The Nigerian situation of 1967-70 and the India-Pakistan conflict of 1971 should ensure that we do not ignore lightly the need for an adequate international response in cases of man-made disasters. The latter, in particular, involved serious international complications. Since March 1971, when the flow of Pakistani refugees from East Pakistan into India began, the Indian government called for international help to stem the tide, to feed the hungry hordes, and to make possible their return home. As time passed and the help did not come, to some it seemed almost a matter of simple economics — it was cheaper to go to war than to continue caring for the refugees. Granted the history of confrontation between the two sides, it is clear that the primary catalyst for the war of 1971 was the plight of these refugees. This danger of serious conflict resulting from humanitarian need is one of the main reasons for the increasing attention being paid to the problems of international humanitarian relief in cases of man-made disasters.

In 1967 the Yearbook published a comment by me on ECOSOC Resolution 1237 (XLII) of June 6, 1967. In that resolution the Economic and Social Council recommended to the General Assembly the creation of the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The comment referred to concluded with the opinion that Resolution 1237 (XLII) provided an adequate basis on which the General Assembly might appropriately proceed to establish the Office; it expressed the view that this resolution would eventually be adopted and that the proposed High Commissioner would become an important personality in the United Nations programme for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Depuis qu’il y a des hommes, ils échangent entre eux les produits de la terre et ceux de leur travail, pour vivre et pour mieux vivre. Si le commerce mondial a pu quadrupler en valeur depuis 1948 celà est dû, en grande partie, à la stabilité que la règie de droit a pu assurer aux échanges internationaux par la conclusion de nombreux traites bilatéraux et principalement grâce à l’Accord multilatéral du GATT de 1947.

In the communique issued in February 1972 after their meeting, President Nixon and Mr. Chou En-lai declared:

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position:

… the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all United States forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan.

The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas” and “independent Taiwan”, or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

On September 10, 1971, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space adopted and decided to submit to the General Assembly for consideration and final adoption a draft Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects. Approval of the Convention was recommended by the First Committee of the General Assembly on November 11, 1971; and on November 29, 1971 it was endorsed by the General Assembly. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects marks the culmination of a decade of debate and negotiation of the problem of liability for damage arising from outer space activities.

In earlier volumes of this Yearbook, international responses to the prospective dangers and opportunities posed by direct satellite broadcasting were examined. It was suggested that the international treatment of the implications of this activity might be seen in the light of:

International Drainage Basin disputes, like other disputes, may be settled in three ways: by agreement of the parties, reached after consultation and negotiation and perhaps aided by the mediation and conciliation of third parties; by submission to third party determination; and by the use of force, whether it takes the form of self-help by one of the parties to the dispute or of collective action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Those who study international water resources problems usually conclude that these disputes are best resolved in the first of the three ways outlined, namely by agreements between the interested co-basin states. They do so not simply because voluntarily accepted solutions are likely to be more satisfactory and enduring, but because each drainage basin has its own distinctive characteristics and its problems, being peculiar to it, can be solved only by the adoption of a special regime. They therefore recommend that co-basin states should try to reconcile their conflicts of interest in the development of a drainage basin by consultation and negotiation and by any other means, such as through the good offices of third parties, leading to agreement. Indeed, some go further and assert that international law imposes an obligation on co-basin states to do so.

Unlike the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam and Cambodia which were established pursuant to the 1954 Geneva Accord, the International Commission for Laos was the product of two Geneva Conferences held in 1954 and 1962. The two Geneva Agreements on Laos envisaged the fulfilment of different political objectives. Whereas the 1954 Agreement was designed to reestablish the independence and integrity of Laos and to insure the withdrawal of the Viet Minh forces therefrom, the distinctive features of the 1962 Agreement included the legitimization of a Government of National Unity embracing all three Laotian factions, that is, the Royalists, the Leftists and the Neutralists, as well as an international recognition of the independence and neutrality of Laos.

Incidents of unlawful interference with international civil aviation over the past few years have posed novel and difficult problems for international lawyers. For example, a person may unlawfully seize an aircraft and thereafter escape to a state that refuses either to extradite him or prosecute him. Or a group of guerillas may, after an aircraft has been unlawfully seized, detain the aircraft, passengers and crew and even destroy the aircraft in circumstances where the state in which the detention and destruction have occurred may decide to take no action. The inability of an aggrieved state, such as the state of registry of the aircraft or states of which the crew and passengers are nationals, to secure the extradition or prosecution of the alleged offenders could greatly nullify the effect of the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions which contain provisions aimed at ensuring disposal of an alleged offender who has committed a hijacking or other act of unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities. In view of these and related problems, there was an attempt in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), from mid-1970 to mid-1971, to develop an internationally agreed procedure for securing the enforcement of international obligations of states in respect of unlawful interference with international civil aviation. This attempt failed. As the failure to find a solution in no way lessened the importance of the problems, a concise presentation of the history of the negotiations which took place in ICAO fora in 1970-1971 may be useful for those who may consider taking up this subject in the future.