Stimulated by the publications of Moreland and Blagden who have both discussed the institution of the Shahbandar, this paper presents the results of some further research on this subject. It gives special attention to some specific points, such as the origin of the institution in the Archipelago and the functions of the Shahbandar from the view-point of international relations, i.e. his dealings with foreigners and foreign powers.

It is unfortunate that historians, as a rule, do not follow the example of social anthropologists in devoting some part of their monographs to a discussion of the theoretical problems involved in the material they have been handling. This is not of such importance in the history of Europe, where much can be taken for granted on the part of the reader. But when the European historian turns to the study of Asian history, and writes in the same way as he would were he writing the history of a European people, merely substituting an Asian set of names and places, then the result frequently lacks interest, and may even be a distortion of the general picture of the past that he wishes to relate.

Relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands have shown a rancour on the Indonesian side, and en obduracy on the part of the Netherlands, unparallelled in the relations between any other ex-colony and its former imperial master. The bitterness of Indian nationalists has dissipated itself into a reverence for things English above all others, whilst the French attitude in Indo-China, similar in many ways to that of the Dutch in the Indies, and the fighting in the Indo-Chinese war, far heavier than those of the Netherlands military actions in 1948 and 1949, have still left the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos with warrior feelings for France than the Indonesian government has for the Netherlands.

In their declining decades colonialists all but universally produced a series of attitudes and a set of administrative schemes which would have been incomprehensible to earlier, more robust imperial rulers. These views end actions, apparently typical of moribund colonialism, are generally labeled humanitarian. A multiplicity of interpretations can be offered to explain the phenomena to be observed in virtually all colonies in the final and rather confusing years before national freedom is won.

The development of the Indonesian party system in the first quarter of this century can be traced to various factors. The defeat of Russia by Japan started a chain of now ideas in Asian minds which finally led to the overthrow of the European powers in Asia. But this event in isolation could not have achieved much. The overthrow of the Manchu Empire in China in 1911 by the Chinese nationalist revolutionaries under the leadership of Sun Yet Sen, created a new national consciousness among the Chinese in Indonesia, and Indonesian nationalism partly owes its origin to reaction against-this new-born nationalism among overseas Chinese in Indonesia.

The two administrative units of Sumatra with which this paper is concerned are East Sumatra, stretching along the Strait of Malacca, and North Tapanuli, extending from the mountainous interior around Lake Tobe to the Indian Ocean.

It is generally accepted that history is an element of culture and the historian a member of society, thus, in Croce's aphorism, that the only true history is contemporary history. It follows from this that when there occur great changes in the contemporary scene, there must also be great changes in historiography, that the vision not merely of the present but also of the past must change.