We study the transmission of bank distress to nonfinancial firms from 34 countries during the 2007–2009 financial crisis using systemic and bank-specific shocks. We find that bank distress is associated with equity valuation losses and investment cuts to borrower firms with the strongest lending relationships with banks. The losses are not offset by borrowers’ access to public debt markets and are concentrated in firms with the greatest information asymmetry problems and weakest financial positions. Our findings suggest that public debt markets do not mitigate the effects of relationship bank distress during financial crises.

Measuring the extent to which a firm is financially constrained is critical in assessing capital structure. Extant measures of financial constraints focus on macro firm characteristics such as age and size, variables highly correlated with other firm attributes. We parse 10-K disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using a unique lexicon based on constraining words. We find that the frequency of constraining words exhibits very low correlation with traditional measures of financial constraints and predicts subsequent liquidity events, such as dividend omissions or increases, equity recycling, and underfunded pensions, better than widely used financial constraint indexes.

We examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness. We find that the presence of independent directors with industry experience on a firm’s audit committee significantly curtails firms’ earnings management. In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm’s compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence of such directors on the full board increases the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and improves acquirer returns from diversifying acquisitions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that having relevant industry expertise enhances independent directors’ ability to perform their monitoring function.

We use nearly 500 shifts in statutory corporate and personal income tax rates as natural experiments to assess the effect of corporate and personal taxes on capital structure. We find both corporate and personal income taxes to be significant determinants of capital structure. Based on ex post observed summary statistics, across Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, taxes appear to be as important as other traditional variables in explaining capital structure choices. The results are stronger among corporate tax payers, dividend payers, and companies that are more likely to have an individual as the marginal investor.

We use short interest as an investor-based measure of over- or undervaluation that distinguishes between the misvaluation and Q-theories of mergers. Using this measure, we find that misvaluation is a strong determinant of merger decision-making. Firms in the top quintile of short interest are 54% more likely to engage in stock acquisitions and 22% less likely to engage in cash acquisitions. Stock (but not cash) acquirers have higher short interest than their targets. Overall, our results suggest that the previously documented underperformance of stock acquirers and the overperformance of cash acquirers can be explained by misvaluation, as captured by short interest.

This article proposes a structural model for sovereign credit risk with endogenous sovereign debt and default policies. A maximum-likelihood estimation of the model with local stock market prices generates daily model-implied sovereign spreads. This approach explains two-thirds of the daily variation in observed sovereign spreads for emerging and European economies over the 2000–2011 period. Global factors help to further explain the time variation in sovereign credit risk. In particular, sovereign spreads in emerging markets vary with U.S. market uncertainty, whereas European spreads depend on Euro-zone bond factors.

This article examines the international determinants of capital structure using a large sample of firms from 37 countries. The reliable determinants for leverage are firm size, tangibility, industry leverage, profits, and inflation. The quality of the countries’ institutions affects leverage and the adjustment speed toward target leverage in significant ways. High-quality institutions lead to faster leverage adjustments, whereas laws and traditions that safeguard debt holders relative to stockholders (e.g., more effective bankruptcy procedures and stronger creditor protection) lead to higher leverage.

We investigate whether the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) gave recipients competitive advantages. Using a difference-in-difference (DID) approach, we find that: i) TARP recipients received competitive advantages and increased both their market shares and market power; ii) results may be driven primarily by the safety channel (TARP banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the cost-disadvantage channel (TARP funds may be relatively expensive); and iii) these competitive advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP banks that repaid early. These results may help explain other findings in the literature, and yield important policy implications.

There is a generalized conviction that variation in dividend yields is exclusively related to expected returns and not to expected dividend growth, for example, Cochrane’s (2011) presidential address. We show that this pattern, although valid for the aggregate stock market, is not true for portfolios of small and value stocks, where dividend yields are related mainly to future dividend changes. Thus, the variance decomposition associated with the aggregate dividend yield has important heterogeneity in the cross section of equities. Our results are robust to different forecasting horizons, econometric methodology (long-horizon regressions or first-order vector autoregression), and alternative decomposition based on excess returns.

We examine the ability of three groups of informed market participants to anticipate the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Institutional investors and financial analysts exhibit some awareness of the impending crisis in their preference for nonfinancial stocks over financial stocks. In contrast, corporate insiders of financial firms appear to be completely unaware of the timing and extent of the financial crisis. Net purchases by managers of financial firms exceed those by managers of nonfinancial firms over the entire 2006–2008 period. Our results add considerable weight to the argument that the financial crisis was more a case of flawed judgment than flawed incentives.

We construct a mortality table for U.S. public companies during 1985–2006. We find that the age-specific mortality rates of firms initially increase, peaking at age three, and then decrease with age, implying that the first 3 years of public life are critical. Financial intermediaries involved around the “public birth” of a firm (e.g., venture capitalists (VCs) and high-quality underwriters) are associated with lower firm mortality rates, sometimes for up to 7 years after the initial public offering (IPO). VCs reduce mortality rates more through natal financial care than through selection, whereas high-quality underwriters affect firm mortality more through selection.

We examine the role of government in the labor–creditor relationship using the case of the Chrysler bankruptcy. As a result of the government intervention, firms in more unionized industries experienced lower event-window abnormal bond returns, higher abnormal bond yields, and lower cumulative abnormal bond returns. The results are stronger for firms closer to distress. We also observe the effect in firms in which labor bargaining power is stronger and those with larger pension liabilities. Overall, the results underline the importance of government as a significant force in shaping the agency conflict between creditors and workers.

In the United States, momentum portfolios formed from 12 to 7 months prior to the current month deliver higher future returns than momentum portfolios formed from 6 to 2 months prior, suggesting an “echo” in returns. In 37 countries excluding the United States, there is no robust evidence of such an echo. In portfolios that combine securities in developed and emerging markets, or across three major geographic regions (Americas excluding United States, Asia, and Europe), there is also no evidence of an echo. Any echo in the United States appears to be driven largely by a carryover of short-term reversals from month − 2.

We trace directors through time and across firms to study whether acquirers’ access to nonpublic information about potential targets via their directors’ past board service histories affects the market for corporate control. In a sample of publicly traded U.S. firms, we find acquirers about 4.5 times more likely to buy firms where their directors once served. Effects are stronger when the acquirer has better corporate governance, the interlocked director has a larger ownership stake at the acquirer, or the director played an important role during past service. The findings are robust to endogeneity of board composition and controls for contemporaneous interfirm interlocks.

This study examines whether state-level economic conditions affect the liquidity of local firms. We find that liquidity levels of local stocks are higher (lower) when the local economy has performed well (poorly). This relation is stronger when local financing constraints are more binding, the local information environment is more opaque, and local institutional ownership levels and trading intensity are higher. Overall the evidence supports the notion that the geographical segmentation of U.S. capital markets generates predictable patterns in local liquidity.

This paper documents pervasive evidence of intra-industry reversals in monthly returns. Unlike the conventional reversal strategy based on stock returns relative to the market portfolio, we document intra-industry return reversals that are larger in magnitude, consistently present over time, and prevalent across subgroups of stocks, including large and liquid stocks. These return reversals are driven by order imbalances and noninformational shocks. Consistent with reversals representing compensation for supplying liquidity, intra-industry reversals are stronger following aggregate market declines and volatile times, reflecting binding capital constraints and limited risk-bearing capacity of liquidity providers.

We examine two competing views regarding the impact of competition among credit rating agencies on rating quality: the view that rating agencies do not sacrifice their reputation by inflating firm ratings, and the view that competition among rating agencies arising from the conflict of interest inherent in an “issuer pay” model creates pressure to inflate ratings. Using Fitch’s market share as a measure of competition among rating agencies and controlling for the endogeneity problem caused by unobservable industry effects, we find no relation between Fitch’s market share and ratings, suggesting that competition does not lead to rating inflation.

This paper examines data from 45 world markets and shows that the previously documented relation between mean returns and idiosyncratic volatility arises because of biases in volatility estimates that we can attribute to the bid–ask bounce in trade prices. We show that no significant relation exists between mean returns and idiosyncratic volatility estimated from quote-midpoint returns. Further, there is no significant relation between mean returns and the portion of transaction-price-based idiosyncratic volatility that is orthogonal to bid–ask spreads. The pricing of idiosyncratic volatility is due to the negative pricing of the bid–ask spread.

We show that mutual funds employ portfolio strategies based on market sentiment. We build a proxy for the degree of a fund’s sentiment beta (or FSB). The low-FSB funds outperform high-FSB funds, even after controlling for standard risk factors and fund characteristics. This effect is sizable and delivers a net-of-risk performance of 3.8% per year. Funds with a lower FSB follow more idiosyncratic strategies, suggesting that FSB is a deliberate, active choice of the fund manager. A sentiment contrarian strategy leads to high flows due to its superior performance, whereas a sentiment catering strategy fails to attract significant investor flows.

We study the evolution and renegotiation of the cash-flow rights that venture capitalists (VCs) obtain in their portfolio companies. When company performance between financing rounds is poor, subsequent contracts contain stronger VC cash-flow rights, and existing VCs tend to either give new VCs senior claims or forfeit their existing rights altogether. These results are consistent with the importance of financing problems between different VCs and with theory predicting that financing frictions worsen with poor performance. A consequence is that VC cash-flow rights are frequently significantly diluted before exit, implying that VC investments are riskier than previously estimated.