country continues to face challenges on socio-religious and political fronts. Both the rise of political Islam and the increased presence of religion and faith in the public sphere are among the key features of Indonesia's consolidating democracy. This development has reinvigorated the discourse on citizenship and rights and also the historical debate over the relationship between religion and the state. Bearing this in mind, this paper looks at the narrative of women's rights and women's status in the public domain and public policy in Indonesia. It is evident, especially in the past decade, that much of the public conversation within the religious framework is increasingly centred on women's traditional social roles. This fact has motivated this study. Several norms and ideas that are relied on are based on cultural and faith-based interpretations - of gender. Therefore, this paper specifically examines examples of the ways in which social, legal, and political trends in this context affect progress with respect to gender equality and gender policy. I argue that these trends are attempts to subject women to conservative religious doctrines and to confine them to traditional gender roles. The article discusses how these developments should be seen in the context of the democratic transition in Indonesia.

Drawing on new archival evidence, this paper focuses on the origins of Vietnam's foreign economic policy of 1986, better known as doi moi (renovation). The existing scholarship contends that doi moi ideas emerged amid Vietnam's socio-economic crisis during the late 1970s through a bottom-up process of market-oriented activities by local authorities. I argue, however, that these scholars overlooked the early ideas of economically engaging the West to obtain advanced technology to raise the Vietnamese products’ quality, and therefore, their competitiveness in the socialist bloc. Following the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, Vietnamese diplomats-turned reformists studied the role of western technology and capital investment in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Politburo entrusted Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, a senior advisor to Hanoi's chief negotiator Le Duc Tho in Paris, to conduct a series of clandestine studies on the role of western technology in economic relations between East and West. Thach's learning about the West's technological revolution led them to the shocking conclusion that the Soviet bloc was at least a decade behind the West in technological development. The fear of Vietnam being trapped in economic backwardness propelled these reformers to advocate bold ideas of economically engaging the West in the post-Vietnam War era to extract advanced technology to support post-war economic development and modernisation. However, it took an economic crisis (1977–78), followed by another costly two-front war against Cambodia and China between 1979 and 1985, for reformist Nguyen Co Thach's ideas to prevail over the conservative faction's military-first policy.